Helger Lipmaa, N. Asokan, and Valtteri Niemi. Secure Vickrey Auctions without Threshold Trust. In Matt Blaze, editor, Financial Cryptography --- Sixth International Conference, volume ? of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages ?--?, Southhampton Beach, Bermuda, March 11--14 2002. Springer-Verlag. To appear.  Home/Search   Document Details and Download   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....and sell the items on the Internet. In the cryptographic literature, auction is also an attractive topic for the researchers to design a secure and practical protocol employing cryptographic primitives. To date, many researchers have studied and published various and outstanding auction protocols [1, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17]. As there are a variety of auction styles such as English, Dutch, Sealed Bid, Vickrey, and M 1, etc. refer to [2] for details) whose rules are quite di#erent, each protocol has distinctive goals and decision strategies depending on its own style. Our target among the auction styles is to design ....

.... Institute of Industrial Science, Univ. of Tokyo, Meguro ku, Tokyo, 153 8505, Japan. treated non repudiation as a mandatory requirement. But, 16] does not meet anonymity so that these protocols raise privacy problem. 9] cannot resolve tiebreaking which compromises non repudiation. In others [1, 4, 7, 10, 11, 12, 15, 17], they seems to be anonymous in that only the indices of the winner are revealed to the auctioneer at the end of protocol. However, inevitably, the auctioneer must perform supplementary communications with the winner, namely who is placed in the winning indices, to confirm the fact that he ....

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H.Lipmaa, N.Asokan, and V.Niemi, Secure Vickrey Auctions without Threshold Trust, To appear in Proc. of Financial Cryptography '02, 2002.

....protocols [GMW87, CCD88b, CCD88a, BOGW88, GB96] recent results report more and more applications. Several reports are enthusiastic about the impressing results that can be achieved using semi trusted parties [SM] However, the final success of this kind of techniques is not yet clear [LAN02]. Bra02b] show how simple auctions can be solved privately without any servers and auctioneers. Here we address a more general class of maximization problems that allows us to approach problems such like combinatorial auctions with multiple buyers and sellers. 2.1 Maximization problems An ....

Helger Lipmaa, N. Asokan, and Valtteri Niemi. Secure Vickrey Auctions without Threshold Trust. In Financial Cryptography 2002, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Southhampton Beach, Bermuda, 11--14 March 2002. Springer-Verlag. To appear.

....more general (M 1)st price auctions attracted much attention. Starting with the work by Franklin and Reiter [13] which introduced the basic problems of sealed bid auctions, but disregarded the privacy of bids after the auction is finished, many secure auction mechanisms have been proposed, e.g. [1, 2, 4, 8, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 25, 28, 31, 32]. When taking away all the protocols that (in their current form) are only suitable for the secure execution of first price auctions or reveal (partial) information after the auction is finished [13, 32, 25, 24, 15, 19, 31, 4] the remaining work can be divided into two categories. Most of the ....

....can already exploit the bidders trust. We argue that distributing the trust onto several distinct auctioneers does not solve the privacy problem, because you can never rule out that some of them, or even all of them, collude. This point of view is supported in a growing number of publications [20, 21, 29]. The remaining auction protocols prune the auctioneer s ability to falsify the auction outcome and reveal confidential information by introducing a new third party that is not fully trusted. However, all of these approaches make weak assumptions about the trustworthiness of this third party. In ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

H. Lipmaa, N. Asokan, and V. Niemi. Secure Vickrey auctions without threshold trust. In Proceedings of the 6th Annual Conference on Financial Cryptography, 2002. to appear. 14

....recently (M 1)st price auctions attracted much attention. Starting with the work by Franklin and Reiter [13] which introduced the basic problems of sealed bid auctions, but disregarded the privacy of bids after the auction is finished, many secure auction mechanisms have been proposed, e.g. [1, 2, 4, 8, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 25, 26, 30, 33, 34, 37]. When taking away all the protocols that (in their current form) are not suitable for the secure execution of second price auctions or reveal (partial) information after the auction is finished [13, 34, 26, 25, 15, 19, 33, 4] the remaining work can be divided into two categories. Most of the ....

....can already exploit the bidders trust. We argue that distributing the trust onto several distinct auctioneers does not solve the privacy problem, because you can never rule out that some of them, or even all of them, collude. This point of view is supported in a growing number of publications [20, 21, 31]. The remaining auction protocols prune the auctioneer s ability to falsify the auction outcome and reveal confidential information by introducing a new third party that is not fully trusted. However, all of these approaches make weak assumptions about the trustworthiness of this third party. In ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

H. Lipmaa, N. Asokan, and V. Niemi. Secure Vickrey auctions without threshold trust. In Proceedings of the 6th Annual Conference on Financial Cryptography, 2002. to appear.

