Holger Hoos and Craig Boutilier. Bidding languages for combinatorial auctions. In The Seventeenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 1211--1217, Seattle, WA, 2001. Home/Search Document Details and Download
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Price-Based Information Certificates for Minimal-Revelation.. - Parkes (2002) (2 citations) (Correct)
....combin tori uction is exponential, both for direct nd indirect revelation mechanisms [24] lthough indirect mechisms cn chieve better vergecse performce. One pproch to ddress the communication complexity is to develop structured bidding lnguges that re compact for pticul gent preferences [22, 6]. An other pproch is to place explicit restrictions on the expressivity of lguge, while being ceful to mintn the equilibrium properties of mechism [16, The valuation problem is nother equly importer problem, but one that hs received less ttention. There re mny electronic commerce pplictions in ....
C. Boutilier and H. Hoos. Bidding languages for combinatorial auctions. In Proc. 17th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-01), 2001.
Differential-Revelation VCG Mechanisms for Combinatorial.. - Conen, Sandholm (2002) (2 citations) (Correct)
....network traffic) and (3) bidders may prefer Dr. Sandholm s work was funded by, and conducted at, CombineNet, Inc. 311 S. Craig St. Pittsburgh, PA 15213. not to reveal all of their valuation information due to reasons of privacy or long term competitiveness. Appropriate bidding languages [24, 9, 22, 15, 12] can potentially solve the communication overhead in some cases (when the bidder s utility function is compressible) However, they still require the bidders to completely determine and transmit their valuation functions and as such do not solve all the issues. So in practice, when the number of ....
Holger Hoos and Craig Boutilier. Bidding languages for combinatorial auctions. In Proceedings of the Seventeenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 1211--1217, Seattle, WA, 2001.
Effectiveness of Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial.. - Hudson, Sandholm (2002) (4 citations) (Correct)
.... 13,17] there is a huge number of bundles to evaluate; communicating the bids can incur prohibitive overhead (e.g. network traffic) and agents may prefer not to reveal all of their valuation information due to reasons of privacy or long term competitiveness [16] Appropriate bidding languages [7, 8, 11, 18, 19] can solve the communication overhead in some cases (when the bidder s utility function is compressible) However, they still require the agents to completely determine and transmit their valuation functions and as such do not solve all the issues. So in practice, when the number of items for sale ....
H. Hoos and C. Boutilier. Bidding languages for combinatorial auctions. IJCAI, 2001.
Effectiveness of Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial.. - Hudson, Sandholm (2002) (4 citations) (Correct)
.... exhibit complementarity (a bundle of items is worth more than the sum of its parts) and or substitutability (a bundle is worth less than the sum of its parts) Determining the winners in such auctions is a complex optimization problem that has recently received considerable attention (e.g. [1,6,7,9,13,19,24 26]) An equally important problem, which has received much less attention, is that of bidding. There are # bundles, and each agent may need to bid on all of them to fully express its preferences. This can be undesirable for any of several reasons: determining one s valuation for any given bundle ....
.... 23] there is a huge number of bundles to evaluate; communicating the bids can incur prohibitive overhead (e.g. network traffic) and agents may prefer not to reveal all of their valuation information due to reasons of privacy or long term competitiveness [20] Appropriate bidding languages [7, 9, 13,22,24] can solve the communication overhead in some cases (when the bidder s utility function is compressible) However, they still require the agents to completely determine and transmit their valuation functions and as such do not solve all the issues. So in practice, when the number of items for sale ....
Holger Hoos and Craig Boutilier. Bidding languages for combinatorial auctions. In Proceedings of the Seventeenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 1211--1217, Seattle, WA, 2001.
Differential-Revelation VCG Mechanisms for Combinatorial.. - Conen, Sandholm (2002) (2 citations) (Correct)
....(1b) there is a huge number of bundles to evaluate; 2) communicating the bids can incur prohibitive overhead (e.g. network traffic) and (3) agents may prefer not to reveal all of their valuation information due to reasons of privacy or long term competitiveness. Appropriate bidding languages [22, 8, 20, 13, 10] can potentially solve the communication overhead in some cases (when the bidder s utility function is compressible) However, they still require the agents to completely determine and transmit their valuation functions and as such do not solve all the issues. So in practice, when the number of ....
Holger Hoos and Craig Boutilier. Bidding languages for combinatorial auctions. In Proceedings of the Seventeenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 1211--1217, Seattle, WA, 2001.
Exchanges for Complex Commodities: Search for Optimal Matches - Gong (2002) (9 citations) (Correct)
....available vehicle. They suggested an advanced semantics for these constraints, which allowed compact description of complex bids; however, they did not allow complex constraints in sell orders. They implemented an algorithm that found near optimal matches, but it scaled only to one thousand bids. Boutilier and Hoos [2001] developed a general propositional language for specifying bids in combinatorial auctions, which allowed a compact representation of most bids. Conen and Sandholm [2002] described a system that helped the participants of combinatorial auctions to specify their bids; it elicited the preferences of ....
