L. Buttyan and J.-P. Hubaux. Enforcing service availability in mobile adhoc WANs. In MobiHoc '00: Proceedings of the 1st ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking & computing, pages 87--96. IEEE Press, 2000.  Home/Search   Document Details and Download   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....is collected locally, with some indirect deduction about well behaving nodes that can be useful when considering mobility. Authors analyze their solution in game theoretical terms, showing that games can be very useful in such an anarchic setting. A radically di#erent solution was proposed in [3, 4] by Buttyan and Hubaux. A mobile ad hoc network is modeled as a market, where services are exchanged. A virtual economy, based on a virtual currency called nuglet (or bean) is then introduced, forcing nodes to pay to have their packets forwarded, and to being paid when they forward some data. ....

....possible to overcome this e#ect when introducing repetition, as we will see in Section 6. 5 Analysis of mechanisms It is possible to capture some of the strategies presented in Section 2 with the model we just presented, in order to show its generality and power. In the NUGLETS proposal ([3, 4]) a model very similar to our is used, in which selfishness is formally explained with a double goal to optimize for every node (throughput versus lifetime) but having as a constraint in every node that the number of sent packets can not be greater that the number of forwarded packets plus a ....

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L. Buttyan and J. P. Hubaux. Enforcing service availability in mobile ad-hoc wans. In Proceedings of IEEE/ACM Workshop on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing (MobiHOC) , Boston, MA, USA, August 2000.

....with the excessive route request traffic degrading the network performance. At the same time, the adversary can falsely accuse a significant fraction of nodes within the time out period related to reinstating from a negative rating and, essentially, partition the network. A different approach [But00] is to provide incentive to nodes, so that they comply with protocol rules; i.e. properly relay user data. The concept of fictitious currency is introduced, in order to endogenize the behavior of the assumed greedy nodes, which would forward packets in exchange for currency. Each intermediate ....

L. Buttyan and J.P. Hubaux, "Enforcing Service Availability in Mobile Ad Hoc WANs," MobiHoc, Boston, Massachusetts, August 2000

....If every user argues in this fashion, then the throughput that each user receives will drop dramatically. We can see that there is a trade off between an individual user s lifetime and throughput. Cooperation among nodes in an ad hoc network has been previously addressed in [5] 6] 7] [8], 9] In [5] nodes, which agree to relay traffic but do not, are termed as misbehaving. Clever means to identify misbehaving users and avoid routing through these nodes are proposed. Their approach consists of two applications: Watchdog and Pathrater.The former runs on every node keeping track ....

....and avoid routing through these nodes are proposed. Their approach consists of two applications: Watchdog and Pathrater.The former runs on every node keeping track of how the other nodes behave; the latter uses this information to calculate the route with the highest reliability. In [6] 7] [8], a secure mechanism to stimulate nodes to cooperate and to prevent them from overloading the network is presented. The key idea is that nodes providing a service should be remunerated, while nodes receiving a service should be charged. Based on this concept, an acceptance algorithm is proposed. ....

L. Buttyan and J. P. Hubaux, "Enforcing Service Availability in Mobile Ad-Hoc WANs," Proc. of IEEE/ACM Workshop on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing (MobiHOC), Boston, MA, USA, August 2000.

....have been envisioned mainly for emergency and military situations. In such applications, all of the nodes in the network belong to a single authority and therefore have a common objective. As a result, cooperation among the nodes can be assumed. However, as observed by several authors [4] [5], 6] 7] 8] it may soon be possible to deploy ad hoc networks for civilian applications as well. In such emerging civilian applications, the nodes typically do not belong to a single authority. Consequently, cooperative behaviors such as forwarding each other s messages, cannot be directly ....

....antennas [11] 12] which are gaining momentum in wireless networks in order to improve capacity, will also make monitoring hard. Another possibility to provide incentive is to use credit (or virtual currency) or micro payment [13] Buttyan and Hubaux proposed a nice solution of this type in [5], and then presented an improved result based on credit counters in [6] For both proposals, a node receives one unit of credit for forwarding a message of another node, and such credits are deducted from the sender (or the destination) Besides other potential issues that we will discuss in ....

