9 citations found. Retrieving documents...
The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC). Number FIPS 198. National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST), 2002. http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/index.html.

 Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check  

This paper is cited in the following contexts:
Provably Secure Competitive Routing against Proactive.. - Awerbuch, Holmer, Rubens (2003)   (Correct)

....list is onion encrypted [57] Each route is specified by an address indicating the next hop, an HMAC of the packet (not including the list) and the encrypted remaining list. Both the HMAC and the encrypted remaining list are computed with the shared key between the source and that node. An HMAC [4] using a one way hash function such as SHA1 [1] and a standard block cipher encryption algorithm such as AES [3] can be used. When a node receives a packet it verifies the HMAC of the packet and decrypts the remainder of the source route using its shared key with the source. If the HMAC verifies, ....

....As mentioned in [25] source authentication is more of a concern in routing than confidentiality. Papadimitratos and Haas showed in [42] how im personation and replay attacks can be prevented for on demand routing by disabling route caching and providing end to end authentication using an HMAC [4] primitive which relies on the existence of security associations between sources and desti nations. Dahill et al. 19] focus on providing hop by hop authentication for the route discovery stage of two well known on demand protocols: AODV [44] and DSR [30] relying on digital signatures. Other ....

The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC). Number FIPS 198. National Insti- 15 tute for Standards and Technology (NIST), 2002. http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/index.html.


Scaling Secure Group Communication Systems: Beyond.. - Amir, Nita-Rotaru..   (Correct)

.... successive key changes (time out) or maximum volume of data exchanged (dataout) Generating client group keys is much less costly in the integrated architecture, since, if no change occurs in the servers configuration, the cost of generating a new key for a group amounts to one keyed MAC (HMAC [1]) operation. When network connectivity does change (and so does the membership of the servers group) the group key shared by 4 Secure Spread Server (EVS) Servers Servers Encryption Selector Spread Library (EVS) Figure 2. A Three Step Client Server architecture for ....

The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC). No. FIPS 198, National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST), 2002. http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/index.html.


Scaling Secure Group Communication Systems: Beyond.. - Amir, Nita-Rotaru.. (2002)   (Correct)

.... Integrity and confidentiality: protect the contents of the communication both from eavesdropping as well as undetected modification. An encryption mode may provide just confidentiality, or it may also provide integrity, however, in general, data integrity is usually achieved via MAC (e.g. HMAC [1]) algorithms. We distinguish among two basic approaches to integrating security services into a client server GCS. The first approach (referred to as the layered architecture) places security services in a client library layered atop the GCS client library. The second approach entails housing ....

.... key changes (time out) or maximum volume of data exchanged (data out) Generation of client group keys is much less costly in the integrated architecture, since, if no change occurs in the servers configuration, the cost of generating a new key for a group amounts to one keyed MAC (HMAC [1]) operation. When network connectivity does change (and so does the membership of the server group) the group key shared by the servers is refreshed using a full blown group key agreement protocol. For this, we use the TGDH [27] protocol because of its superior performance. The use of encryption ....

The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC). No. FIPS 198, National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST), 2002. http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/index.html.


An On-Demand Secure Routing Protocol Resilient to.. - Awerbuch, Holmer.. (2002)   (19 citations)  (Correct)

....As mentioned in [10] source authentication is more of a concern in routing than confidentiality. Papadimitratos and Haas showed in [11] how impersonation and replay attacks can be prevented for on demand routing by disabling route caching and providing end to end authentication using an HMAC [12] primitive which relies on the existence of security associations between sources and destinations. Dahill et al. 16] focus on providing hop by hop authentication for the route discovery stage of two well known on demand protocols: AODV [2] and DSR [3] relying on digital signatures. Other ....

....[17] Each probe is specified by the identifier of the node, an HMAC of the packet (not including the list) and the encrypted remaining list (see Lines 3 6, Figure 4) Both the HMAC and the encrypted remaining list are computed with the shared key between the source and that node. An HMAC [12] using a one way hash function such as SHA1 [35] and a standard block cipher encryption algorithm such as AES [36] can be used. A node can detect if it is required to send acks by checking the identifier at the beginning of the list (see Lines 8 12, Figure 4) If it matches, then it verifies the ....

The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC). No. FIPS 198, National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST), 2002. http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/index.html.


Provably Secure Competitive Routing against Proactive.. - Awerbuch, Holmer, Rubens (2003)   (Correct)

No context found.

The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC). Number FIPS 198. National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST), 2002. http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/index.html.


High-Performance Secure Group Communication - Nita-Rotaru (2003)   (Correct)

No context found.

The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC). No. 198 in FIPS, National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST), 2002. http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/index.html.


ODSBR: An On-Demand Secure Byzantine Routing Protocol - Awerbuch, Curtmola.. (2003)   (Correct)

No context found.

The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC). No. FIPS 198, National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST), 2002. http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/index.html.


Provably Secure Competitive Routing against Proactive.. - Awerbuch, Holmer, Rubens (2003)   (Correct)

No context found.

The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC). Number FIPS 198. National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST), 2002. http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/index.html.


Mitigating Byzantine Attacks in Ad Hoc Wireless Networks - March Baruch Awerbuch (2004)   (Correct)

No context found.

The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC). No. FIPS 198, National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST), 2002. http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/index.html.

Online articles have much greater impact   More about CiteSeer.IST   Add search form to your site   Submit documents   Feedback  

CiteSeer.IST - Copyright Penn State and NEC