| Matt Bishop. A Security Analysis of the NTP Protocol Version 2. In Sixth Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, November 1990. |
....part of wireless network nodes, it can be deployed in networks today and is expected to become more widely utilized in future systems at reduced expense, size, weight, and power consumption. In addition, the time synchronization signal itself in such systems may be subject to certain attacks [6, 12]. Esoteric hardware such as cesium beam clocks, rubidium clocks, and hydrogen maser clocks, could also be used in special applications today to provide sufficiently accurate time synchronization for months. Although our general requirement for time synchronization is indeed a restriction on the ....
Matt Bishop. A Security Analysis of the NTP Protocol Version 2. In Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, November 1990.
....protocols exist, they usually require considerable management overhead. Furthermore, they generally have a high complexity and achieve properties that TESLA does not require. An example is the network time protocol (NTP) by Mills [21] Bishop performs a detailed security analysis of NTP [7]. For these reasons, we outline a simple and secure time synchronization protocol that suffices the humble requirements of TESLA. 1Note that this key schedule is different from the previous schedule described in section 2.1, where key Ki was used to compute the MAC in interval [i and was ....
M. Bishop. A Security Analysis of the NTP Protocol Version 2. In Sixth Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, November 1990.
....key schedule is different from the previous schedule described in section 2.1, where key Ki was used to compute the MAC in interval Ii and was disclosed in interval Ii d. require. An example is the network time protocol (NTP) by Mills [21] Bishop performs a detailed security analysis of NTP [7]. For these reasons, we outline a simple and secure time synchronization protocol that suffices the humble requirements of TESLA. The time synchronization requirement that secures TESLA against an active attacker is that the receiver knows an upper bound of the difference between the sender s ....
M. Bishop. A Security Analysis of the NTP Protocol Version 2. In Sixth Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, November 1990.
....protocols exist, they usually require considerable management overhead. Furthermore, they generally have a high complexity and achieve properties that TESLA does not require. An example is the network time protocol (NTP) by Mills [21] Bishop performs a detailed security analysis of NTP [7]. For these reasons, we outline a simple and secure time synchronization protocol that suffices the humble requirements of TESLA. 1 Note that this key schedule is different from the previous schedule described in section 2.1, where key y was used to compute the MAC in interval and was ....
M. Bishop. A Security Analysis of the NTP Protocol Version 2. In Sixth Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, November 1990.
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Matt Bishop. A Security Analysis of the NTP Protocol Version 2. In Sixth Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, November 1990.
No context found.
M. Bishop. A security analysis of the NTP protocol version 2. In Proceedings of the 6th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, pages 20--29, 1990.
No context found.
M. Bishop. A security analysis of the NTP protocol version 2. In Proceedings of the 6th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, pages 20--29, 1990.
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