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L. Buttyan and J. P. Hubaux, "Enforcing service availability in mobile ad-hoc WANs," in IEEE/ACM Workshop on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing (MobiHOC), Boston, MA, August 2000. [Online]. Available: http://icawww.epfl.ch/Publications/Buttyan/ButtyanH00.ps

....with the excessive route request traffic degrading the network performance. At the same time, the adversary can falsely accuse a significant fraction of nodes within the time out period related to reinstating from a negative rating and, essentially, partition the network. A different approach [24] is to provide incentive to nodes, so that they comply with protocol rules; i.e. properly relay user data. The concept of fictitious currency is introduced, in order to endogenize the behavior of the assumed greedy nodes, which would forward packets in exchange for currency. Each intermediate ....

L. Buttyan and J.P. Hubaux, "Enforcing Service Availability in Mobile Ad Hoc WANs," 1 MobiHoc, BA Massachusetts, Aug. 2000.

....society, services are usually provided in exchange of an amount of money, previously agreed between both parts. The Terminodes project defined a virtual currency named beans used by nodes to pay for the messages. Those beans would be distributed by the intermediary nodes that forwarded the message [3, 4]. Implementations of digital cash systems supporting fraud detection require several di#erent participants and the exchange of a significant number of messages [6] To reduce this overhead, Terminodes assumes that hosts are equipped with a tamper resistant security module, responsible for all the ....

L. Buttyan and J. Hubaux. Enforcing service availability in mobile ad-hoc wans. In Proc. of the First IEEE/ACM Workshop on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing (MobiHOC), Boston, MA, USA, August 2000.

....given by several corrupted nodes or collusions. This approach potentially is a strong prevention mechanism, however, to the best of our knowledge, the impact on the network and the security performance remain to be investigated. Incentives to cooperate have been proposed by Butty an and Hubaux [BH00] in the form of so called nuglets that serve as a per hop payment in every packet or in the form of counters [BH01] to encourage forwarding. Both nuglets and counters reside in a secure module in each node, are incremented when nodes forward for others and decremented when they send packets for ....

Levente Butty an and Jean-Pierre Hubaux. Enforcing Service Availability in Mobile Ad-Hoc WANs. In Proceedings of IEEE/ACM Workshop on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing (MobiHOC) , Boston, MA, USA, August 2000.

....to be imprinted several times. Haas employs threshold security, allowing for several corrupted nodes or collusions [7] Garcia Luna Aceves et al. 15] looked at security of distance vector protocols in general. For the Terminodes project, incentives to cooperate by means of so called nuglets [4] that serve as a per hop payment in every packet have been suggested by Buttyan et al. to ensure forwarding. The scheme suggested here in the following sections addresses additional issues in the network layer such as traffic diversion. Marti et al. 12] observed increased throughput in mobile ad ....

L. Buttyan and J.-P. Hubaux. Enforcing service availability in mobile ad-hoc wans. MobiHOC, 2000.

....perfect; otherwise, someone will find out how to get around them. Most of the attacks and vulnerabilities have been the result of bypassing prevention mechanisms. Given this reality, detection and response are essential (see also Section 2 for a discussion on strong prevention mechanisms such as [4]) In this paper, we propose a method based on detection of misbehavior, followed by a reaction. We would like to achieve that only good behavior pay o# in terms of service and reasonable power consumption. Thus, in our scheme detection has to trigger a response, i.e. a reaction of other nodes ....

....investigated whether, and how, digital signatures can be employed in mobile adhoc networks. The CONFIDANT protocol also addresses routing misbehavior but in addition gives strong incentives for correct forwarding. Buttyan and Hubaux proposed incentives to cooperate by means of so called nuglets [4] that serve as a per hop payment in every packet or counters [5] in a secure module in each node to encourage forwarding. One of their findings is that increased cooperation is beneficial not only for the entire network but also for individual nodes, which conforms to our results. The main ....

