Christopher A. Stein, John H. Howard, and Margo I. Seltzer. Unifying file system protection. In Proceedings of the 2001.  Home/Search   Document Details and Download   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....consistent, while Bayou shifts much of this burden to application supplied merge procedures. Finally, L # s design focuses on providing useful semantics to connected clients, while Bayou focuses on managing conflicts caused by updates from disconnected clients. TDB [3] S4 [13] and PFS [12] use logging and (for TDB and PFS) collision resistant hashes to allow modifications by malicious users or corrupted storage devices to be detected and (with S4) undone; L # uses similar techniques. 8 Conclusion consistent data structures in DHTs. L # represents the data as a log of operations ....

C. Stein, J. Howard, and M. Seltzer. Unifying file system protection. In Proc. of the USENIX Technical Conference, pages 79--90, 2001.

....the world on an explicit request from the application. XOM protects data stored in memory by appending the data blocks with a MAC of itself. To prevent an adversary from copying blocks from one memory address to another, the block s address is included in the MAC. The Protected File System (PFS) SHS01] and the Transparent Cryptographic File System (TCFS) CCSP01] use similar integrity protection mechanisms. As described in Section 1.2, this approach is vulnerable to replay attacks. For example, XOM will not notice if stores to memory are never performed (except when memory is first ....

C. Stein, J. Howard, and M. Seltzer. Unifying file system protection. In Proceedings of the USENIX Annual Technical Conference, Boston, MA, 2001.

....or order of the logs. Ivy is vulnerable to DHash returning stale copies of signed log heads; Ivy could detect stale data using techniques introduced by SUNDR [24] Ivy s use of logs makes it slow, although this inefficiency is partially offset by its snapshot mechanism. TDB [20] S4 [38] and PFS [36] use logging and (for TDB and PFS) collision resistant hashes to allow modifications by malicious users or corrupted storage devices to be detected and (with S4) undone; Ivy uses similar techniques in a distributed file system context. Spreitzer et al. 35] suggest ways to use cryptographically ....

C. Stein, J. Howard, and M. Seltzer. Unifying file system protection. In Proc. of the USENIX Technical Conference, pages 79--90, 2001.

....stored on the smartcard. Similarly, set top box user may view TV channels for free by reading secret keys from the set top box s storage. The research prototypes that provide secrecy and tamperdetection typically use a combination of symmetric key encryption and one way hash trees (Merkle trees) [12, 9, 20]. Nodes of a Merkle tree contain one way hashes [14] The internal nodes validate their children and leaf nodes validate data records. Data records are updated and validated by traversing a path in the tree. We use Digital Rights Management (DRM) systems as a motivating example of a system that ....

....File System, SFSRO, which embeds a Merkle tree in the inode hierarchy [9] The root hash, which certifies the in tegrity of the file system, is signed by the file system s owner. Stein, Howard and Seltzer designed Protected File System, PFS, which is layered on top of a write ahead file system [20]. PFS validates blocks against a volatile array of one way hash values. Cattaneo et al. implemented Transparent Cryptographic File System, TCFS, which validates file blocks using Hash based Message Authentication Codes (HMACs) 14] that are embedded in the blocks [4] However, both PFS and TCFS ....

C. Stein, J. Howard, and M. Seltzer. Unifying file system protection. In Proceedings of the USENIX Annual Technical Conference, 2001. Boston, MA.

....most sensitive files from prying eyes, not as a general purpose file system. Cepheus [8] adds integrity and file sharing to a CFS like file system, but trusts the server for the integrity of read shared data. SNAD [14] can use digital signatures for integrity, but does not guarantee freshness. PFS [17] is an elegant scheme for checking the integrity of a file system stored on an untrusted disk. With minor modifications, PFS could make strong freshness guarantees. However, PFS is really a local file system designed to reside on untrusted, potentially remote disks. Users on multiple clients ....

Christopher A. Stein, John H. Howard, and Margo I. Seltzer. Unifying file system protection. In Proceedings of the 2001.

....most sensitive files from prying eyes, not as a general purpose file system. Cepheus [8] adds integrity and file sharing to a CFS like file system, but trusts the server for the integrity of read shared data. SNAD [13] can use digital signatures for integrity, but does not guarantee freshness. PFS [16] is an elegant scheme for checking the integrity of a file system stored on an untrusted disk. With minor modifications, PFS could make strong freshness guarantees. However, PFS is really a local file system designed to reside on untrusted, potentially remote disks. Users on multiple clients ....

Christopher A. Stein, John H. Howard, and Margo I. Seltzer. Unifying file system protection. In Proceedings of the 2001.

....the smartcard. Similarly, a set top box user may view TV channels for free by extracting secret keys from the set top box s storage. The research prototypes that protect data against malicious corruption typically use a combination of symmetric key encryption and one way hash trees (Merkle trees) [9, 6, 15]. We use Digital Rights Management (DRM) systems as a motivating example of a system that requires secure and reliable storage of data with monetary value. DRM systems enable secure binding of digital content (such as software, music, video, e books or email) to a contract. The contract is a ....

C. Stein, J. Howard, and M. Seltzer. Unifying file system protection. In Proceedings of the USENIX Annual Technical Conference, 2001. Boston, MA.

....the signed root inode could be kept in the local storage and updated when the underlying inodes change. Stein et al. designed the Protected File System (PFS) to verify file system data and meta data blocks without requiring any changes to the file system interface or storage organization [20]. It uses cryptographic hashes over all data and meta data blocks to detect any tampering with file system blocks. The block hashes are written to the same write ahead log as the meta data updates. PFS does not provide protection against replay attacks. SUNDR [11] is a network file system ....

C. Stein, J. Howard, and M. Seltzer. Unifying file system protection. In Proceedings of the USENIX Annual Technical Conference, 2001. Boston, MA.

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Christopher A. Stein, John H. Howard, and Margo I. Seltzer. Unifying file system protection. In Proceedings of the 2001.

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C. Stein, J. Howard, and M. Seltzer. Unifying file system protection. In Proc. of the USENIX Technical Conference, 2001. 101

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