Hennessy, M. and Riely, J., Information ow vs resource access in the asynchronous pi-calculus, ICALP'00, LNCS 1853, 415-427, Springer, 2000.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....in considering (i) a concrete programming language, ii) a timing sensitive security speci cation and (iii) asynchronous message passing. Although some recent process algebra based investigations have explored timing sensitive security (e.g. 19] and security in an asynchronous setting (e.g. [23, 26]) timing is often disregarded; and handshaking models that require both sides to synchronize during communication are typically used. There is no such requirement under asynchronous message passing (as expressed by send, receive and if receive) which is suitable for modeling programming in a ....

M. Hennessy and J. Riely. Information ow vs resource access in the asynchronous pi-calculus (extended abstract). In ICALP'00, LNCS 1853, pages 415-427, 2000.

....for applications. This direction may not have been pursued in the foregoing studies. Combination of existing techniques and the present one would be an interesting subject for further study. In the analysis of secure information ow, equality over programs often plays a central role, cf. [2, 3, 10, 14, 31]. Among them, 9, 10] present a bisimulation for cryptographic protocols where high level actions are abstracted away, preceding the behavioural theory of secrecy in Section 5. The main di erence from our 3 approach is that [9, 10] are based on CCS without using type structure, which would limit ....

....theorem for the spi calculus based on may equivalence, using type information to control the interface of the attacker. Our approach di ers in that it rst uses linearity to limit environments, then applies it to information ow analysis by a simple elaboration of channels with security levels. [14] uses a secrecy sensitive may equivalence for noninterference in the calculus. The use of linear type structure in the present work is the main di erence. Finally, the rst two present authors proposed, in [20] with Vasconcelos) and in [23] type systems for the calculus which ensures ....

Hennessy, M. and Riely, J., Information ow vs resource access in the asynchronous pi-calculus, ICALP'00, LNCS 1853, 415-427, Springer, 2000.

....of more sophisticated practical languages. 22 The question of secure information ow and noninterference has also been investigated in the setting of process calculi [5, 15] More recently, there have been studies on noninterference for functional languages [14] and mobile process calculi [9] [8] and [7] The latter papers are closer to our work, as they use a type system to enforce noninterference. The treatment in [9] and [8] however, seems overly restrictive: it amounts (at least in the core calculus) to forbid all control ow from actions on high channels to actions on low channels. ....

....in the setting of process calculi [5, 15] More recently, there have been studies on noninterference for functional languages [14] and mobile process calculi [9] 8] and [7] The latter papers are closer to our work, as they use a type system to enforce noninterference. The treatment in [9] and [8], however, seems overly restrictive: it amounts (at least in the core calculus) to forbid all control ow from actions on high channels to actions on low channels. In [9] the core calculus is extended with more sophisticated constructs; in the extended calculus some actions may be classi ed as ....

M. Hennessy and J. Riely. Information ow vs resource access in the asynchronous pi-calculus (extended abstract). In Proceedings ICALP'00, number 1853 in LNCS, 2000.

....equivalences. The present work introduces, for the rst time, a consistent theory of bisimilarity based on a labelled transition relation which allows to abstract away non actions using linear types. In theories of secure information ow, equality over programs often play a central role, cf. [2, 3, 10, 13, 30]. Among them, Focardi et al. 9, 10] present a bisimulation for cryptographic protocols where high level actions are abstracted away. In contrast with the present work, 9, 10] are based on CCS without 3 using type structure. Abadi and his colleagues studied several typing systems and their ....

....take more abstract approach using linearity of communication in order to limit the environments of opponent processes without speci c security constructors such as signatures and nonces, and then apply it for information ow analysis by adding simple security levels to channels. Hennessy and Riely [13] use a secrecy sensitive may equivalence for noninterference in the calculus. The present work introduces a theory of bisimilarity based on linearity which is directly applicable to secrecy of divergent programming languages. This line of study is not developed in [1, 2, 4, 5, 13] We also ....

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Hennessy, M. and Riely, J., Information ow vs resource access in the asynchronous pi-calculus, ICALP00, LNCS 1853, 415-427, Springer, 2000.

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Hennessy, M. and Riely, J., Information ow vs resource access in the asynchronous pi-calculus, ICALP'00, LNCS 1853, 415-427, Springer, 2000.

No context found.

Hennessy, M. and Riely, J., Information ow vs resource access in the asynchronous pi-calculus, ICALP00, LNCS 1853, 415-427, Springer, 2000.

No context found.

M. Hennessy and J. Riely. Information ow vs resource access in the asynchronous pi-calculus (extended abstract). In Proceedings ICALP'00, number 1853 in LNCS, 2000.

No context found.

M. Hennessy and J. Riely. Information ow vs resource access in the asynchronous pi-calculus (extended abstract). In Proceedings of the 27th ICALP, LNCS 1853, pages 415-427, July 2000.

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Hennessy, M. and Riely, J., Information ow vs resource access in the asynchronous pi-calculus, ICALP00, LNCS 1853, 415-427, Springer, 2000.

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