Wei Dai. Pipenet. http://www.eskimo.com/weidai/pipenet.txt, February 1995. Post to the cypherpunks mailing list.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....have been proposed to implement various notions of anonymity. Unfortunately, there is no universally accepted terminology in the field, and different authors 25 Property Informal definition Opaqueness definition untraceability Attacker may not know anything about senders (e.g. MIX net [Cha81, Dai95] with nymservers and dummy traffic, SMA95] and kernel opaque Absolute sender anonymity Attacker may not know who the senders are but may know whether 2 conversations originate from the same (unknown) agent (e.g. Webbased email) k anonymity Attacker may only know senders up to a ....

....the corresponding property. The predicates are listed in Table 2. Figure 2 shows implications between the various anonymity properties. A solid arrow denotes implication, a dashed arrow conjunction. A common design is based on Chaum s MIX nets [Cha81] and involves a network of anonymizing servers [Dai95, Cot96, SGR97]. This approach provides identity protection in a situation where the Big Brother attacker may observe traffic on the wires connecting everyone s computer to the network, but all communications are encrypted and travel through a secure server(s) which blends them together and distributes to ....

Wei Dai. Pipenet. Post to the cypherpunks mailing list, February 1995.

....like Onion Routing, it can be configured so that trusted functions are performed at various locations [2] However, communication between and from these points is not itself anonymous or resistant to traffic analysis. This makes Proxymate and Onion Routing especially natural complements. Pipe net [5] is a proposal somewhat similar to Onion Routing. It has not been implemented, however. Pipenet s threat model is more paranoid than Onion Routing s: it attempts to resist active attacks by global observers. For example, Pipe net s connections are permanent and carry constant traffic (to resist ....

W. Dai. Pipe-net, February 1995, post to the cypherpunks mailing list.

....local switch, but connections between switches are not hidden. This implies that all calls between two businesses, each large enough to use an entire switch, reveal which businesses are communicating. In onion routing, mixing is dispersed throughout the Internet, which improves hiding. Pipe net [21] is a proposal similar to onion routing that has never (and one might contend cannot ever) been built. Pipe net s threat model is more paranoid than onion routing s: it attempts to resist active attacks by global observers. For example, Pipe net s connections carry constant traffic, are all ....

W. Dai. Pipe-net, February 1995, post to the cypherpunks mailing list. 16

....LPWA [12, 8] formerly known as Janus) is a proxy server that generates consistent untraceable aliases for you that enable you to browse the Web, register at web sites and open accounts, and be recognized upon returning to your accounts, all while still preserving your privacy. Pipe net [5] is the proposal most similar to onion routing. It has not been implemented, however. Pipe net s threat model is more paranoid than onion routing s: it attempts to resist active attacks by global observers. For example, Pipe net s connections carry constant traffic (to resist timing signature ....

W. Dai. Pipe-net, February 1995, post to the cypherpunks mailing list.

....of anonymity for low latency communications. One important lesson to take away from these efforts is that there are a great deal many clever and powerful attacks against low latency anonymized traffic when adversaries have control over many segments of the network. Wei Dai s PipeNet architecture [9] is based on a distributed network of packet forwarders, connected by long term encrypted communications links that are padded to constant bandwidth when not in use to prevent traffic analysis; Chaumian mixes are used at each router node. The result is much like a lowlatency IP level cousin of the ....

Wei Dai, "PipeNet," Feb 1995, post to the cypherpunks mailing list.

....interesting to examine, as their security depends intimately on the state of the art in high performance computing. Therefore, we concentrate on algorithms to break A5, RC4, CDMF, and DES. Software implementations running on general purpose microcomputers have received perhaps the most attention [3, 12, 5, 10, 4]. To achieve maximum performance, though, we must also consider the tradeoffs associated with customizable hardware. We will focus mainly on hardware implementations of cryptanalytic algorithms; we then compare the tradeoffs between the hardware and software approaches. The most specialized ....

Wei Dai. Speed benchmarks, 1996. Post to cypherpunks mailing list. Available on the Internet as http://www.eskimo.com/~weidai/benchmarks.txt.

....bi directional anonymity protection for generalpurpose low latency interactive Internet traffic. Wei Dai has described an architecture that would provide this protection based on a distributed system of anonymizing packet forwarders, analogous to today s remailer network; he called it Pipenet [13]. We will use the generic term pipenet for any architecture built along these lines. No complete pipenet design, much less implementation, is available yet. Several authors have independently attempted to build a system with similar features [26] but because they were unaware of the work of Wei ....

Wei Dai, "PipeNet," Feb 1995, post to the cypherpunks mailing list.

....association between real identity and pseudonyms so that email sent to a pseudonym can be redirected to the associated real identity. Forwarder tracking and replay attacks are possible here. See [54] for more information. 4. 14 PipeNet al..though no PipeNet has been constructed, its design by Dai [24] is similar to those of Crowds, Onion Routing, and this work 3 . PipeNet can be roughly envisioned as an Onion Routing network that also carries dummy traffic. Each node that carries a connection forces all of that node s active connections to run at the same rate. PipeNet only claims to provide ....

....Onion Routing network that also carries dummy traffic. Each node that carries a connection forces all of that node s active connections to run at the same rate. PipeNet only claims to provide client anonymity. Recently, Dai updated the proposed protocol with anti replay protection. See the URL in [24] for details. 4.15 Zero Knowledge Systems Zero Knowledge Systems Inc. is developing a commercial version composing many of the techniques mentioned here. They envision the establishment of a number of freedom servers , apparently Mix nodes in separate administrative domains, for interactive ....

Wei Dai. Pipenet. post to the cypherpunks mailing list, February 1995. See http://www. eskimo.com/¸weidai.

....local switch, but connections between switches are not hidden. This implies that all calls between two businesses, each large enough to use an entire switch, reveal which businesses are communicating. In onion routing, mixing is dispersed throughout the Internet, which improves hiding. Pipe net [8] is a proposal similar to onion routing. It has not been implemented, however. Pipe net s threat model is more paranoid than onion routing s: it attempts to resist active attacks by global observers. For example, Pipe net s connections carry constant traffic (to resist timing signature attacks) ....

W. Dai. Pipe-net, February 1995, post to the cypherpunks mailing list.

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Wei Dai. Pipenet. http://www.eskimo.com/weidai/pipenet.txt, February 1995. Post to the cypherpunks mailing list.

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