Ackley, D. H., & Littman, M. L. (1994). Altruism in the evolution of communication. In Brooks, R. A., & Maes, P. (Eds.), Artificial Life IV, pp. 40--48. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....To a receiver agent understanding speech act protocols, the message contained within the communication act may be non standard, but there is no ambiguity as to the type of message sent. Previous work has shown that beneficial communication can emerge in a multi agent system. Ackley and Littman [1] show that agents can evolve to communicate altruistically in a track world even when doing so provides no immediate benefit to the individual. MacLennan and Burghardt [14] use genetic algorithms to evolve finite state machines that cooperate by communicating in a simple abstract world. Walker and ....

David H. Ackley and Michael L. Littman. Altruism in the evolution of communication. In Rodney A. Brooks and Pattie Maes, editors, Artificial Life IV: Proceedings of the International Workshop on the Synthesis and Simulation of Living Systems. MIT Press, November 1994.

....of signals that the males evolved to follow. My simulation differs from theirs in that all of my individuals were of the same type (no gender distinction) and they were assigned fitness values based on acquiring resources which required cooperation to use. My simulation is most similar to Ackley and Littman s (1994) simulation which showed the evolution of altruistic behavior using signaling. Interestingly, the individuals in Ackley and Littman s world evolved to send signals to their nearby fellows even if they themselves might not benefit from such actions. This was due to the specialized spatial selection ....

Ackley, David and Michael Littman. 1994. Altruism in the evolution of communication. In Artificial Life IV: Proceedings of the fourth international workshop on the synthesis and simulation of living systems, eds. R. Brooks and P. Maes. MA: MIT Press. pp. 40--48.

....of a signalling system was in the interests of both parties as it allowed mating to take place at better than chance frequencies. In MacLennan and Burghardt s (1994) model, signallers and receivers were rewarded if and only if they engaged in successful communicative interactions. Other models (Ackley Littman, 1994; Oliphant, 1996) have looked at the special case where communication would benefit receivers, but the potential signallers are indifferent. Oliphant argues that this is a good way to model the evolution of alarm calls, for example: if one bird in a flock spots an approaching hawk, it is clear ....

....a rich but limited food source. By calling and thus sharing the food, the signaller incurs a fitness cost; by responding to the call, the receiver benefits through obtaining food it would otherwise have missed. Thus, the call would be located in the altruism quadrant. The situations modelled by Ackley and Littman (1994) and Oliphant (1996) where receivers benefit but signallers are ambivalent, can be thought of as points on the positive vertical axis, i.e. where PS = 0 and PR 0. Conflicts of interest can be defined as interactions in which natural selection favours different outcomes for each participant ....

Ackley, D. H., & Littman, M. L. (1994). Altruism in the evolution of communication. In Brooks, R. A., & Maes, P. (Eds.), Artificial Life IV, pp. 40--48. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

....a signalling system was in the interests of both parties as it allowed mating to take place at better than chance frequencies. In MacLennan and Burghardt s (1994) model, signallers and receivers were rewarded if and only if they engaged in successful communicative interactions. Other SAB AL models (Ackley Littman, 1994; Oliphant, 1996) have looked at the special case where communication would benefit receivers, but the potential signallers are indifferent. Oliphant argues that this is a good way to model the evolution of alarm calls: it captures the idea that the potential signaller already knows about the ....

....a rich but limited food source. By calling and thus sharing the food, the signaller incurs a fitness cost; by responding to the call, the receiver benefits through obtaining food it would otherwise have missed. Thus, the call would be located in the altruism quadrant. The situations modelled by Ackley and Littman (1994) and Oliphant (1996) where receivers benefit but signallers are ambivalent, can be thought of as points on the positive vertical axis, i.e. where PS = 0 and PR 0. Conflicts of interest can be defined as interactions in which natural selection favours different outcomes for each participant ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

Ackley, D. H., & Littman, M. L. (1994). Altruism in the evolution of communication. In Brooks, R. A., & Maes, P. (Eds.), Artificial Life IV, pp. 40--48. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

....by the use of computational simulation techniques. A large body of computational modelling work has demonstrated that nonrandom genetic transmission (i.e. natural selection) of innate communication systems is capable of producing optimal, innate communication systems (e.g. Werner and Dyer (1991) Ackley and Littman (1994), MacLennan and Burghardt (1994) Levin (1995) Cangelosi and Parisi (1996) Oliphant (1996) Bullock (1997) de Bourcier and Wheeler (1997) Di Paolo (1997) Werner and Todd (1997) Noble (1998) A growing body of computational modelling work suggests that iterated learning alone is capable of ....

Ackley, D. and M. Littman (1994). Altruism in the evolution of communication. In R. Brooks and P. Maes (Eds.), Artificial Life 4: Proceedings of the Fourth International Workshop on the Synthesis and Simulation of Living Systems, pp. 40--48. Redwood City, CA: Addison-Wesley.

