D. Ray and R. Vohra, Equilibrium Binding Agreements," Brown University Working Paper No. 92#8, 1992. Home/Search Document Details and Download
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Finding the Best Way to Join in: A Dynamic Accession Game - Kóczy (2000) (Correct)
....before the draws are made. Less relevant approaches would allow interaction between two players at a time only or allow only self enforcing strategies (too slow too fast communication) Players who enforce the move are called perpetrators, while the rest are the residuals (after Ray and Vohra [10]) As the definition of the residual coalition is often arbitrary, we use the term informally. We assume that the perpetrators set is always minimal, meaning that if the set of coalitions of size k is not smaller in partition than in # and the two are separated by one move, all players in a ....
Debraj Ray and Rajiv Vohra. Equilibrium binding agreements. Journal of Economic Theory, 73:30--78, 1997.
Accession Games: A Dynamic Per-Member Partition Function Approach - Kóczy (2000) (Correct)
....these different roles by fair draws, and hence they choose this strategy if not disregarding others strategies the expected worth of this lottery dominates other strategies. At each move players who enforce the move are called perpetrators, while the rest are the residuals (after Ray and Vohra [13]) As, in the definition of Ry and Vohra, the definition of the residual coalition is often arbitrary, we use the term less formally. We assume that the perpetrators set is always minimal. As a corollary if the set of coalitions of size k is not smaller in partition T than in T then the two ....
Debraj Ray and Rajiv Vohra, Equilibrium binding agreements, Journal of Economic Theory 73 (1997), 30-78.
Accession Games: A Dynamic Per-Member Partition Function Approach - Kóczy (2000) (Correct)
....these di#erent roles by fair draws, and hence they choose this strategy if not disregarding others strategies the expected worth of this lottery dominates other strategies. At each move players who enforce the move are called perpetrators, while the rest are the residuals (after Ray and Vohra [13]) As, in the definition of Ray and Vohra, the definition of the residual coalition is often arbitrary, we use the term less formally. We assume that the perpetrators set is always minimal. As a corollary if the set of coalitions of size k is not smaller in partition than in # then the two ....
Debraj Ray and Rajiv Vohra, Equilibrium binding agreements, Journal of Economic Theory 73 (1997), 30--78.
Cooperative Models for Extending the European Union - Kóczy (1999) (1 citation) (Correct)
....new positions. The couple # = N, V ) is said to be an n person game. Although, Yi in [69] argues di#erently, claiming that it is in the interest of member countries to reduce external tari#s, too. In Yi s work references are only made to some inaccessible unpublished manuscripts, such as [47], including some of his joint works with Shin, 70] so for simplicity, we attribute these results to him. Note, that agreement does not imply that all the players are better o#. Proposition 4. Strategy vectors are in one to one correspondence with coalition structures. Proof. For any ....
D. Ray and R. Vohra, Equilibrium binding agreements, Brown University, 1994.
Coalitional Negotiation - Mauleon, Vannetelbosch (1999) (Correct)
....bargaining but also the compliance with the agreement. Up to now the compliance issue has been neglected in coalitional bargaining and its applications to economic situations such as environmental agreements, cartel formation or public goods 5 There are no relationships between Ray and Vohra s [19] equilibrium binding agreements (EBA) concept and the LCS or the LCCS. Also, EBA do not support the e cient coalition structure while the LCS does in most examples under costless inspection. 23 coalitions. To study the impact of the compliance issue on both the coalition formation outcome and ....
Ray, D. and R. Vohra, 1997, "Equilibrium Binding Agreements," Journal of Economic Theory 73, 30-78.
Equilibrium Binding Agreements - Ray, Vohra (1983) (11 citations) Self-citation (Ray Vohra) (Correct)
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D. Ray and R. Vohra, Equilibrium Binding Agreements," Brown University Working Paper No. 92#8, 1992.
Group Formation in Risk-Sharing Arrangements - Genicot, Ray (2002) Self-citation (Ray) (Correct)
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Ray, D. and R. Vohra (1997), "Equilibrium Binding Agreements," Journal of Economic Theory 73, 30--78.
Coalition Formation as a Dynamic Process - Konishi, Ray (2002) (4 citations) Self-citation (Ray Vohra) (Correct)
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Ray, D. and R. Vohra, Equilibrium binding agreements, Journal of Economic Theory 73 (1997), 30--78.
Absorbing Sets in Coalitional Systems - Inarra, Kuipers, Olaizola (2001) (Correct)
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Ray D. and R. Vohra, 1997. Equilibrium Binding Agreements. Journal of Economic Theory: 73, 30-78.
Equilibrium Binding Agreements: A comment - Guillaume Haeringer Departament (Correct)
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D. Ray and R. Vohra, Equilibrium binding agreements, Journal of Economic Theory, 73 (1997), pp. 30--78.
International Environmental Agreements - The Role of.. - Diamantoudi, Sartzetakis (2002) (Correct)
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RAY, D. AND VOHRA, R. (1997). "Equilibrium Binding Agreements." Journal of Economic Theory 73, 30-78.
Unequal Connections - Goyal, Joshi (2002) (Correct)
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D. Ray and R. Vohra (1997), Equilibrium binding agreements, Journal of Economic Theory, 73, 30-78. 39
Farsightedness and Cautiousness in Coalition Formation - Mauleon, Vannetelbosch (2003) (Correct)
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Ray, D. and R. Vohra, 1997, "Equilibrium Binding Agreements," Journal of Economic Theory 73, 30-78.
Stable Organizations with Externalities - Currarini (2002) (Correct)
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Ray, D., Vohra, R. (1997), "Equilibrium Binding Agreements", Journal of Economic Theory 73: 30-78.
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