Benoit Hudson and Tuomas Sandholm. Effectiveness of preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions. In AAMAS-02 workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce, 2002. Extended version: Carnegie Mellon University, Computer Science Department, CMU-CS-02-124, March. Also: Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics workshop (SITE-02).  Home/Search   Document Details and Download   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....tight price based lower bound to describe the information revelation required in an efficient combinatorial auction, for any particular problem instance. Related work has considered theoretical and empirical properties of automated preference elicitation for non price based combinatorial auctions [HS02, CS01]. Also related, via oracle based models of valuation queries, is a recent result that proves that the worst case communication complexity is exponential in all efficient combinatorial auctions, whether iterative or sealed bid [NS02] Proxy bidding agents were previously proposed in the context of ....

B Hudson and T Sandholm. Effectiveness of preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions. In Proc. Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce (AMEC'IV) workshop, 2002. at AAMAS-02.

....elicitator agent, which acts on behalf of the mechanism and asks a sequence of explicit questions of agents. Example queries include rank queries, e.g. do you prefer bundle S or S27 , and value queries, e.g. what is your value for bundle S , queries. In this collection, Hudson 85 Sandholm [17] present experimental results that compare the effectiveness of different preference elicitation properties. In addition, Conen 85 Sandholm [10] propose a differential elicitation method to implement VCG mechanisms. Differential elicitation is a price based approach, although prices need not be ....

B. Hudson and T. Sandholm. Effectiveness of preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions. In Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce IV: Designing Mechanisms and Systems, volume 2531 of Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence. 2002. This volume. 2O

....They propose a model in which a single elicitator agent, asks a sequence of preference elicitation questions of agents. Example queries include rank queries, e.g. do you prefer bundle # , and value queries, e.g. what is your value for bundle , queries. Recently, Hudson Sandholm [17] have presented experimental results that compare the effectiveness of different preference elicitation properties. This work is related to that of Parkes [31] and Parkes Ungar [32, 33] that studies the role of price based methods in the design of minimal information revelation mechanisms for ....

Hudson, B. and T. Sandholm: 2002, `Effectiveness of preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions'. In: Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce IV: Designing Mechanisms and Systems, Vol. 2531 of Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence.

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Benoit Hudson and Tuomas Sandholm. Effectiveness of preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions. In AAMAS-02 workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce, 2002. Extended version: Carnegie Mellon University, Computer Science Department, CMU-CS-02-124, March. Also: Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics workshop (SITE-02).

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Benoit Hudson and Tuomas Sandholm. Effectiveness of preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions. In AAMAS-02 workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce (AMEC), Bologna, Italy, 2002.

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Hudson, B., Sandholm, T.: Effectiveness of preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions. In: AAMAS-02 workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce (AMEC), Bologna, Italy (2002) Extended version: Carnegie Mellon University, Computer Science Department, CMU-CS-02-124, March. Also: Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics workshop (SITE-02).

....to allocate the items even approximately optimally, if the bidders can have general preferences [10] This holds even when bidders can dispose of extra items for free, that is, their valuation functions are monotone. However, experimentally, preference elicitation appears to help quite a bit [9]. Nonetheless, the amount of querying can be prohibitively large when the bidders have general (monotone) preferences. An analogous issue arises with shopping agents. Consider the following scenario. Alice goes to her software agent and asks it to help her purchase a vacation. In order to act ....

....parties, one agent s preferences can be used to decide what information needs to be elicited from another party in order to determine an optimal (or approximately optimal) allocation of items. This has been the driving motivation in the work on preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions [6, 8, 7, 9], but our work in this paper did not yet capitalize on this extra power. In the future, it would be interesting to harness this power, together with the possibilities that preference restrictions open, to design effective goal driven preference elicitation algorithms. Acknowledgements We would ....

B. Hudson and T. Sandholm. Effectiveness of preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions. In Commerce (AMEC), Bologna, Italy, 2002. Extended version: Carnegie Mellon University, Computer Science Department, CMU-CS-02-124, March. Also: Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics workshop (SITE-02).

.... avenue involves studying more sophisticated equilibrium notions which take into account that players have limited memory (e.g. 1, 14, 32, 39, 41] or limited capability to solve optimization problems (e.g. 19, 23, 24, 34] There are also open issues on communication complexity in games (e.g. [7, 8, 17, 35, 50]) and on the complexity of computing general equilibria ( market equilibria ) e.g. 50] and other solutions. There are numerous open research questions even in the area of computing solutions to noncooperative games. Some recent work has focused on novel knowledge representations which, in ....

Benoit Hudson and Tuomas Sandholm. Effectiveness of preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions. In AAMAS-02 workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce (AMEC), Bologna, Italy, 2002. Extended version: Carnegie Mellon University, Computer Science Department, CMU-CS-02124, March. Also: Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics workshop (SITE-02). 11

....the last 4 years. An equally important problem, which has only recently started to receive attention, is that of eliciting the bidders preferences so that they do not have to bid on all combinations [5, 7] Preference elicitation has been shown to be extremely effective in reducing revelation [11]. In this paper we introduce a new family of preference elicitation algorithms. The algorithms in this family do not rely on absolute bids, but rather on relative (differential) value information. This holds the promise to reduce the revelation of the bidders valuations even further. We ....

.... and related elicitation methods, may lead to significant savings in the amount of information that is elicited from the bidders (compared to the full elicitation of the GVA) in fact, as the number of items in the auction grows, only a vanishing fraction of all value queries end up being asked [11]. In this paper we present a mechanism that does not elicit absolute valuations but rather elicits differences between valuations and, thus, may reveal only a fraction of each value information to the auctioneer. We call this differential revelation (because only differences of valuations are ....

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Benoit Hudson and Tuomas Sandholm. Effectiveness of preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions. Technical report, Carnegie Mellon University, Computer Science Department, CMU-CS-02-124, March, 2002. Also accepted to the Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics workshop (SITE), June, 2002.

....preferences [10] This holds even when bidders can dispose of extra items for free, that is, their valuation functions are monotone. However, in practice only a vanishing fraction of the bidders preferences needs to be elicited before the optimal allocation of items to bidders can be determined [9]. Despite this positive view, the amount of querying can be prohibitively large when the bidders have general (monotone) preferences. An analogous problem arises in the context of shopping agents. Consider the following scenario. Jenny has decided it is time to take a vacation, so she goes to ....

....parties, one agent s preferences can be used to decide what information needs to be elicited from another party in order to determine an optimal (or approximately optimal) allocation of items. This has been the driving motivation in the work on preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions [6, 8, 7, 9], but our work in this paper did not yet capitalize on this extra power. In the 9 future, it would be interesting to harness this power, together with the possibilities that preference restrictions open, to design effective goal driven preference elicitation algorithms. Acknowledgements This ....

Benoit Hudson and Tuomas Sandholm. Effectiveness of preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions. In AAMAS-02 workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce (AMEC), Bologna, Italy, 2002. Extended version: Carnegie Mellon University, Computer Science Department, CMU-CS-02-124, March. Also: Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics workshop (SITE02) . 10

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Benoit Hudson and Tuomas Sandholm. Effectiveness of preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions. In AAMAS-02 workshop on AgentMediated Electronic Commerce (AMEC), Bologna, Italy, 2002. Extended version: Carnegie Mellon University, Computer Science Department, CMU-CS-02-124, March. Also: Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics workshop (SITE-02).

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