....recently (M 1)st price auctions attracted much attention. Starting with the work by Franklin and Reiter [13] which introduced the basic problems of sealed bid auctions, but disregarded the privacy of bids after the auction is finished, many secure auction mechanisms have been proposed, e.g. [1, 2, 4, 8, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 25, 26, 30, 33, 34]. When taking away all the protocols that (in their current form) are not suitable for the secure execution of second price auctions or reveal (partial) information after the auction is finished [13, 34, 26, 25, 15, 19, 33, 4] the remaining work can be divided into two categories. Most of the ....

....can already exploit the bidders trust. We argue that distributing the trust onto several distinct auctioneers does not solve the privacy problem, because you can never rule out that some of them, or even all of them, collude. This point of view is supported in a growing number of publications [20, 21, 31]. The remaining auction protocols prune the auctioneer s ability to falsify the auction outcome and reveal confidential information by introducing a new third party that is not fully trusted. However, all of these approaches make weak assumptions about the trustworthiness of this third party. In ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

H. Lipmaa, N. Asokan, and V. Niemi. Secure Vickrey auctions without threshold trust. In Proceedings of the 6th Annual Conference on Financial Cryptography, 2002. to appear.

....equivalent to English auctions for bidders that privately evaluate a good, attracted much attention. Starting with the work by Franklin and Reiter [9] which introduced the basic problems, but disregarded the privacy of bids after the auction, many secure auction mechanisms have been proposed [1, 3, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 21, 24, 27, 28]. When taking away all the protocols that (in their current form) are not suitable for the secure execution of second price auctions or reveal (partial) information after the auction is finished [9, 28, 21, 20, 11, 15, 27, 3] the remaining work can be divided into two categories. Most of the ....

....of five auctioneer servers can already exploit the bidders trust. We argue that distributing the trust onto several distinct auctioneers does not solve the general problem, because you can never rule out that all of them collude. This point of view is supported in a growing number of publications [16, 17, 25]. The remaining auction protocols prune the auctioneer s ability to falsify the auction outcome and reveal confidential information by introducing a new third party, that is not fully trusted. However, all of these approaches make weak assumptions about the trustworthiness of this third party. In ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

H. Lipmaa, N. Asokan, and V. Niemi. Secure Vickrey auctions without threshold trust. In Proceedings of the 6th Annual Conference on Financial Cryptography, 2002. to appear.

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Helger Lipmaa, N. Asokan, and Valtteri Niemi. Secure Vickrey Auctions without Threshold Trust. In Matt Blaze, editor, Financial Cryptography --- Sixth International Conference, volume ? of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages ?--?, Southhampton Beach, Bermuda, March 11--14 2002. Springer-Verlag. To appear.

No context found.

Helger Lipmaa, N. Asokan, and Valtteri Niemi. Secure Vickrey Auctions without Threshold Trust. In Matt Blaze, editor, Financial Cryptography --- Sixth International Conference, volume 2357 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 87--101, Southhampton Beach, Bermuda, March 11--14, 2002. Springer-Verlag.

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Helger Lipmaa, N. Asokan, and Valtteri Niemi. Secure Vickrey Auctions without Threshold Trust. In Matt Blaze, editor, Financial Cryptography | Sixth International Conference, volume 2357 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 87-101, Southhampton Beach, Bermuda, March 11-14 2002. Springer-Verlag.

No context found.

Helger Lipmaa, N. Asokan, and Valtteri Niemi. Secure Vickrey Auctions without Threshold Trust. In Matt Blaze, editor, Financial Cryptography | Sixth International Conference, volume 2357 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 87-101, Southhampton Beach, Bermuda, March 11-14 2002. Springer-Verlag.

....After that, we propose a general model for cryptographic protocols that involve social or financial choices (e.g. voting or auctions) In this model one can implement any function from class PD (e.g. maximum finding in the case of auctions) by using subquadratic length interaction. As [CGS97,DJ01,LAN02], our model uses a certain encoding function enc together with a homomorphic public key cryptosystem. Finally, we propose a few alternative constructions for the encoding function. Until now, one has mostly used the function enc(n) a , where a is an a priori fixed upper limit on the number ....

