B. Horne, B. Pinkas, and T. Sander, "Escrow services and incentives in peer-to-peer networks," in Proceedings of ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC'01), October 2001. Home/Search Document Details and Download
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A Reputation-Based Approach for Choosing Reliable.. - Damiani, di.. (2002) (32 citations) (Correct)
....id associated with a servent to be a digest of a public key, obtained using a secure hash function [4] and for which the servent knows the corresponding private key. Second, each resource is associated with an identi er (digest) computed applying a secure hash function to the resource content [15]. These assumptions do not imply loss of anonymity, as the digest associated with a servent is only a pseudonym (opaque identi er ) Also, servents are not required to keep their identi ers persistent; persistence of an identi er simply allows the servent to build a reputation for it, which ....
....as to insert invalid content into the network they would rst need to provide a certain amount of resources. Reputation models allow the expression and reasoning about trust in a peer based on its past behavior [18] and interactions other peers have experienced with it. Recent approaches (e.g. [15]) propose to facilitate trust between unacquainted parties by o oading risk to a trusted third party, which acquires revenues by assuming this risk. Of course, this technique requires dropping the complete uniformity assumption typical of P2P networks. A similar approach involving a reputation ....
B. Horne, B. Pinkas, and T. Sander. Escrow services and incentives in peer-to-peer networks. In Proc. of the 3rd ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, Tampa, Florida, USA, October 2001.
Proxy Cryptography Revisited - Ivan, Dodis (Correct)
....rights by giving a proxy key to his assistent. The proxy key transforms a signature created by the vice president into the president s signature, thus allowing the assistent to cosign only if the document was first signed by the vicepresident. Another example is that of a key escrow system [13, 23, 18, 17, 14, 27], where a trusted party can mediate the conflicts between users and the law enforcement agencies. The problem is to allow the law enforcement agency to read messages encrypted for a set of users, for a limited period of time, without knowing the users secrets. The solution is to locate a key ....
B. Horne, B. Pinkas, and T. Sander. Escrow Services and Incentives in Peer-to-Peer Networks. 3rd ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2001.
Cost-Profit Analysis of a Peer-to-Peer Media Streaming.. - Hefeeda, Habib, Bhargava (2002) (Correct)
....Number of customers l Conventional P2P with a = 0.2 P2P with a = 0.4 P2P with a = 0.6 Figure 4: Profit comparison between conventional and P2P architectures. under different payment mechanisms such as micro payment, points based, and rewards for sharing. Economic incentives are proposed in [7] to motivate users to keep the content within the subscription community, instead of relying on tamper resistance protocols. Incentive mechanisms are also used to desynchronize users resource requests in order to avoid congestion in the network [8] By probabilistically waiving the cost of using ....
B. Horne, B. Pinkas, and T. Sander. Escrow services and incentives in peer-to-peer networks. In Proc. of The ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC'01), Tampa, Florida, October 2001.
Proxy Cryptography Revisited - Ivan, Dodis (Correct)
....rights by giving a proxy key to his assistent. The proxy key transforms a signature created by the vice president into the president s signature, thus allowing the assistent to co sign only if the document was first signed by the vice president. Another example is that of a key escrow system [11], where a trusted party can mediate the conflicts between users and the law enforcement agencies. The problem is to allow the law enforcement agency to read messages encrypted for a set of users, for a limited period of time, without knowing the users secrets. The solution is to locate a key ....
B. Horne, B. Pinkas, and T. Sander. Escrow Services and Incentives in Peer-to-Peer Networks. 3rd ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2001.
Performance Analysis of a Hybrid Media Streaming System - Tu, Sun, Prabhakar (Correct)
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B. Horne, B. Pinkas, and T. Sander, "Escrow services and incentives in peer-to-peer networks," in Proceedings of ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC'01), October 2001.
Limited Reputation Sharing in P2P Systems - Sergio Marti And (2004) (2 citations) (Correct)
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B. Horne, B. Pinkas, and T. Sander. Escrow services and incentives in peer-to-peer networks. In Proceedings of 3rd ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2001.
FluidMedia: an offline peer-to-peer media transaction.. - Zhang, Brignone.. (2002) (1 citation) (Correct)
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Bill Horne, Benny Pinkas and Tomas Sander. Escrow Services and Incentives in Peer-to-Peer Networks. In Proceedings of ACM conference on Electronic Commerce, October 2001.
Economics of a Collaborative Peer-to-Peer Infrastrcuture .. - Hefeeda, Afeche.. (Correct)
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B. Horne, B. Pinkas, and T. Sander. Escrow services and incentives in peer-to-peer networks. In Proc. of ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC'01), Tampa, Florida, October 2001.
Verifying Data Integrity in Peer-to-Peer Media Streaming - Habib, Xu, Atallah.. (2005) (Correct)
No context found.
B. Horne, B. Pinkas, and T. Sander. Escrow services and incentives in peer-to-peer networks. In proc. ACM Electronic Commerce (EC '01), Oct. 2001.
Cost-Profit Analysis of a Peer-to-Peer Media Streaming.. - Hefeeda, Bhargava (2003) (Correct)
No context found.
B. Horne, B. Pinkas, and T. Sander. Escrow services and incentives in peer-to-peer networks. In Proc. of ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC'01), Tampa, Florida, October 2001.
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