Levente Buttyan and Jean-Pierre Hubaux. Enforcing service availability in mobile ad-hoc wans. In Proceedings of IEEE/ACM Workshop on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing (MobiHOC), Boston, MA, USA, August 2000.

....to be imprinted several times. Haas employs threshold security, allowing for several corrupted nodes or collusions [7] Garcia Luna Aceves et al. 15] looked at security of distance vector protocols in general. For the Terminodes project, incentives to cooperate by means of so called nuglets [4] that serve as a per hop payment in every packet have been suggested by Buttyan et al. to ensure forwarding. The scheme suggested here in the following sections addresses additional issues in the network layer such as traffic diversion. Marti et al. 12] observed increased throughput in mobile ad ....

L. Buttyan and J.-P. Hubaux. Enforcing service availability in mobile ad-hoc wans. MobiHOC, 2000.

....in the node configuration. The modified version of the DSR protocol checks the current node configuration and, depending on the selfishness model used for that node, decides whether to execute the networking functions. In the first model, the SN does not perform the packet forwarding function [1, 2]. When this behavior is selected, the packet forwarding function performed in the SN is disabled for all packets that have a source address or a destination address different from the current SN. However, a selfish node that operates following this model participates in the Route Discovery and ....

Levente Buttyan and Jean-Pierre Hubaux, "Enforcing Service Availability in Mobile Ad-Hoc WANs", 1st IEEE/ACM Workshop on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing (MobiHOC

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L. Buttyan and J. P. Hubaux. Enforcing Service Availability in Mobile Ad-Hoc WANs. In Proceedings of IEEE/ACM Workshop on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing (MobiHoc), Boston, MA, USA, August 2000.

....fails to do so. Their solution uses a watchdog mechanism to identify the misbehaving nodes and a pathrater mechanism to construct routes that avoid those nodes. Both the CONFIDANT [5] and the CORE [27] approaches propose a reputation based solution to identify and punish misbehaving nodes. In [6, 8], Buttyan and Hubaux use a virtual currency called nuglets to charge and reward the provision of the packet forwarding service in ad hoc networks while in [34] Zhong et al. rely on a central authority that collects receipts from the forwarding nodes and charges rewards the nodes based on these ....

L. Buttyan and J.-P. Hubaux. Enforcing Service Availability in Mobile Ad Hoc WANs. In Proceedings of MobiHOC, Boston, MA, USA, August 2000.

....track of their encounters, route discovery can be performed at a much lower cost than with traditional broadcast search methods. A more detailed overview of the security issues in wireless ad hoc networks can be found in [6] More work in the area of ad hoc network security has been reported in [26, 25, 18, 4, 24, 13, 3, 5]; these papers are loosely related to the security problems observed in this paper. 3. SYSTEM MODEL 3.1 Assumptions and overview We consider and discuss two models: the first is fully selforganized, and the second assumes the presence of a trusted authority. 3.1.1 Fully self organized ad hoc ....

L. Buttyan and J.-P. Hubaux. Enforcing service availability in mobile ad-hoc WANs. In Proceedings of the 1st IEEE/ACM MobiHoc, August 2000.

....to the resetting mechanism. It is an open question which forwarding rule would be the best with respect to this new goal. 5 Related work To the best of our knowledge, there are only two papers addressing the problem of noncooperating nodes in mobile ad hoc networks: 11] and our previous paper [6]. The authors of [11] consider the case in which some malicious nodes agree to forward packets but fail to do so. In order to cope with this problem, they propose two mechanisms: a watchdog, in charge of identifying the misbehaving nodes, and a pathrater, in charge of defining the best route ....

....by the transit traffic while still enjoying the possibility to send and to receive packets. The proposed mechanisms could be enriched in such a way that a misbehaving node would be locked out by its neighbors. However, this possibility could be exploited to mount denial of service attacks. In [6], we addressed the same problem as in this paper, and proposed a stimulation mechanism that is based on a virtual currency, called nuglets. Nuglets are used to pay for 19 Figure 11: The effect of less cooperative nodes on the average credit level in the network packet forwarding. We proposed two ....

