T. Kagal, L. Finin and A. Josh. Trust-Based Security in Pervasive Computing Environments. IEEE Computer, pages 154--157, December 2001.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....privacy in the system. Stajano [5] notices that while researchers are busy thinking about the killer applications for pervasive computing, cyber criminals and computer villains are already considering new, ingenious attacks that are not possible in traditional computing environments. Kagal et al. [6, 7] admit that securing pervasive computing environments presents challenges at many levels. The very same features that make pervasive computing environments convenient and powerful make them vulnerable to new security and privacy threats. Traditional security mechanisms and policies may not ....

L. Kagal, T. Finin, and A. Joshi, "Trust-Based Security in Pervasive Computing Environments," IEEE Computer, 2001.

....for controlling rights. Work by Kagal and Finin [KU 02, KFJ01] has Horn Claus rules for stating access rights and distributed trust. Their rules permit conditional delegations and access, where the conditions in the conditional must be satisfied in order to obtain access privileges. According to [KFJ01], they plan to add obligations to their framework. Our work differs from theirs in many major ways. Firstly, we do have obligations. Secondly, our provisions are different from conditions that appear in conditional access permissions in a critical way. That is, these conditional predicates are not ....

....agent to communicate the fulfillment of the provisions to the rule execution evaluation engine. For example, registering with an auction house may not be handled by the access control module that is responsible for granting the authority to place bids. Moreover, the conditions that Kagal et al. [KFJ01] refer to are evaluated as they are, independent of whether or not the same accesses can be obtained by satisfying different conditions. In contrast, our provisioning framework looks for the best provisions and asks an external agent to check for their validity. Another line of research dealing ....

L. Kagal, T. Finin and A. Joshi. TrustBased Security in Pervasive Computing Environments. in IEEE Computer, December 2001.

....look at the rights or features of an artifact. He can use his e ring A to touch the artifact B in order to get an authorization or attribute certificate and drop it in his PDA to view this one. A Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is not mandatory, key management can be based on trust relationships [5]. Our local proof of knowledge protocol ensures that the received certificate corresponds to the artifact B that was touched by the e ring A. Table 1. Local proof of secret protocol. The bold arrow ( means that one bit messages are exchanged through the dedicated interface. 1) A C B C E KP B ....

L. Kagal, T. Finin and, A. Joshi. Trust-Based Security in Pervasive Computing Environments. In IEEE Computer Volume 24, Number 12, pages 154-157. December 2001.

....the policy model and only leave at runtime the comparison of VPOS and the evaluation of state dependent conditions. This becomes a significant advantage in critical applications involving security policies. There has been work on using logic rules for controlling rights. Work by Kagal and Finin [13, 12] has Horn Claus rules for stating access rights and distributed trust. Their rules permit conditional delegations and access, where the conditions in the conditional must be satisfied in order to obtain access privileges. According to [12] they plan to add obligations to their framework. Our work ....

....rules for controlling rights. Work by Kagal and Finin [13, 12] has Horn Claus rules for stating access rights and distributed trust. Their rules permit conditional delegations and access, where the conditions in the conditional must be satisfied in order to obtain access privileges. According to [12], they plan to add obligations to their framework. Our work differs from theirs in many major ways. Firstly, we do have obligations. Secondly, our provisions are different from conditions that appear in conditional access permissions in a critical way. That is, these conditional predicates are not ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

L. Kagal, T. Finin and A. Joshi. Trust-Based Security in Pervasive Computing Environments. in IEEE Computer, December 2001.

....for controlling rights. Work by Kagal and Finin [KU 02, KFJ01] has Horn Claus rules for stating access rights and distributed trust. Their rules permit conditional delegations and access, where the conditions in the conditional must be satisfied in order to obtain access privileges. According to [KFJ01], they plan to add obligations to their framework. Our work differs from theirs in many major ways. Firstly, we do have obligations. Secondly, our provisions are different from conditions that appear in conditional access permissions in a critical way. That is, these conditional predicates are not ....

