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Levi, I. Imprecision and indeterminacy in probability judgement. Philosophy of Science 52, 3 (1985), 390--409.

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Nonlinear Filtering of Convex Sets of Probability Distributions - Kenney, Stirling (2002)   (Correct)

....where we are unable to specify with con dence the prior distribution of a parameter set. Our method of dealing with this problem is to characterize the prior as a convex set of distributions, rather than a singleton. The convexity assumption is adopted since, as noted by Levi (Levi, 1980; Levi, 1985), it permits the suspension of judgment between choices. Thus, if p 1 (x; t 0 ) and p 2 (x; t 0 ) are possible prior distributions for x t 0 , then so is every convex combination 4 p 1 (x; t 0 ) 1 )p 2 (x; t 0 ) where 2 [0; 1] The ltering problem is then to propagate and update this ....

Levi, I. (1985). Imprecision and indeterminacy in probability judgement. Philos. Sci., 52:390-409.


Algorithms for Imprecise Probabilities - Moral   (Correct)

.... of the work on imprecise probabilities has focused on the particular case of interval probabilities [1, 12, 13, 17, 19, 20, 21, 67, 24, 46, 47, 52, 64, 63] However, the most general approach that have been used for imprecise probabities consists in the use of convex sets of probability measures [15, 9, 16, 33, 39, 40, 44, 49, 59, 60, 62, 69, 70, 71]. The basic idea is that if for a variable we do not have the exact values of probabilities, we may have a convex set of probability distributions. From a behavioral point of view the use of convex sets of probabilities was justified by Walley [69] According to this author what distinguishes this ....

I. Levi. Imprecision and indeterminacy in probability judgement. Philosophy of Science, 52:390--409, 1985.


Independence Concepts for Convex Sets of Probabilities - Luis De (1995)   (4 citations)  (Correct)

....of the concept of independence, we shall consider the problem of building a global convex set from marginal convex sets of probabilities. 1 INTRODUCTION Convex sets of probabilities have been used as a model for unknown or partially known probabilities (Cano et al. 1991, Dempster 1967, Levi 1985, Stirling and Morrel 1991, Walley 1991) The basic idea is that if for a variable we do not have the exact values of probabilities, we may have a convex set of probability distributions. From a behavioural point of view the use of convex sets of probabilities was justified by Walley (1991) ....

I. Levi (1985) Imprecision and indeterminacy in probability judgement Philosophy of Science 52, 390-409.


Set-Based Bayesianism - Kyburg, Jr., Pittarelli (1992)   (2 citations)  (Correct)

....set of functions. The approach would be Bayesian by (among other things) retaining the requirement that a decision method for sets of probability functions reduce, for unit sets, to maximization of expected utility. 2. Problems for Strict Bayesianism. We use the term strict Bayesianism following Levi (1985). According to the strict Bayesian view, a rational agent is committed to recognizing a single probability function for use in computing expected utilities in any given context of deliberation, and is compelled to select a course of action that has maximum expected utility, relative to that ....

....and updating probabilities, convex Bayesianism includes strict Bayesianism as the special case in which S is a singleton. 3.1 Imprecision vs. Indeterminacy In each of the examples of the previous section, the available information naturally determines a set of classical probability functions. Levi (1985) distinguishes two attitudes toward such sets. Under the black box (Good, 1962) interpretation, the agent is committed to some single (unknown) element of this set whether he knows it or not . This view is not incompatible with strict Bayesianism. Maximum entropy or other techniques may be ....

Levi, I.: 1985, 'Imprecision and Indeterminacy in Probability Judgment', Philosophy of Science, 52, 390-409.


An Extended Set-valued Kalman Filter - Morrell Arizona State   (Correct)

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Levi, I. Imprecision and indeterminacy in probability judgement. Philosophy of Science 52, 3 (1985), 390--409.


An Extended - Set-Valued Kalman Filter   (Correct)

No context found.

LEVI, I. Imprecision and indeterminacy in probability judgement. Philosophy of Science 52, 3 (1985), 390--409.

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