....systems, which depend in part on the computational simulation of cultural and genetic processes fall into three main groups: 1. Those which suggest that genetic transmission between generations alone is capable of developing and refining innate communication systems (e.g. Werner and Dyer, 1991; Ackley and Littman, 1994; MacLennan and Burghardt, 1994; Levin, 1995; Cangelosi and Parisi, 1996; Oliphant, 1996; Bullock, 1997; de Bourcier and Wheeler, 1997; Di Paolo, 1997; Werner and Todd, 1997; Noble, 1998) 2. Those which suggest that cultural transmission between generations alone is capable of developing and ....

Ackley, D. and M. Littman (1994). Altruism in the evolution of communication. In R. Brooks and P. Maes (Eds.), Artificial Life 4: Proceedings of the Fourth International Workshop on the Synthesis and Simulation of Living Systems, pp. 40--48. Redwood City, CA: Addison-Wesley.

....the behavior of another organism (which can include non veridical deceit see Dawkins Krebs, 1978) the signal used in any particular case should be the single one found to be most effective. And if communication is considered a means of altruistically benefiting one s genetic relatives (Ackley Littman, 1994), we would expect convergence onto stable (but possibly family specific) ways to help one another. What then can drive the evolution of a large variety of elaborate communication signals In this paper, we explore a particularly powerful force that can engender such diversity: sexual selection ....

....the number of signals used would always be tied down by the number of world states in his environment. When learning was added, individual signals often took on more than one meaning, indicating greater communication variety within the population, but even this diversity was static over time. Ackley and Littman (1994) explored altruism as a possible function of communication. In their simulation, local populations of organisms could evolve to signal one another about the common features of their local environment, again under the assumption that not every organism could see every feature. In contrast to ....

Ackley, D.H., and Littman, M.L. (1994). Altruism in the evolution of communication. In R.A. Brooks and P.

....it is straightforward to collect total score (or fitness) for each individual. 17.3. 3 Sub Populations with Migration The idea of this implementation is to study a model of sub populations that interact locally one with each other, similar to the model presented by Ackley and Littman in [1] and [2]. In our experiments, each processor manages a sub population of 16 individuals. A table in which is stored the result of the competition between all possible pairs of individuals in the sub population is maintained by each processor. At each generation, 2 successive operations are performed by ....

David H. Ackley and Michael L. Littman. Altruism in the Evolution of Communication. In Artificial Life IV, Brooks and Maes, Eds. MIT Press, 1994, pp. 40-48.

....innate systems of communication. Game theoretic approaches (Warneryd, 1993; Blume, Kim, and Sobel, 1993; Kim and Sobel, 1995; Skyrms, 1996) and an increasingly large literature of computational modeling work (Werner and Dyer, 1991; Oliphant, 1993; Oliphant, 1996; MacLennan and Burghardt, 1994; Ackley and Littman, 1994; Levin, 1995; Cangelosi and Parisi, 1996; Bullock, 1997; Werner and Todd, 1997; de Bourcier and Wheeler, 1997; Di Paolo, 1997; Noble, 1998) have given us a good understanding of how such innate mappings can be tuned by selection. If the system is to be learned, rather than being directly ....

Ackley, D. and M. Littman (1994). Altruism in the evolution of communication. In R. Brooks and P. Maes (Eds.), Proceedings of the fourth artificial life workshop, Cambridge, MA, pp. 40--48. MIT Press.

....of a signalling system was in the interests of both parties as it allowed mating to take place at better than chance frequencies. In MacLennan Burghardt s (1994) model, signallers and receivers were rewarded if and only if they engaged in successful communicative interactions. Other AL models (Ackley Littman 1994; Oliphant 1996) have looked at the special case where communication would benefit receivers, but the potential signallers are indifferent. Oliphant argues that this is a good way to model the evolution of alarm calls, for example: if one bird in a flock spots an approaching hawk, it is clear that ....

....Spite Selfishness, Altruism Effect on Cooperation, mutualism competition receiver on signaller Effect Figure 1: Possible communication scenarios classified by their effects on the fitness of each participant. call would be located in the altruism quadrant. The situations modelled by Ackley Littman (1994) and Oliphant (1996) where receivers benefit but signallers are ambivalent, can be thought of as points on the positive vertical axis, i.e. where P S = 0 and PR 0. Conflicts of interest can be defined as interactions in which natural selection favours different outcomes for each participant ....

