Wolfram Conen and Tuomas Sandholm. Differential-revelation VCG mechanisms for combinatorial auctions. In AAMAS-02 workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce (AMEC), Bologna, Italy, 2002a. Springer Lecture Notes in Computer Science LNCS 2531.  Home/Search   Document Details and Download   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....e.g. do you prefer bundle S or S27 , and value queries, e.g. what is your value for bundle S , queries. In this collection, Hudson 85 Sandholm [17] present experimental results that compare the effectiveness of different preference elicitation properties. In addition, Conen 85 Sandholm [10], propose a differential elicitation method to implement VCG mechanisms. Differential elicitation is a price based approach, although prices need not be ascending. Agents are asked to provide MBR information across a pair of bundles, as the price difference across the bundles is adjusted. While ....

....i between every other choice and that choice. In other words, the solution to (WC) must simulta neously maximize the difference in value between choice k and all other choices, for all k. Consider the following examples from combinatorial auctions. Example 1. Information set, inf d ( v ( A ) [5,10],v(B) v ( A ) 6, v ( AB ) v(A) v(B) is not outcome independent. Valuation v(A) 5,vi(B) 11, vi(AB) 16 satisfies vi WC(infd,A) but Amax(AB,A, infa) 16, with valuation vi ( A) 10, vi ( B) 16, vi ( AB) 26, which satisfies vi inf a. Example 2. Information set, info = ....

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W. Conen and T. Sandholm. Differential-revelation VCG mechanisms for combina- torial auctions. In Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce IV: Designing Mechanisms and Systems, volume 2531 of Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence. 2002. This volume.

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Wolfram Conen and Tuomas Sandholm. Differential-revelation VCG mechanisms for combinatorial auctions. In AAMAS-02 workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce (AMEC), Bologna, Italy, 2002a. Springer Lecture Notes in Computer Science LNCS 2531.

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Wolfram Conen and Tuomas Sandholm. Differential-revelation VCG mechanisms for combinatorial auctions. In AAMAS-02 workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce, 2002.

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Wolfram Conen and Tuomas Sandholm. Differential-revelation VCG mechanisms for combinatorial auctions. In AAMAS-02 workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce (AMEC), Bologna, Italy, 2002.

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Conen, W., Sandholm, T.: Differential-revelation VCG mechanisms for combinatorial auctions. In: AAMAS-02 workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce (AMEC), Bologna, Italy (2002)

....reduced economic efficiency by failing to bid on bundles they would have won. Recently, an approach has been proposed where the auctioneer is enhanced by elicitor software that incrementally elicits the bidders preferences by querying them (based on the preference information elicited so far) [6, 8, 7]. In the worst case, an exponential amount of communication is re quired to allocate the items even approximately optimally, if the bidders can have general preferences [10] This holds even when bidders can dispose of extra items for free, that is, their valuation functions are monotone. ....

....parties, one agent s preferences can be used to decide what information needs to be elicited from another party in order to determine an optimal (or approximately optimal) allocation of items. This has been the driving motivation in the work on preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions [6, 8, 7, 9], but our work in this paper did not yet capitalize on this extra power. In the future, it would be interesting to harness this power, together with the possibilities that preference restrictions open, to design effective goal driven preference elicitation algorithms. Acknowledgements We would ....

W. Conen and T. Sandholm. Differential-revelation VCG mechanisms for combinatorial auctions. In Commerce (AMEC), Bologna, Italy, 2002.

....economic efficiency by failing to bid on bundles they would have won. Recently, an approach was proposed where the auctioneer is enhanced by a software agent, an elicitor, that incrementally elicits the bidders preferences by querying them (based on the preference information elicited so far) [6, 8, 7]. In the worst case, an exponential amount of communication is required to even approximately optimally allocate the items to the bidders if the bidders can have general preferences [10] This holds even when bidders can dispose of extra items for free, that is, their valuation functions are ....

....parties, one agent s preferences can be used to decide what information needs to be elicited from another party in order to determine an optimal (or approximately optimal) allocation of items. This has been the driving motivation in the work on preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions [6, 8, 7, 9], but our work in this paper did not yet capitalize on this extra power. In the 9 future, it would be interesting to harness this power, together with the possibilities that preference restrictions open, to design effective goal driven preference elicitation algorithms. Acknowledgements This ....

Wolfram Conen and Tuomas Sandholm. Differential-revelation VCG mechanisms for combinatorial auctions. In AAMAS-02 workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce (AMEC), Bologna, Italy, 2002.

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Wolfram Conen and Tuomas Sandholm. Differential-revelation VCG mechanisms for combinatorial auctions. In AAMAS-02 workshop on AgentMediated Electronic Commerce (AMEC), Bologna, Italy, 2002.

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