V. Gurvich (1988), A stochastic game with perfect information and without Nash equilibria in pure stationary strategies. Uspehi Mat. Nauk, v.43, N 2 (260), p.135-136 (in Russian). English transl. in Russian Mathematical Surveys. Home/Search Document Not in Database Summary Related Articles Check |
This paper is cited in the following contexts:
On Nash-solvability in pure stationary strategies of finite.. - Boros, Gurvich (2002) Self-citation (Gurvich) (Correct)
....transformations of local costs (see section 1.3) which do not change the normal form of a cyclic game, and hence do not change the set of Nash equilibria, either. However, for non zero sum cyclic games Nash solvability fails already in case of 2 players. An example is given by [13] see also [8] for more details) In this example two players move alternatingly in the complete bipartite digraph K 3,3 . In a way, this example is minimal, because for K 2,k bipartite digraphs Nash sovability already holds (see [10] Some other classes of cyclic game forms, Nash solvable in a stronger sense, ....
V. Gurvich (1988), A stochastic game with perfect information and without Nash equilibria in pure stationary strategies. Uspehi Mat. Nauk, v.43, N 2 (260), p.135-136 (in Russian). English transl. in Russian Mathematical Surveys.
On Nash-solvability in pure stationary strategies of finite.. - Boros, Gurvich (2001) Self-citation (Gurvich) (Correct)
....transformations of local costs (see section 1.3) which do not change the normal form of a cyclic game, and hence do not change the set of Nash equilibria, either. However, for non zero sum cyclic games Nash solvability fails already in case of 2 players. An example is given by [13] see also [8] for more details) In this example two players move alternatingly in the complete bipartite digraph K 3;3 . In a way, this example is minimal, because for K 2;k bipartite digraphs Nash sovability already holds (see [10] Some other classes of cyclic game forms, Nash solvable in a stronger sense, ....
V. Gurvich (1988), A stochastic game with perfect information and without Nash equilibria in pure stationary strategies. Uspehi Mat. Nauk, v.43, N 2 (260), p.135-136 (in Russian). English transl. in Russian Mathematical Surveys.
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