David Mazi eres and Dennis Shasha. Building secure file systems out of Byzantine storage. In Proceedings of the 21st Annual ACM SIGACT-SIGOPS Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, pages 108--117, July 2002. Home/Search Document Details and Download
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Secure Untrusted Data Repository (SUNDR) - Li, Krohn, Mazieres, Shasha Self-citation (Eres Shasha) (Correct)
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David Mazi eres and Dennis Shasha. Building secure file systems out of Byzantine storage. In Proceedings of the 21st Annual ACM SIGACT-SIGOPS Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, pages 108--117, July 2002.
Third-Year Review Statement - Mazieres Self-citation (Eres) (Correct)
....with Jinyuan Li, Max Krohn, and Dennis Shasha on SUNDR, a fully general purpose distributed file system that resides entirely on untrusted storage. We have specified the SUNDR protocol and proven that it guarantees data integrity or detectable failures whether or not the server obeys the protocol [8]. An implementation is under way, and appears capable of delivering competitive performance. SUNDR will allow people to manage data in new ways. Organizations can outsource file service without fear of the server operators tampering with stored data. Since the server is not trusted, clients can ....
David Mazi eres and Dennis Shasha. Building secure file systems out of Byzantine storage. In Proceedings of the 21st Annual ACM SIGACT-SIGOPS Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, pages 108--117, July 2002.
Building secure file systems out of Byzantine storage - Mazières, Shasha (2002) (14 citations) Self-citation (Eres Shasha) (Correct)
....disk and server redundancy and backups. Byzantine behavior, by contrast, includes faulty actions that may go undetected, such as subtle, malicious tampering by hackers or unscrupulous # A full version of this paper is available as NYU computer science department technical report TR2002 826 [12]. This research was supported in part by National Science Foundation awards CCR 0093361 and IIS 9988345. employees. This work is the first to show how to render Byzantine file server failures readily detectable. In an ideal network file system, if one user writes and closes a file, the next ....
....are treated similarly to users. Every group has its own associated i table, and each version structure additionally contains a version number for every group. This change requires substantial extensions to the protocol and proof, for which we refer the reader to the full version of this paper [12]. 4.5 Pragmatic considerations Client failures. In the concurrent protocols, a fetch waits for a conflicting modification. If the modification never completes, then the fetch waits forever. However, this is not necessary. The fetch could time out and return an error code, and the user could then ....
David Mazi eres and Dennis Shasha. Building secure file systems out of byzantine storage. Technical Report TR2002.
A Serverless, Wide-Area Version Control System - Chen (2004) (Correct)
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D. Mazi eres and D. Shasha. Building secure file systems out of Byzantine storage. In Proc. of the Twenty-First ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing (PODC 2002.
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