Hintikka, J., Some Main Problems of Deontic Logic. In: R. Hilpinen (ed.), Deontic Logic: Introductory and Systematic Readings, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1970.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....it seems most natural in our applications and causes fewer problems. The only counterintuitive aspect of this definition is that the starting condition of the obligation lays outside the scope of the O operator while the end condition of the obligation lays within the scope of the O operator. See [13] for a more thorough discussion on this topic. In most cases the deadline is enforced only once (or explicitly reenforced every time it is needed) To ensure that the deadline only becomes active the first time OE becomes true we extend the definition with an until clause that states that the ....

Hintikka,J. Some main problems of deontic logic. Hilpinen,R. (ed.), Deontic Logic: Introductory and Systematic Readings. Dordrecht:Reidel (1971),59-103.

....to be a prima facie obligation; a reason to act remains a reason to act, even if in the circumstances other reasons prevail. prakken.tex Date: December 17, 1996 Time: 17:18 238 HENRY PRAKKEN AND MAREK SERGOT It should be noted that earlier discussions of prima facie obligations, of e.g. (Hintikka, 1971; Loewer and Belzer, 1983; Jones and P orn, 1985) do not use non monotonic techniques. However, this is perhaps because at the time non monotonic logics were not yet (widely) available. Since this has changed, the view that reasoning with prima facie obligations is non monotonic has become ....

Hintikka, J. (1971). Some main problems of deontic logic. In R. Hilpinen (ed.), Deontic Logic: Introductory and Systematic Readings. Reidel, Dordrecht, pages 59--104.

....it seems most natural in our applications and causes less problems. The only counterintuitive aspect of this definition is that the starting condition of the obligation lays outside the scope of the O operator while the end condition of the obligation lays within the scope of the O operator. See [12] for a more thorough discussion on this topic. In most cases the deadline is enforced only once (or explicitly reenforced every time it is needed) To ensure that the deadline only becomes active the first time OE becomes true we extend the definition with an until clause that states that the ....

J. Hintikka. Some Main Problems of Deontic Logic. In R. Hilpinen (ed.), Deontic Logic: Introductory and Systematic Readings, pages 59-103, Reidel, 1971.

....model which will enable us to distinguish between personal obligations , general obligations , impersonal obligations and directed obligations 2 . Deontic logic is usually seen as the logic of a set of norms belonging to a single person who is either implicitly referred to (as stated by Hintikka (1971:60) or mentioned explicitly (as in Kanger (1966:88) In using the traditional framework of single person obligations to explicate Hohfeld s (1913) theory of rights, Kanger (1957:42) loses some information about the counter party; i.e. he loses the relational aspect of rights. Kanger ....

Hintikka, Jakko (1971), "Some Main problems of Deontic Logic", in Hilpinen, Risto (ed.), Deontic Logic; Introductory and Systematic Readings, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht Holland, pp. 59-104.

....it seems most natural in our applications and causes less problems. The only counterintuitive aspect of this definition is that the starting condition of the obligation lays outside the scope of the O operator while the end condition of the obligation lays within the scope of the O operator. See [15] for a more thorough discussion on this topic. In most cases the deadline is enforced only once (or explicitly reenforced every time it is needed) To ensure that the deadline only becomes active the first time OE becomes true we extend the definition with an until clause that states that the ....

J. Hintikka. Some Main Problems of Deontic Logic. In R. Hilpinen (ed.), Deontic Logic: Introductory and Systematic Readings, pages 59-103, Reidel, 1971.

.... considered obligation. Defeat of such an argument does not mean that the conclusion ceases to be a prima facie obligation; a reason to act remains a reason to act, even if in the circumstances other reasons prevail. It should be noted that earlier discussions of prima facie obligations, of e.g. (Hintikka, 1971; Loewer and Belzer, 1983; Jones and Porn, 1985) do not use non monotonic techniques. However, this is perhaps because at the time non monotonic logics were not yet (widely) available. Since this has changed, the view that reasoning with prima facie obligations is non monotonic has become ....

J. Hintikka. Some main problems of deontic logic. In R. Hilpinen (ed.): Deontic Logic: Introductory and Systematic Readings. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1971, 59--104.

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Hintikka, J., Some Main Problems of Deontic Logic. In: R. Hilpinen (ed.), Deontic Logic: Introductory and Systematic Readings, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1970.

No context found.

J. Hintikka. Some Main Problems of Deontic Logic. In R. Hilpinen (ed.), Deontic Logic: Introductory and Systematic Readings, pages 59-103, Reidel, 1971.

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