L. Butty'an and J.-P. Hubaux. Enforcing Service Availability in Mobile Ad-Hoc WANs. In Proceedings of the 1st IEEE/ACM Workshop on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing (MobiHOC), Boston, August 2000.

....packet. 18 Figure 11: The effect of the nuglet synchronization interval on the average nuglet level in the network 6 Related work To the best of our knowledge, there are only three papers addressing the problem of non cooperating nodes in mobile ad hoc networks: 13, 6] and our previous paper [7]. The authors of [13] consider the case in which some malicious nodes agree to forward packets but fail to do so. In order to cope with this problem, they propose two mechanisms: a watchdog, in charge of identifying the misbehaving nodes, and a pathrater, in charge of defining the best route ....

.... which rates other nodes according to their observed or reported behavior, and a path manager, that maintains path rankings and performs specific actions when processing routing messages that involve misbehaving nodes (e.g. it may ignore route requests that originate from misbehaving nodes) In [7], we addressed the same problem as in this paper, and proposed a similar stimulation mechanism. In that paper, however, nuglets are interpreted as virtual money that is used to pay for packet forwarding. We proposed two payment models: the Packet Purse Model and the Packet Trade Model. In the ....

L. Buttyan and J.-P. Hubaux. Enforcing Service Availability in Mobile Ad-Hoc WANs. In Proceedings of the IEEE/ACM Workshop on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing (MobiHOC) , Boston, August 2000.

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L. Buttyan and J.-P. Hubaux. Enforcing service availability in mobile adhoc WANs. In MobiHoc '00: Proceedings of the 1st ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking & computing, pages 87--96. IEEE Press, 2000.

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Levente Buttyan and Jean-Pierre Hubaux, "Enforcing Service Availability in Mobile Ad-Hoc WANs", 1st IEEE/ACM Workshop on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing (MobiHOC 2000.

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Buttyan, L. and J.P.Hubaux, Enforcing Service Availability in Mobile Ad-Hoc WANs, In Proceeding of IEEE/ACM Workshop on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing (MobiHoc), Boston, MA, USA, August 2000.

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L. Buttyan and J.P. Hubaux. Enforcing Service Availability in Mobile Ad hoc WANs. In Proceedings of IEEE/ACM Workshop on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing (MobiHOC), Lausanne, CH, June 2002.

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L. Buttyan and J. Hubaux, "Enforcing service availability in mobile adhoc WANs," IEEE/ACM Workshop on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing (MobiHoc), Boston, MA, USA, Aug. 2000.

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L. Buttyan and J. Hubaux, "Enforcing service availability in mobile ad-hoc WANs," IEEE/ACM Workshop on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing (MobiHoc), Boston, MA, USA, Aug. 2000.

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L. Buttyan and J.P. Hubaux. Enforcing Service Availability in Mobile Ad hoc WANs. In Proceedings of IEEE/ACM Workshop on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing (MobiHOC), Lausanne, CH, June 2002.

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L. Buttyan and J.P. Hubaux. Enforcing service availability in mobile ad-hoc wans. In Proc. of IEEE/ACM MobiHOC, 2000.

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L. Buttyan and J. Hubaux, "Enforcing Service Availability in Mobile Ad-Hoc WANs", in Proc. of First Annual Workshop on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing (MobiHOC 2000), August 2000.

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L. Buttyan and J.-P. Hubaux. Enforcing service availability in mobile ad hoc wans. In Proc. 1st ACM Workshop on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing (MobiHoc 2000.

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L. Buttyan and J.P. Hubaux, "Enforcing Service Availability in Mobile Ad Hoc WANs," in proceedings of the 1st MobiHoc, BA Massachusetts, Aug. 2000.

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L. Buttyan and J.P. Hubaux. "Enforcing Service Availability in Mobile Ad Hoc WANs." 1 MobiHoc, BA Massachusetts, Aug. 2000.

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L. Buttyan and J. P. Hubaux, "Enforcing Service Availability in Mobile Ad-Hoc WANs," in Proceedings of IEEE/ACM Workshop on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing (MobiHOC), Boston, MA, USA, August 2000.

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