....a certain encoding function enc together with a homomorphic public key cryptosystem. Finally, we propose a few alternative constructions for the encoding function. Until now, one has mostly used the function enc(n) a , where a is an a priori fixed upper limit on the number of participants [DJ01,LAN02]. We show that one can instead used the function enc(n) Z a (n) where Z a (n) is the nth member of a certain Lucas sequence, to achieve otherwise exactly the same properties as in [DJ01,LAN02] but with linear length (instead of quadratic length) correctness arguments. We also propose an ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

Helger Lipmaa, N. Asokan, and Valtteri Niemi. Secure Vickrey Auctions without Threshold Trust. In Matt Blaze, editor, Financial Cryptography --- Sixth International Conference, volume 2357 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 87-- 101, Southhampton Beach, Bermuda, March 11--14 2002. Springer-Verlag.

....and respondent will execute a variant of OT with choice , during which the interviewer only gets to know the value . Then the respondent argues that the sum of all commitments is a commitment to the value i D D j , for some j 2 [1; m] by using range proofs in exponents [LAN02]. A more efficient proof methodology is available when D is a prime [LAN02] given that one uses an integer commitment scheme. Additionally, she argues that every single commitment corresponds to a value i for i 2 [1; m] also using range proofs of exponents [LAN02] After the OT step, the ....

....which the interviewer only gets to know the value . Then the respondent argues that the sum of all commitments is a commitment to the value i D D j , for some j 2 [1; m] by using range proofs in exponents [LAN02] A more efficient proof methodology is available when D is a prime [LAN02], given that one uses an integer commitment scheme. Additionally, she argues that every single commitment corresponds to a value i for i 2 [1; m] also using range proofs of exponents [LAN02] After the OT step, the interviewer gets g , and recovers from it efficiently. Note that m ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

Helger Lipmaa, N. Asokan, and Valtteri Niemi. Secure Vickrey Auctions without Threshold Trust. In Matt Blaze, editor, Financial Cryptography --- Sixth International Conference, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Southhampton Beach, Bermuda, March 11--14 2002. Springer-Verlag. To appear.

....Andrew Yao [Yao82] was the first to consider cryptographic (English) auctions. The first cryptographically secure Vickrey auction scheme that provides losers privacy was proposed in [NS93] A large number of cryptographic Vickrey auction schemes have been proposed since that. See [NPS99,LAN02] for some examples and overview of related literature. Such schemes would satisfy all desired properties that were described in the beginning of this chapter, except that they do not minimize the cognitive cost. In particular, the best cryptographic auction schemes guarantee the auction ....

....particular, the best cryptographic auction schemes guarantee the auction correctness, and privacy, to the extend required by the auction mechanism. In the following we will shortly describe a simplified version of the LAN auction scheme by Lipmaa, Asokan and Niemi. The full version of this scheme [LAN02] incorporates, in particular, protection against replay attacks. The LAN scheme has B bidders, a seller S and an auction authority A. Anybody who has something to sell can act as S (i.e. no trust can be put on S) while the authority is an established business party with a reputation history. In ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

Helger Lipmaa, N. Asokan, and Valtteri Niemi. Secure Vickrey Auctions without Threshold Trust. In Matt Blaze, editor, Financial Cryptography --- Sixth International Conference, volume ? of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages ?--?, Southhampton Beach, Bermuda, 11--14 March 2002. Springer-Verlag. To appear.

No context found.

H. Lipmaa, N. Asokan and V. Niemi. Secure Vickrey Auctions without Threshold Trust. Proc. of Financial Cryptography 2002, (LNCS 2357), pp. 87-101 (2002).

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Lipmaa, H., Asokan, N., Niemi, V.: Secure Vickrey auctions without threshold trust. In: Proc. of the 6th Annual Conference on Financial Cryptography. (2002)

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Helger Lipmaa, N. Asokan and Valtteri Niemi. Secure Vickrey Auctions without Threshold Trust. In Sixth Annual Proceedings of Financial Cryptography, 2002.

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Lipmaa, H., Asokan, N., Niemi, V.: Secure Vickrey auctions without threshold trust. In: Proc. of the 6th Annual Conference on Financial Cryptography. (2002)

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Helger Lipmaa, N. Asokan and Valtteri Niemi. Secure Vickrey Auctions without Threshold Trust. In Sixth Annual Proceedings of Financial Cryptography, 2002.

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H. Lipmaa, N. Asokan, and V. Niemi. Secure Vickrey auctions without threshold trust. In M. Blaze, editor, Proceedings of the 6th Annual Conference on Financial Cryptography (FC), volume 2357 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer, 2002. to appear.

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