Hershberger, J. and S. Suri: 2001, `Vickrey Pricing in Network Routing: Fast Payment Computation'. In: Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science. pp. 252--259. Home/Search Document Details and Download
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Truthful and Competitive Double Auctions - Deshmukh, Goldberg, Hartline.. (2002) (Correct)
....most important positive results in this eld is aforementioned family of Vickrey Clarke Groves mechanisms. Recent work in computer science pertaining to these elds has focused largely on merging the considerations of incentives (e.g. truthfulness) with considerations of computational complexity [12,18,19,20]. One of the rst examples of such work is the paper of Nisan and Ronen [19] where the mechanism design framework is applied to some standard optimization problems in computer science, such as shortest paths and scheduling on unrelated machines. Of course, auctions, be they traditional or ....
J. Hershberger and S. Suri. Vickrey Pricing in network routing: Fast payment computation. In Proc. of the 42nd IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2001.
Competitive Generalized Auctions - Fiat, Goldberg, Hartline (2002) (26 citations) (Correct)
.... One of the most important positive results in this eld is the family of Vickrey Clarke Groves mechanisms [4, 8, 21] Recent work in computer science pertaining to these elds has focused largely on merging the considerations of incentives with considerations of computational complexity (e.g. [9, 14, 15, 16]) One of the rst examples of such work is the paper of Nisan and Ronen [15] in which the mechanism design framework is applied to some standard optimization problems in computer science, such as shortest paths and scheduling on unrelated machines. Another line of research focuses on the ....
J. Hershberger and S. Suri. Vickrey Pricing in network routing: Fast payment computation. In Proc. of the 42nd IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2001.
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents - Archer, Tardos (2001) (39 citations) (Correct)
....boils down to a one parameter problem that is a special case of ours, as 3 we show in the full version of this paper. While all of these papers depart from the standard VCG mechanism, they still aim to maximize the utilitarian objective, whereas we look at general objective functions. Both [14] and [3] consider cases where the VCG mechanism can be computed in polynomial time, and address how to speed up this run time. While we are interested in polytime computable mechanisms, we make no attempt to optimize the run time. Nisan and Ronen [24] applied the mechanism design framework to ....
J. Hershberger and S. Suri. Vickrey pricing in network routing: Fast payment computation. In FOCS, 2001.
Frugal Path Mechanisms - Archer, Tardos (33 citations) (Correct)
....[23, 4, 9] is the main general positive result here. Nisan and Ronen [17] applied the mechanism design framework to some standard optimization problems in computer science, such as shortest paths and scheduling on unrelated machines, and raised some associated computational issues. The papers [11] and [18] address computational di#culties with the VCG mechanism. The topic of revenue maximizing auctions has received a huge amount of attention. See the recent papers [1, 3, 6, 7, 8, 14, 16, 21, 22] or [5] for a recent survey on combinatorial auctions. The issue of frugality is raised in ....
John Hershberger and Subhash Suri. Vickrey pricing in network routing: Fast payment computation. In Proceedings of the 42 nd IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2001.
Towards Fast Vickrey-Pricing Using Constraint Programming - Holland, O'Sullivan (2004) (Correct)
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Hershberger, J. and S. Suri: 2001, `Vickrey Pricing in Network Routing: Fast Payment Computation'. In: Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science. pp. 252--259.
Fast Vickrey-Pricing for the Assignment Problem - Holland, O'Sullivan (2003) (Correct)
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John Hershberger and Subhash Suri. Vickrey pricing in network routing: Fast payment computation. In Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pages 252--259, 2001.
Competitiveness via Consensus - Goldberg, Hartline (2002) (Correct)
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J. Hershberger and S. Suri. Vickrey Pricing in network routing: Fast payment computation. In Proc. of the 42nd IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2001.
Multi-Player and Multi-Round Auctions with Severely.. - Blumrosen, Nisan, Segal (2003) (5 citations) (Correct)
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J. Hershberger and S. Suri. Vickrey pricing in network routing: Fast payment computation. In 42th FOCS, 2001. 13
Competitiveness via Consensus - Goldberg, Hartline (2002) (Correct)
No context found.
J. Hershberger and S. Suri. Vickrey Pricing in network routing: Fast payment computation. In Proc. of the 42nd IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2001.
Competitiveness via Consensus - Goldberg, Hartline (2002) (Correct)
No context found.
J. Hershberger and S. Suri. Vickrey Pricing in network routing: Fast payment computation. In Proc. of the 42nd IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2001.
Competitive Generalized Auctions - Fiat, Goldberg, Hartline, Karlin (2002) (26 citations) (Correct)
No context found.
J. Hershberger and S. Suri. Vickrey Pricing in network routing: Fast payment computation. In Proc. of the 42nd IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2001.
Coalitional Games on Graphs: Core Structure, Substitutes .. - Garg, Kumar, Rudra.. (2002) (Correct)
No context found.
J. Hershberger and S. Suri, \Vickrey Pricing in Network Routing: Fast Payment Computation", in FOCS 2001.
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