Amy Greenwald and Justin Boyan. Bidding algorithms for simultaneous auctions: A case study. In Third ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pages 115--124, Tampa, FL, 2001. Home/Search Document Details and Download
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A Constraint Programming Agent for Automated Trading - Aurell, Boman, Carlsson.. (Correct)
....in competitive Internet auctions. An overview of the first event (TAC 00) and the general philosophy and motivation has been published in [32] There has also been published a description of the agents that reached the finals [12] as well as detailed presentations of the best performing agents [29, 11], and some of the others [10] A presentation of the second event, which was considerably more challenging, can be found on the TAC home page [31] with presentations by many of the agents that reached the semi finals. Several more detailed descriptions are presently being prepared, and at least ....
....and delivered as such to the clients. In fact, the problem facing the agent in this respect is completely equivalent to that of an auctioneer determining winning bids in a combinatorial auction. A successful TAC agent must therefore make use of similar integer programming techniques, as in [29, 11], or, alternatively, as here, of techniques of constraint programming. Relative to other agents, the TAC agents instead have a strategy problem. To determine which strategy to use in a competitive situation is not easy [23] If a game is played out many times among many players using ....
Amy Greenwald and Justin Boyan. Bidding algorithms for simultaneous auctions: A case study. In Proc. of the Third ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pages 115--124, 2001.
The 2001 Trading Agent Competition - Wellman, Greenwald, Stone, Wurman (2002) (17 citations) Self-citation (Greenwald) (Correct)
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Amy Greenwald and Justin Boyan. Bidding algorithms for simultaneous auctions: A case study. In Third ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pages 115--124, Tampa, FL, 2001.
Bidding Marginal Utility in Simultaneous Auctions - Amy Greenwald Department (2003) Self-citation (Greenwald) (Correct)
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Amy Greenwald and Justin Boyan. Bidding algorithms for simultaneous auctions: A case study. In Proceedings of Third ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 115-124 2001.
The 2001 Trading Agent Competition - Wellman, Greenwald, Stone, Wurman (2002) (17 citations) Self-citation (Greenwald) (Correct)
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Amy Greenwald and Justin Boyan. Bidding algorithms for simultaneous auctions: A case study. In Third ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pages 115--124, Tampa, FL, 2001.
The 2002 Trading Agent Competition: An Overview of Agent.. - Greenwald (2002) (5 citations) Self-citation (Greenwald) (Correct)
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Amy Greenwald and Justin Boyan. Bidding algorithms for simultaneous auctions: A case study. In Proceedings of Third ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 115-124 2001.
Bidding under Uncertainty: Theory and Experiments - Greenwald, Boyan (2004) Self-citation (Greenwald Boyan) (Correct)
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A. Greenwald and J. Boyan. Bidding algorithms for simultaneous auctions: A case study. In Proceedings of Third ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 115-124 2001.
Bidding under Uncertainty: Theory and Experiments - Amy Greenwald Department (2004) Self-citation (Greenwald Boyan) (Correct)
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A. Greenwald and J. Boyan. Bidding algorithms for simultaneous auctions: A case study. In Proceedings of Third ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 115-124 2001.
The First International Trading Agent Competition.. - Stone, Greenwald (2000) (3 citations) Self-citation (Greenwald) (Correct)
....involves a novel data structure called a priceline, which is designed to handle (estimated) closing prices, estimated) supply and demand, sunk costs, hedging, and arbitrage in a uni ed way. RoxyBot s high level strategy is outlined in Table 7; full details are available in Boyan and Greenwald [6]. A) REPEAT 1. Update current prices and holdings 2. Estimate clearing prices and build pricelines 3. Run completer to nd optimal buy sell quantities 4. Set bid ask prices strategically UNTIL game over (B) Run optimal allocator RoxyBot s high level strategy. We rst describe the ....
....from 1 to 1280 on all our instances except the one whose optimal solution was unknown (because the ILP was unable to solve it) We found that a Summaries of these approaches appear in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, respectively. Full details can be found in Stone et al. 12] and Greenwald and Boyan [6]. 0.01 0.1 1 10 100 1000 10000 8 16 32 64 Number of clients CPlex search time vs. number of clients Figure 4. ILP running time at di erent problem sizes. Note the log scale of the y axis. beam width of only 1 (i.e. best rst search) yielded a median accuracy of 99.4 in the 8 ....
A. Greenwald and J. Boyan. Bidding algorithms for simultaneous auctions: A case study. In Proceedings of Third ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 115-124 2001.
Designing a Successful Trading Agent: A Fuzzy Set Approach - He, Jennings (2004) (Correct)
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A. Greenwald and J. Boyan, "Bidding algorithms for simultaneous auctions: A case study," in Proc. 3rd ACM Conf. Electronic Commerce, 2001, pp. 115--124.
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