C. Andrew Neff. A verifiable secret shuffle and its application to e-voting. In 8th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS 2001. Home/Search Document Details and Download
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Universal Re-encryption for Mixnets - Golle, Jakobsson, Juels, Syverson (2002) (16 citations) (Correct)
....[6, 29] a variety of schemes and properties have been introduced. One of the most relevant properties for a mix network is that of correctness, namely the assurance that inputs are not tampered with by servers so as to alter their underlying plaintexts. Correctness may be universally verifiable [27, 2, 1, 19, 26, 14, 22] meaning that the correctness of the output with respect to the input may be checked by any player, whether or not a participant in the mixing process. Alternatively, the correctness guarantees may rely on honest behavior by a majority of mix servers. Examples of this type of robustness can be ....
....of a universal ciphertext produces a new universal ciphertext that corresponds to an encryption of the same plaintext under the same public key. It is also desirable that a server that mixes the inputs can prove that it operated correctly. This can be done using a number of existing schemes, e.g. [22, 26, 14], and will be discussed in greater detail below. 3. Retrieval of the outputs. Potential recipients must try to decrypt every encrypted message output by the universal mixnet. Successful decryptions correspond to messages that were intended for that recipient. The others (corresponding to ....
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A. Neff. A verifiable secret shuffle and its application to e-voting. In P. Samarati, editor, ACM CCS '01, pages 116--125. ACM Press, 2001.
Making Mix Nets Robust For Electronic Voting By.. - Jakobsson, Juels, Rivest (2002) (16 citations) (Correct)
.... net can be obtained in serveral different ways, namely cut and choose [17, 2] repetition robustness [11, 12, 15] standard zeroknowledge proofs in sorting networks [3, 13] use of multiple participants per layer [8, 18] error detecting techniques [14] and techniques based on secret sharing [10, 16]. We explain the relations between these in Section 2. In most of these schemes, a detected cheating attempt results in the emulation of of the cheater (such as in [14] or the restarting of the protocol after a replacement of the cheater (such as in [17] In some schemes, such as [8, 18] ....
....in its nodes. While it offers public verifiability at reasonable cost, its asymptotic behavior makes it useful primarly for batches of small or moderate sizes; it becomes impractical for large elections. More recently, techniques developed independently by Furukawa and Sako [10] and by Neff [16] employ what may loosely be regarded as secretsharing mechanisms to detect corruptions of data. Both of these techniques are publicly verifiable, and have costs linear in the number of inputs (and servers) While they offer features well suited for use in large scale elections, our proposed ....
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A. Neff. A verifiable secret shuffle and its application to e-voting. In P. Samarati, editor, ACM CCS '01, pages 116--125. ACM Press, 2001.
Cryptographic Voting Protocols: A Systems Perspective - Chris Karlof Naveen (2005) (1 citation) (Correct)
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C. Andrew Neff. A verifiable secret shuffle and its application to e-voting. In 8th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS 2001.
Designing Voting Machines for Verification - Naveen Sastry Tadayoshi (Correct)
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C. A. Neff. A verifiable secret shuffle and its application to e-voting. In 8th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS 2001.
A Verifiable Secret Shuffle of Homomorphic Encryptions - Groth (Correct)
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A. Neff, "A Verifiable Secret Shuffle and its Application to E-Voting", ACM CCS '01: p. 116-125, 2001
Making Mix Nets Robust for Electronic Voting by.. - Jakobsson, Juels, Rivest (2002) (16 citations) (Correct)
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A. Neff. A verifiable secret shuffle and its application to e-voting. In P. Samarati, editor, ACM CCS '01, pages 116--125. ACM Press, 2001.
Mixminion: Design of a Type III Anonymous Remailer Protocol - Danezis, Dingledine.. (2003) (18 citations) (Correct)
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C. A. Neff. A verifiable secret shuffle and its application to e-voting. In P. Samarati, editor, 8th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS-8), pages 116--125. ACM Press, November 2001. ourtechnology/technicaldocs/shuffle. pdf>.
A Verifiable Secret Shuffle of Homomorphic Encryptions - Groth (2003) (Correct)
No context found.
A. Neff, "A Verifiable Secret Shuffle and its Application to E-Voting", ACM CCS '01: p. 116-125, 2001
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