Emmanuel Bresson, Olivier Chevassut, David Pointcheval, and Jean-Jacques Quisquater. Provably authenticated group diffie-hellman key exchange. In Pierangela Samarati, editor, 8th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Philadelphia, PA, USA, November 2001. ACM Press. Home/Search Document Details and Download
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Efficient Construction of (Distributed) Verifiable Random Functions - Dodis (2002) (Correct)
....has to obtain information about g a 1 : a L . We call the resulting assumptions full target gDDH gCDH (where L = 2 yields regular DDH CDH) We remark that these full target assumptions are the standard way to define generalized (aka group) Diffie Hellman assumptions (e.g. in [STW96, BCP01, BCPQ01, Lys02] but we will find our distinction (and, therefore, terminology) more convenient. Finally, making L larger generally makes the assumption stronger (e.g. Unless a generic inefficient conversion is used, or one assumes the existence of a random oracle, in which case applying the random ....
Emmanuel Bresson, Olivier Chevassut, David Pointcheval, and Jean-Jacques Quisquater. Provably authenticated group diffie-hellman key exchange. In Eighth ACM Conference on Computer and Communication Security, pages 255--264. ACM, November 5--8 2001.
Efficient Construction of (Distributed) Verifiable Random Functions - Dodis (2002) (Correct)
....has to obtain information about g a 1 : a L . We call the resulting assumptions full target gDDH gCDH (where L = 2 yields regular DDH CDH) We remark that these full target assumptions are the standard way to define generalized (aka group) Diffie Hellman assumptions (e.g. in [STW96, BCP01, BCPQ01, Lys02] but we will find our distinction (and, therefore, terminology) more convenient. Finally, making L larger generally makes the assumption stronger (e.g. Unless a generic inefficient conversion is used, or one assumes the existence of a random oracle, in which case applying the ....
....has to obtain information about g a 1 : a L . We call the resulting assumptions full target gDDH gCDH (where L = 2 yields regular DDH CDH) We remark that these full target assumptions are the standard way to define generalized (aka group) Diffie Hellman assumptions (e.g. in [STW96, BCP01, BCPQ01, Lys02] but we will find our distinction (and, therefore, terminology) more convenient. Finally, making L larger generally makes the assumption stronger (e.g. Unless a generic inefficient conversion is used, or one assumes the existence of a random oracle, in which case applying the random oracle ....
Emmanuel Bresson, Olivier Chevassut, and David Pointcheval. Provably authenticated group diffiehellman key exchange --- the dynamic case. In Boyd [Boy01], pages 290--309. 14
Group Key Agreement Efficient in Communication - Kim, Perrig, Tsudik (Correct)
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Emmanuel Bresson, Olivier Chevassut, David Pointcheval, and Jean-Jacques Quisquater. Provably authenticated group diffie-hellman key exchange. In Pierangela Samarati, editor, 8th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Philadelphia, PA, USA, November 2001. ACM Press.
Group Key Agreement Efficient in Communication - Kim, Perrig, Tsudik (Correct)
No context found.
Emmanuel Bresson, Olivier Chevassut, and David Pointcheval. Provably authenticated group Diffie-Hellman key exchange --- the dynamic case. In Colin Boyd, editor, Advances in Cryptology -- ASIACRYPT '2001.
Asynchronous Group Key Exchange with Failures - Cachin, Strobl (2004) (2 citations) (Correct)
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E. Bresson, O. Chevassut, D. Pointcheval, and J. Quisquater, "Provably authenticated group Diffie-Hellman key exchange," in Proc. 8th ACM Conference on Computer and Communication Secuirty (CCS), 2001.
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