Steve Zdancewic and Andrew C. Myers. Secure Information Flow via Linear Continuations. Higher Order and Symbolic Computation, 15(2/3), 2002. Home/Search Document Details and Download
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Manifest Security for Distributed Information - Crary, Harper, Pfenning (2006) Self-citation (Zdancewic) (Correct)
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Steve Zdancewic and Andrew C. Myers. Secure Information Flow via Linear Continuations. Higher Order and Symbolic Computation, 15(2/3), 2002.
Manifest Security for Distributed Information - Crary, Harper, Pfenning.. (2006) Self-citation (Zdancewic) (Correct)
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Steve Zdancewic and Andrew C. Myers. Secure Information Flow via Linear Continuations. Higher Order and Symbolic Computation, 15(2/3), 2002.
Dynamic Security Labels and Noninterference - Zheng, Myers (2004) (4 citations) Self-citation (Myers) (Correct)
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Steve Zdancewic and Andrew C. Myers. Secure information flow via linear continuations. Higher Order and Symbolic Computation, 15(2--3):209--234, September 2002.
Run-time Principals in Information-flow Type Systems - Tse, Zdancewic (2004) (5 citations) Self-citation (Zdancewic) (Correct)
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S. Zdancewic and A. C. Myers. Secure information flow via linear continuations. Higher Order and Symbolic Computation, 15(2/3), 2002.
Language-Based Information-Flow Security - Sabelfeld, Myers (2003) (80 citations) Self-citation (Myers) (Correct)
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S. Zdancewic and A. C. Myers, "Secure information flow via linear continuations," Higher Order and Symbolic Computation, vol. 15, no. 2--3, pp. 209--234, Sept. 2002.
Observational Determinism for Concurrent Program Security - Zdancewic, Myers (2003) (3 citations) Self-citation (Zdancewic Myers) (Correct)
....systems for tracking information flow within programs are an attractive way to enforce security properties such as data confidentiality and integrity. Recent work has proposed a number of security typed languages whose type systems statically check information flow, ranging from simple calculi [28, 45, 17, 1, 38, 49, 41, 19, 18] to full featured languages [27, 50, 30, 4] Many systems for which information security is important are concurrent for example, web servers, databases, operating systems yet the problem of checking information flow in concurrent programming languages has not yet received a satisfactory ....
.... to serve as a user level programming language (its syntax and type system are too unwieldy) Instead, it is intended to serve as a model language for studying information flow and concurrency; nevertheless, using these constructs, one can encode (via CPS translation) other security typed languages [49]. The approach taken here is to factor the information security analysis into two pieces: a type system that eliminates both explicit and implicit storage channels, and a racefreedom analysis that eliminates timing channels. Factoring the security analysis makes both the information flow analysis ....
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S. Zdancewic and A. C. Myers. Secure information flow via linear continuations. Higher Order and Symbolic Computation, 15(2--3):209--234, Sept. 2002.
Language-Based Information-Flow Security - Sabelfeld, Myers (2003) (80 citations) Self-citation (Myers) (Correct)
....usable as ordinary values) They propose a type system for confidentiality and integrity in SLam and prove a noninterference theorem using logical relations. They also extend SLam and the type system with state and concurrency, but do not prove noninterference. Zdancewic and Myers [12] [76] define a secure calculus that has first class continuations, state, and references, and prove that its type system enforces noninterference. Continuations are a more expressive control construct than functions. They also show that a fragment of SLam, augmented with state and references, can be ....
....much attention in studies of secure information flow. One difficulty with checking information flow in low level languages is that useful information about program structure is lost during compilation. Consequently, typical source language techniques do not generalize straightforwardly [12] [76], 119] Zdancewic and Myers [12] 76] present a type system that ensures noninterference in low level programs in which the only control construct is continuations (which correspond to indirect branches at the machine code level [120] Ordered linear continuation types enforce a stack ....
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S. Zdancewic and A. C. Myers, "Secure information flow via linear continuations," Higher Order and Symbolic Computation, vol. 15, no. 2--3, 2002, To appear.
A Monadic Analysis of Information Flow Security with Mutable.. - Karl Crary Aleksey (Correct)
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S. Zdancewic and A. C. Myers. Secure information flow via linear continuations. Higher Order and Symbolic Computation, 15(2-3):209--234, Sept. 2002. A Informativeness judgment
A Monadic Analysis of Information Flow Security with Mutable.. - Karl Crary Aleksey (Correct)
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S. Zdancewic and A. C. Myers. Secure information flow via linear continuations. Higher Order and Symbolic Computation, 15(2-3):209--234, Sept. 2002. 13
A Monadic Analysis of Information Flow Security with Mutable .. - Cmu-Cs- School Of (Correct)
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S. Zdancewic and A. C. Myers. Secure information flow via linear continuations. Higher Order and Symbolic Computation, 15(2-3):209--234, Sept. 2002. A Judgments A.1 Informativeness judgment rules
Under consideration for publication in J. Functional.. - Karl Crary Aleksey (Correct)
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Zdancewic, Steve, & Myers, Andrew C. (2002). Secure information flow via linear continuations.
JFP 15 (2): 249--291, 2005. c - Cambridge University Press (2005) (Correct)
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Zdancewic, S. and Myers, A. C. (2002) Secure information flow via linear continuations.
Checking Secure Information Flow in Java Bytecode.. - Bernardeschi, De.. (Correct)
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A.C. Myers S. Zdancewic. Secure information flow via linear continuations. Higher Order and Symbolic Computation, 15(2/3), 2002.
A Monadic Analysis of Information Flow Security with.. - Crary, Kliger, Pfenning (2004) (1 citation) (Correct)
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S. Zdancewic and A. C. Myers. Secure information flow via linear continuations. Higher Order and Symbolic Computation, 15(2-3):209--234, Sept. 2002. 13
Type-Based Information Flow Analysis for the Pi-Calculus - Kobayashi (2003) (2 citations) (Correct)
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S. Zdancewic and A. C. Myers. Secure information flow via linear continuations. Higher-Order and Symbolic Computation, 15(2/3):209--234, 2002.
A Monadic Analysis of Information Flow Security with.. - Crary, Kliger, Pfenning (2003) (1 citation) (Correct)
No context found.
S. Zdancewic and A. C. Myers. Secure information flow via linear continuations. Higher Order and Symbolic Computation, 15(2-3):209--234, Sept. 2002.
A Monadic Analysis of Information Flow Security with.. - Crary, Kliger, Pfenning (2003) (1 citation) (Correct)
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S. Zdancewic and A. C. Myers. Secure information flow via linear continuations. Higher Order and Symbolic Computation, 15(2-3):209--234, Sept.
Type-Based Information Flow Analysis for Low-Level Languages - Kobayashi, Shirane (2002) (3 citations) (Correct)
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Steve Zdancewic and Andrew C. Myers. Secure information flow via linear continuations. Higher-Order and Symbolic Computation, 2002. To appear. A preliminary version appeared in Proceedings of ESOP 2001, Springer LNCS 2028, pp.46--61.
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