| T. Dierks and C. Allen. The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. IETF RFC 2246, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2246.txt, 1999. |
....according to possession of capabilities, not according to extrinsic factors such as location. Our definitions capture some properties established by conventional security protocols. For example, consider two principals connected by a Transport Layer Security (TLS, also known as SSL) connection [7], who send and receive clear text messages that are encrypted and decrypted by the connection. Then that channel is both send constrained and receive constrained on the predicate #(p) #(p) R sc# rc# Figure 1. Send and receive constrained channels possesses secret key K forsomeK ....
T. Dierks and C. Allen (1999). "Transport Layer Security". RFC 2246. www.ietf.org.
....channel rc f on the predicate f: f(receiver(m) for any message m appearing in an operation rc f .send(m) These definitions capture some properties established by conventional security protocols. For example, consider two principals connected by a Transport Layer Security (TLS) connection [7], who send and receive clear text messages that are encrypted and decrypted by the connection. Then that channel is both sendconstrained and receive constrained on the predicate possesses secret key K for some K negotiated by the TLS protocol. But constrained channels are designed to capture a ....
T. Dierks and C. Allen (1999). "Transport Layer Security". RFC 2246. www.ietf.org.
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T. Dierks and C. Allen. The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. IETF RFC 2246, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2246.txt, 1999.
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