....agent to communicate the fulfillment of the provisions to the rule execution evaluation engine. For example, registering with an auction house may not be handled by the access control module that is responsible for granting the authority to place bids. Moreover, the conditions that Kagal et al. [KFJ01] refer to are evaluated as they are, independent of whether or not the same accesses can be obtained by satisfying different conditions. In contrast, our provisioning framework looks for the best provisions and asks an external agent to check for their validity. Another line of research dealing ....

L. Kagal, T. Finin and A. Joshi. TrustBased Security in Pervasive Computing Environments. in IEEE Computer, December 2001.

....for decentralized security control. Due to the large number of entities in the environment, it may not be possible to identify them accurately or even pre determine the users of each service. Therefore we suggest developing policies associated with properties of entities instead of identities [11, 13]. These properties are established by proving them from an entity s credentials, beliefs of other entities and the appropriate security policies. The paper is structured as follows: The discussion about the specification of the language in Section 2 includes the policy constructs, the action ....

L. Kagal, T. Finin, and A. Joshi. Trust based security for pervasive computing enviroments. In IEEE Communications, December 2001.

.... in as much the vicinity of a device keeps changing with movement thus changing available data sources[32] Moreover, much of this interaction with other devices happens outside of a user s home environment, which means that devices in the vicinity cannot by default be assumed to be trustworthy[19]. The eBiquity group (http: research.ebiquity.org) at the University of Maryland Baltimore County, is involved in the design, development and evaluation of a framework that 3 addresses these issues[7] 1] 32] 19] This paper focuses on the security challenges and our proposed solution. We ....

.... means that devices in the vicinity cannot by default be assumed to be trustworthy[19] The eBiquity group (http: research.ebiquity.org) at the University of Maryland Baltimore County, is involved in the design, development and evaluation of a framework that 3 addresses these issues[7] 1] 32] [19]. This paper focuses on the security challenges and our proposed solution. We seek to address security issues in pervasive computing environments through the use of agent methodologies and distributed trust. We present Vigil as the security infrastructure for such pervasive computing environments. ....

Lalana Kagal, Tim Finin, and Anupam Joshi. Trust-based security in pervasive computing environments. In IEEE Computer, December 2001.

....information for individual agents or groups of agents. We believe that these schemes will not scale adequately or provide the increased flexibility required for emerging dynamic multi agent systems that consists of an extremely large number of agents that are spread over a large geographic area [11] like the agentcities project 1 . Hence we argue that it no longer makes sense to divide authorization into authentication and access control [16, 14] We propose a security framework for multi agent systems which is based on distributed trust management. Distributed trust management involves ....

Lalana Kagal, Tim Finin, and Anupam Joshi. Trust based security for pervasive computing enviroments. In IEEE Communications, December 2001.

No context found.

T. Kagal, L. Finin and A. Josh. Trust-Based Security in Pervasive Computing Environments. IEEE Computer, pages 154--157, December 2001.

No context found.

T. Kagal, L. Finin and A. Josh. Trust-Based Security in Pervasive Computing Environments. IEEE Computer, pages 154--157, December 2001.

No context found.

Lalana Kagal, Tim Finin, and Anupam Joshi. Trust-based security in pervasive computing environments. IEEE Computer, 34(12):154--157, December 2001.

No context found.

Lalana Kagal, Tim Finin, and Anupam Joshi. Trust-based security in pervasive computing environments. IEEE Computer, 34(12):154--157, December 2001.

No context found.

T. Finin L. Kagal and A. Joshi. Trust-based security in pervasive computing environments. IEEE Computer, 34(12):154--157, 2001. 41

No context found.

Lalana Kagal, Tim Finin and Anupam Joshi. Trust-Based Security in Pervasive Computing Environments. Computer Communications, December 2001.

No context found.

Lalana Kagal, Tim Finin, and Anupam Joshi. Trust-based security in pervasive computing environments. IEEE Computer, pages 154--157, DEC 2001.

No context found.

Kagal, Finin, Joshi, "Trust-Based Security in Pervasive Computing Environments". IEEE Computer, December 2001

Online articles have much greater impact   More about CiteSeer.IST   Add search form to your site   Submit documents   Feedback  

CiteSeer.IST - Copyright Penn State and NEC