Axelrod, R., More Effective Choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma, Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 379-403, 1980.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....to solve the resource allocation problem using the right hand rule. 5 Simulating the Traffic Intersection Example For our simulation of the traffic intersection problem, we developed a simulation tool [12] in which 15 different strategies competed. Most of the strategies are described in ( 1] [2]) see also Fig 4. All strategies handle the moves of the other agent and not the payoff value, since the latter does not affect the strategy. In a round robin tournament, each strategy was paired with each different strategy plus its own twin, as well as with the Random strategy. Each game in the ....

R. Axelrod. More effective choice in the prisoner's dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 24(3):3--25, 1980.

....describes two contests that he announced in the beginning of the 80 s on what strategy would win an IPD, when the strategies were to meet each other in a round robin tournament. The only thing the contestants knew for sure was that the random strategy was added to the population of strategies [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8]. The results of the tournament showed that tit for tat, the simplest strategy of them all submitted by Anatol Rapoport, won both tournaments, and a debate started whether tit fortat was the optimal choice of strategy for prisoners dilemma or not. A description of tit for tat is given in table ....

....ends and defect that iteration. own twin and with the random strategy. Different people sent in their favorite strategy to the tournament. There were a lot of strategies trying to beat each other by being more or less nice, resistant to provocation, or even evil; classification due to Axelrod [3, 4]. In our experiment we use the same total payoff sum for the matrices as Axelrod used. However, we vary the two lowest payoffs (0 and 1) so that they change order between PD and the CG matrix in table 2.4b. Table 2.5 describes the result of the simulation. In our experiment we used a simulation ....

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R. Axelrod. More effective choice in the prisoner's dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 24(3):3--25, 1980.

....individual utilities and are not pre disposed to help each other. If an agent cooperates this is not because of an undirected altruism but because of a reciprocal altruism [20] favoring a selfish agent. The TfT strategy has become an informal guiding principle for reciprocal altruism [1] [2]. Binmore [5] gives a critical review of the TfT strategy and of Axelrod s simulation. He concludes that TfT is only one of a very large number of equilibrium strategies and that TfT is not evolutionarily stable. On the other hand evolutionary pressures will tend to select equilibrium for the IPD ....

R. Axelrod. More effective choice in the prisoner's dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 24(3):3--25, 1980.

....The players remember previous plays and can adjust their play accordingly. Here, defection is not always the best choice; a player may retaliate in response to defection, and mutual cooperation benefits both players. What sort of strategy might be successful in the Iterated Prisoner s Dilemma Axelrod [1980a, 1980b] hosted two tournaments of fifteen and of 62 IPD strategies submitted by academics and researchers. The simple strategy called tit for tat (TFT) won both tournaments. TFT begins by cooperating, then always repeats its opponent s previous play. It responds to cooperation with cooperation ....

Axelrod, R. (1980b). More effective choice in the prisoner's dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 24(3), 379-403.

....behavior according to the prisoner s dilemma if each store retailer engages in price promotions every week for at least one of its UPCs of a particular product category. However, the pay off of price promotions should be higher if retailers or manufacturers coordinate their pricing strategies. Axelrod (1980a, 1980b, 1981) has investigated strategies for this type of game. He shows that a tit for tat strategy results in the highest profits. A firm that engages in a tit for tat strategy always follows the moves of its opponent, which means that the firm promotes if a competitor promotes and the ....

Axelrod, R. (1980b). More Effective Choice in the Prisoners's Dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 24, 379-403.

....The other two parameters determine, how many different players (up to ten) participate and how long (number of repetitions) a single iterative match between two players is conducted. Each type of player follows a predefined strategy. The implemented strategies are all taken from Axelrod[1, 2]. 4.2.2 Measuring and comparing the performance Both applications have been used to measure and compare the performance of both implementations of comm cntrl. This subsection reports and discusses the results. We measured the performance using the time command on our Unix systems. The absolute ....

Robert Axelrod. More effective choice in the prisoner's dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution, pages 379--403, 1980.

....to solve the resource allocation problem using the right hand rule. 5 Simulating the Traffic Intersection Example For our simulation of the traffic intersection problem, we developed a simulation tool [13] in which 15 different strategies competed. Most of the strategies are described in ( 1] [2]) see also 4. All strategies handle the moves of the other agent and not the payoff value, since the latter does not affect the strategy. In a round robin tournament, each strategy was paired with each different strategy plus its own twin, as well as with the Random strategy. Each game in the ....

R. Axelrod. More effective choice in the prisoner's dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 24(3):3--25, 1980.

....used to approach the dilemma of altruistic communication, are presented in the next two sections. IV.G. 3 Reciprocal altruism Dissatisfied with mathematical inevitability of defection in the standard formulation of the prisoner s dilemma, researchers turned to a more complex version of the game (Axelrod, 1980a; Axelrod, 1980b; Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981) 42 This variant, called the iterated prisoner s dilemma, involves individuals playing each other more than once. In order to benefit from experience gained in previous games against the same opponent, individuals are given a multiple game history ....

....the dilemma of altruistic communication, are presented in the next two sections. IV.G. 3 Reciprocal altruism Dissatisfied with mathematical inevitability of defection in the standard formulation of the prisoner s dilemma, researchers turned to a more complex version of the game (Axelrod, 1980a; Axelrod, 1980b; Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981) 42 This variant, called the iterated prisoner s dilemma, involves individuals playing each other more than once. In order to benefit from experience gained in previous games against the same opponent, individuals are given a multiple game history that documents ....

Axelrod, R. (1980b). More effective choice in the prisoner's dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution 24, 379--403.

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Axelrod, R., More Effective Choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma, Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 379-403, 1980.

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R. Axelrod, "More effective choice in the prisoner's dilemma," J. Conflict Resolution, Vol. 24, pp. 379-403, 1980b.

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