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....bargaining. A related body of research has considered networks from a mechanism design perspective. The field of mechanism design explores conditions under which system designers can achieve various economic and computational properties in the presence of strategic agents (see Parkes [8] for a survey) Many of these resultscanbeapplieddirectlytosystemsthatinvolvenetworks, forexample, mechanismsthatallocate costs in a multicast tree [2] and mechanisms that address an optimal routing problem [3] This work typically assumes that the set of nodes in the system is fixed, a ....
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