| D. Dolev, C. Dwork and M. Naor, Non-Malleable cryptography, Preliminary version: Proc. of the Twenty third ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 1991, pp. 542--552. Full version, to appear, Siam J. on Computing. Available: http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/~naor/onpub.html |
....7.1) Halevi and Krawczyk s definition of security concentrates on the single user (and single server) case. One may suspect that, as a general principal, a protocol which is good when there is one user is also good when there are 1 Non malleability, an extension of semantic security defined in [11], says, roughly, that for any polynomial time computable relation R, seeing E(x) does not help in finding an encryption E(y) such that R(x; y) holds. several. This turns out to be false: we show that there are protocols secure in the single user case but insecure in the multi user case (Section ....
....3 Multi User Insecurity of the HK Protocol In this section we present a public key cryptosystem, S, that we prove semantically secure under a one ciphertext attack. Thus, this scheme satisfies Definition 2 of [17] Definition 2. 4 above) The scheme can be viewed as a watered down version of the [11] public key cryptosystem secure against chosen ciphertext attacks in the postprocessing mode. We then exhibit a simple break of G(S) the implementation of the encrypted challenge response password authentication protocol with cryptosystem S) 3.1 The Scheme S We first describe the cryptosystem ....
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D. Dolev, C. Dwork and M. Naor, Non-Malleable cryptography, Preliminary version: Proc. of the Twenty third ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 1991, pp. 542--552. Full version, to appear, Siam J. on Computing. Available: http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/~naor/onpub.html
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