Craig Boutilier and Holger H. Hoos. Bidding languages for combinatorial auctions. In Proceedings of the Seventeenth International Joint Conference on Arti cial Intelligence, pages 1211-1217, 2001.
Solving Concisely Expressed Combinatorial Auction Problems - Boutilier (2002) (4 citations) Self-citation (Boutilier) (Correct)
....for which CAs are best suited. To circumvent this, several researchers have proposed logical bidding languages that allow might allow complex utility functions to be expressed relatively concisely in a suitable language [12; 13; 5; 8; 2] The recent GB language of Boutilier and Hoos [2] , for example, allows goods to be joined using logical connectives, and prices to be attached to arbitrary subformulae. Despite their attractiveness, the computational aspects of logical bidding languages have received little attention. Indeed, no studies of which we are aware exploit the ....
....utility function is captured. A number of different types of bidding languages have been proposed in the literature, among these languages that allow flat bids to be combined logically [12; 13; 8] and that allow goods to be combined logically [5] The recent GB language of Boutilier and Hoos [2] generalizes these languages by allowing goods to be joined using logical connectives, and prices to be attached to arbitrary subformulae. GB is fully expressive (i.e. can express any utility function over goods) and is strictly more compact than existing languages (i.e. any bid expressible ....
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Craig Boutilier and Holger H. Hoos. Bidding languages for combinatorial auctions. In Proceedings of the Seventeenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 1211--1217, Seattle, 2001.
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Holger Hoos and Craig Boutilier. Bidding languages for combinatorial auctions. In The Seventeenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 1211--1217, Seattle, WA, 2001.
Exchanges for Complex Commodities: Toward a General-Purpose.. - Hershberger (2003) (Correct)
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Craig Boutilier and Holger H. Hoos. Bidding languages for combinatorial auctions. In Proceedings of the Seventeenth International Joint Conference cial Intelligence, pages 1211-1217, 2001.
Preference Estimation and Query Learning - Blum, Jackson, al. (2004) (Correct)
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Holger Hoos and Craig Boutilier. Bidding languages for combinatorial auctions. In Proceedings of the Seventeenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 1211--1217, Seattle, WA, 2001.
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Craig Boutilier and Holger H. Hoos. Bidding languages for combinatorial auctions. In Proceedings of the Seventeenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 1211--1217, 2001.
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C. Boutilier. Bidding languages for combinatorial auctions. In In Proceedings of the 17th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 1211--1217, 2001.
Effectiveness of Query Types and Policies for Preference.. - Hudson, Sandholm (2004) (1 citation) (Correct)
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Computational Resource Exchanges for Distributed.. - Chun, Ng, Albrecht, .. (Correct)
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Boutilier, C., and Hoos, H. H. Bidding languages for combinatorial auctions. In Proceedings of the Seventeenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-01) (2001), pp. 1211--1217.
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Craig Boutilier and Holger H. Hoos. Bidding languages for combinatorial auctions. In Proceedings of the Seventeenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-01), Seattle, pages 1211--1217, 2001. 97
Making Markets and Democracy Work: A Story of Incentives and.. - Sandholm (2003) (3 citations) (Correct)
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Holger Hoos and Craig Boutilier. Bidding languages for combinatorial auctions. In Proceedings of the Seventeenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 1211--1217, Seattle, WA, 2001.
Generalizing Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions - Sandholm (2003) (Correct)
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Holger Hoos and Craig Boutilier. Bidding languages for combinatorial auctions. IJCAI.
Preference Elicitation and Query Learning - Blum, Jackson, Sandholm, Zinkevich (2003) (4 citations) (Correct)
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Hoos, H., Boutilier, C.: Bidding languages for combinatorial auctions. In: Proceedings of the Seventeenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), Seattle, WA (2001) 1211--1217
Using Value Queries in Combinatorial Auctions - Hudson, Sandholm (2003) (3 citations) (Correct)
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H. Hoos and C. Boutilier. Bidding languages for combinatorial auctions. In Proc. IJCAI, pp. 1211-1217, 2001.
Automated Mechanism Design With a Structured Outcome Space - Vincent Conitzer Carnegie (2003) (1 citation) (Correct)
No context found.
Holger Hoos and Craig Boutilier. Bidding languages for combinatorial auctions. In The Seventeenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 1211--1217, Seattle, WA, 2001.
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C. Boutilier and H.H. Hoos. Bidding languages for combinatorial auctions. In The 17th international joint conference arti cial intelligence, pages 1211-1216, 2001.
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