Ackley, D. H., and Littman, M. L. 1994. Altruism in the evolution of communication. In Brooks, R. A., and Maes, P., eds., Artificial Life IV, 40--48. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

....investigate the development of communication. An example of work where agents are not appointed different roles is [MacLennan, 1991] An investigation of the issue of altruism, i.e. how can language evolve if only receiving, and not producing truthful signals has a clear benefit, is presented in [Ackley and Littman, 1994]. The structure of the paper is as follows. In the following section, the environment of the agents is described. Section 2 describes the categorization method. The mechanisms used by the agents to adapt their lexicon are described in section 3. In section 4, we describe methods which allow one to ....

Ackley, D. H. and Littman, M. L. (1994). Altruism in the evolution of communication. In Brooks, R. A. and Maes, P., editors, Proceedings of the Fourth International Workshop on the Synthesis and Simulation of Living Systems. MIT Press/Bradford Book.

....into focus. It is found in these cases that cooperation is stabilized even under circumstances where simpler models predict the contrary. This has been demonstrated both by mathematical considerations and computer models in the case of the Prisoner s Dilemma (Axelrod, 1984) and communication games (Ackley and Littman, 1994; Di Paolo, 1998) Depending on the particulars of the model there may be more than one possible explanation of this phenomenon. Axelrod argues that spatial clustering favours reciprocity if the playing strategy is cooperative (Axelrod, 1984, p. 65 69) Ackley and Litmann suggest, but fail to ....

Ackley, D. H. and Littman, M. L. (1994). Altruism in the evolution of communication. In Brooks, R. A. and Maes, P., editors, Artificial Life IV. MIT Press.

....1. Werner and Dyer (1993) propose a very interesting model BioLand which supports the evolution of communication as well, but the results focus on herding behavior rather than the evolved communication scheme, and it is unclear how the signals generated by the agents affect their behavior. Ackley and Littman(1994) is the closest in spirit to our work, though significantly more complex in its construction, and focusing mainly on issues of distributed evolutionary computation. The agents in their model operated on tracks and used discrete bit communication in 6 channels. As stated earlier, all of this work ....

Ackley, D. H and M. L. Littman (1994) Altruism in the evolution of communication. Proceedings of ALIFE IV. Cambridge: MIT Press 40-49.

....sec. Average execution 1.75 sec. 5.75 sec. time for 1 generation 3. 3 Population Evolution with Local Interactions The idea of this implementation is to study a model of sub populations that interact locally one with each other, similar to the model presented by Ackley and Littman in [ 1 ] and [ 2 ] . This model has also been tested with the Tic Tac Toe problem. In our experiments, each processor manages a subpopulation of 16 individuals. A table in which is stored the result of the competition between all possible pairs of individuals in the sub population is maintained by each processor. ....

David H. Ackley and Michael L. Littman. Altruism in the Evolution of Communication. In Artificial Life IV, Brooks and Maes, Eds. MIT Press, 1994, pp. 4048.

....and Dyer (1991) studied the evolution of mating signals that allowed immobile females to direct mobile but blind males to their location. MacLennan and Burghardt (1994) evolved populations of finite state machines in a task where communication provided a mechanism for cooperative behavior. Ackley and Littman (1994) looked at the evolution of signals that allowed simulated organisms to help each other avoid predators. Levin (1995) used genetic algorithm techniques to study the evolution of correspondences between agent s internal states and externally observable behaviors. A number of researchers have used a ....

....as shown in Figure IV.16b, the results are essentially the same as in the non spatial case. Related work Similar results have been shown by Di Paolo (1996) who attributes the degree of communicative success in his model of foraging behavior to the formation of spatial clusters of individuals. Ackley and Littman (1994) present a model where predator avoidance is facilitated by communication among individuals. They suggest that the communicative success that they observe may be due to spatial 59 effects. IV.H Discussion The simulation work presented in this chapter has shown an number of situations in which ....

Ackley, D. and M. Littman (1994). Altruism in the evolution of communication.

No context found.

Ackley, D. H., & Littman, M. L. (1994). Altruism in the evolution of communication. In Brooks, R. A., & Maes, P. (Eds.), Artificial Life IV, pp. 40--48. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

No context found.

Ackley, D.H. & Littman, M.L. (1994) Altruism in the Evolution of Communication. In R Brooks & P Maes (eds.) Artificial Life IV, MIT Press, Mass., pp 40-48.

No context found.

Ackley, D. H., & Littman, M. L. (1994). Altruism in the evolution of communication. In R. A. Brooks & P. Maes (Eds.), Arti#cial life IV (pp. 40--48). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

No context found.

David H. Ackley and Michael L. Littman. Altruism in the evolution of communication. In R. Brooks and P. Maes, editors, Proceedings of the Fourth Artificial Life Workshop, Cambridge, MA, 1994. MIT Press.

No context found.

Ackley, D. H. and Littman, M. L. (1994). Altruism in the evolution of communication. In (Brooks and Maes, 1994), pages 40--48.

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