Blume, A., Y-G. Kim and J. Sobel 1993. Evolutionary stability in games of communication. Games and Economic Behavior 5, 547-76. Home/Search Document Not in Database Summary Related Articles Check |
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Structure and Strategy in Collective Action: Communication and.. - Chwe (1996) (Correct)
....only about the total number, not the positions, of fellow participants; for simplicity we assume that the coordination problem has no locality. The opposite extreme common in adaptive or evolutionary models is to assume complete locality, each person caring about the actions of only local others (Blume 1993, Ellison 1993, Young 1996a, 1996b; see also Brock and Durlauf 1995) Most collective actions fall between the two extremes: I care about what computer system my colleagues use, but I also care about each system s total market share, which determines how much software is available; I care most ....
....(Aumann and Myerson 1985, Kirman, Oddou, and Weber 1986) all model social structure with a network or graph. Coalition formation generally (for example Hart and Kurz 1983) in some sense has to do with endogenous social structures. Recently, social structure has been considered in adaptive contexts (Blume 1993, Ellison 1993, Young 1996a, 1996b) In general equilibrium theory, local interactions were considered early on (for example Follmer 1974 and Allen 1982b) But social structure still is not a prominent concern of game theory or economic theory generally. Game theory has traditionally answered the ....
Blume, Andreas, Young-Gwan Kim, and Joel Sobel. 1993. "Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication." Games and Economic Behavior 5: 547--575.
The learning barrier: Moving from innate to learned systems of.. - Oliphant (1998) (7 citations) (Correct)
....appears to be specified innately (Hauser, 1996) That communicative behavior tends to be encoded genetically is, perhaps, largely explained by the fact that natural selection provides a very effective means of tuning innate systems of communication. Game theoretic approaches (Warneryd, 1993; Blume, Kim, and Sobel, 1993; Kim and Sobel, 1995; Skyrms, 1996) and an increasingly large literature of computational modeling work (Werner and Dyer, 1991; Oliphant, 1993; Oliphant, 1996; MacLennan and Burghardt, 1994; Ackley and Littman, 1994; Levin, 1995; Cangelosi and Parisi, 1996; Bullock, 1997; Werner and Todd, 1997; ....
Blume, A., Y. Kim, and J. Sobel (1993). Evolutionary stability in games of communication.
Efficiency of Evolutionary Stability in Games of Common Interest.. - Aoyagi (1997) (Correct)
....strategies forms an evolutionarily stable set. Combined with the above result, this set is hence the maximal evolutionarily stable set. 3 A few other papers study evolutionary stability in games with pre play communication using a large message space. With a large but finite message space, Blume et al. 1993) establish the efficiency of evolutionarily stable sets in games of common interest when only one player talks and the other player responds by taking a payoff relevant action. Although our propositions (and many of our arguments) resemble those in Blume et al. 1993) their conclusions depend ....
....but finite message space, Blume et al. 1993) establish the efficiency of evolutionarily stable sets in games of common interest when only one player talks and the other player responds by taking a payoff relevant action. Although our propositions (and many of our arguments) resemble those in Blume et al. 1993), their conclusions depend critically on the assumption that communication and payoff relevant actions are both one sided. The logic behind their efficiency results does not extend to our two sided framework. In fact, Schlag (1993) has shown that in 3 Theta 3 pure coordination games (with ....
Blume, A., Y.-G. Kim and J. Sobel (1993), "Evolutionary stability in games of communication, " Games and Economic Behavior, 5, 547-575.
Formal Approaches to Innate and Learned Communication: Laying.. - Oliphant (1997) (8 citations) (Correct)
....to say that both sender and receiver have a fitness related stake in the outcome of a communicative exchange. Through the use of evolutionary game theory, it has been shown analytically that optimal communication is the only outcome that is evolutionarily stable in this situation (Warneryd, 1993; Blume, Kim, and Sobel, 1993; Kim and Sobel, 1995; Skyrms, 1996) Furthermore, it can 35 Success Failure Transmitter 1.0 0.0 Receiver 1.0 0.0 Figure IV.3: Payoff matrix for common interest communication. Both the sender and the receiver get a high (1.0) payoff when communication between them is successful, and a low (0.0) ....
Blume, A., Y. Kim, and J. Sobel (1993). Evolutionary stability in games of communication. Games and Economic Behavior 5, 547--575.
Cheap Talk and Burned Money - Austen-Smith, Banks (Correct)
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Blume, A., Y-G. Kim and J. Sobel 1993. Evolutionary stability in games of communication. Games and Economic Behavior 5, 547-76.
Learning and the Emergence of Coordinated Communication - Oliphant, Batali (1997) (10 citations) (Correct)
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Andreas Blume, Yong-Gwan Kim, and Joel Sobel. Evolutionary stability in games of communication. Games and Economic Behavior, 5:547--575, 1993.
Specific Institutional Aspects of International Cooperation - A.. - Güth (1997) (Correct)
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Blume, A., Y.-G. Kim, and J. Sobel (1993): Evolutionary stability in games of communication, Games and Economic Behavior, 5 (4), 547 - 575.
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