Gavin Lowe. A heirarchy of authentication specications. In 10th Computer Security Foundations Workshop Proceedings, pages 31-43. IEEE Computer Society Press, 1997.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles

....where one strand sends a message and another strand receives that same message. Typically, for a protocol to be correct, each such bundle must contain one strand for each of the legitimate principals apparently participating in this session, all agreeing on the principals, nonces, and session keys [15, 26, 32]. Penetrator strands or stray legitimate strands may also be entangled in a bundle, even in a correct protocol, but they should not prevent the legitimate parties from agreeing on the data values, or from maintaining the secrecy of the values chosen. One may think of a bundle as collecting all of ....

....a fact we will establish later as Corollary 6.12. We have proved it separately here because it is useful in Section 5 and because we wanted to illustrate a straightforward use of this characteristic proof method. 4 Notions of Correctness Gavin Lowe studies a range of authentication properties in [15]; strand spaces are a natural model for stating and proving his agreement properties, which are akin to the correspondence properties of Woo and Lam [32] A protocol guarantees agreement to a participant B (say, as the responder) for certain data items x if: each time a principal B completes a ....

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Gavin Lowe. A heirarchy of authentication specications. In 10th Computer Security Foundations Workshop Proceedings, pages 31-43. IEEE Computer Society Press, 1997.

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