G. Brassard, N. Lutkenhaus, T. Mor, and B. C. Sanders, Limitations of practical quantum cryptography, Phys. Rev. Lett., 85(2000), 1330--1333.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   APS   Related Articles

....Bob can broadcast messages, or if they already share some small number of secret bits in advance, to authenticate the classical channel. The other two assumptions (the perfectly secure labs, and the creation of qubits) are discussed in some papers regarding practical cryptography (see for instance [7]) but more work is required to justify them. Using this setting, many physicists and computer scientists have tried to prove the security of various quantum key distribution schemes in the last decade. The conventional measure of security is the information Eve can obtain on the final key, and a ....

....proof of BBBMR ( 11, 12] and shortly after ( 13] based on various di#erent methods 2 , hence this old standing important problem of the security is now considered solved. However, it is important to have several approaches since a. practical quantum key distribution is not yet proven secure [7], b. it is rather common in cryptography that proofs of security are found wrong or incomplete once better understanding is obtained (though this statement probably does not apply to any of the proposed proofs in the case of QKD) and c. di#erent proofs are sometimes based upon di#erent ....

G. Brassard, N. Lutkenhaus, T. Mor, and B. C. Sanders, Limitations of practical quantum cryptography, Phys. Rev. Lett., 85(2000), 1330--1333.

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