Citations: ciency for generic group signature schemes - Camenisch, Michels (ResearchIndex)

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J. Camenisch and M. Michels. Separability and E#ciency for Generic Group Signature Schemes. In Advances in Cryptology, Crypto'99, LNCS 1666, pp. 413--430, Springer Verlag, 1999.

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Threshold Ring Signatures and Applications to Ad-hoc.. - Bresson, Stern, Szydlo (2002) (17 citations) (Correct)

.... of ring signatures were discussed simultaneously with the appearance of group signatures [11,12] but the concept itself has only been formalized recently in [25] Many schemes have been proposed for group signatures, o ering various additional properties [19,20,23] as well as increasing e ciency [3,8,9]. The related Witness hiding zero knowledge proofs were treated in [13] and an application to group signatures (without a manager) was discussed at the end of this same article. This, and another construction [15] can also be seen as ring signature schemes. However, the scheme by Rivest et al. . ....

J. Camenish and M. Michels. Separability and eciency for generic group signature schemes. In Crypto '99, LNCS 1666, pp. 106121.

Efficient Anonymous Fingerprinting with Group Signatures.. - Camenisch (2000) (Correct)

....the identity of a malicious buyer on his own depends on the group signature scheme chosen. We discuss this briefly as well as other properties the fingerprinting scheme will have as a function of the type of group signature scheme that is applied. Most newer group signature schemes (including [6, 7]) can be used for our construction. These schemes have the property that the group s public key and the length of signature are independent of the group s size. A signature in those schemes typically contains a randomized encryption of identifying information under the revocation manager s public ....

....the revocation manager to trace a signature without any interaction with the membership manager, it follows that the merchant need not interact with the registration center to identify a malicious buyer. This is possible for instance with the recent group signature scheme by Camenisch and Michels [6]. There, a group member chooses her own RSA modulus that upon signing is encrypted by the revocation manager s public key. Thus, when the membership manager (aka registration center) enforces that the most significant bits are set to the identity of the group member (aka buyer) a direct ....

J. Camenisch and M. Michels. Separability and e#ciency for generic group signature schemes. In Advances in Cryptology --- CRYPTO '99, vol. 1296 of LNCS, pp. 413--430. Springer Verlag, 1999.

Compact E-Cash - Camenisch, Hohenberger, Lysyanskaya (2005) Self-citation (Camenisch) (Correct)

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Jan Camenisch and Markus Michels. Separability and e#ciency for generic group signature schemes. In Michael Wiener, editor, Advances in Cryptology --- CRYPTO '99, volume 1666 of LNCS, pages 413--430. Springer Verlag, 1999.

Direct Anonymous Attestation - Brickell, Camenisch, Chen (2004) (13 citations) Self-citation (Camenisch) (Correct)

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J. Camenisch and M. Michels. Separability and e#ciency for generic group signature schemes. In M. Wiener, editor, Advances in Cryptology --- CRYPTO '99, volume 1666 of LNCS, pages 413--430. Springer Verlag, 1999.

Direct Anonymous Attestation - Brickell, Camenisch, Chen (2004) (13 citations) Self-citation (Camenisch) (Correct)

Practical Verifiable Encryption and Decryption of Discrete.. - Camenisch, Shoup (2003) (17 citations) Self-citation (Camenisch) (Correct)

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J. Camenisch and M. Michels, Separability and e#ciency for generic group signature schemes, Advances in Cryptology --- CRYPTO '99 (M. Wiener, ed.), LNCS, vol. 1666, Springer Verlag, 1999, pp. 413--430.

Dynamic Accumulators and Application to Efficient.. - Camenisch, Lysyanskaya (2002) (16 citations) Self-citation (Camenisch) (Correct)

An Efficient System for Non-transferable Anonymous.. - Camenisch, Lysyanskaya (2001) (4 citations) Self-citation (Camenisch) (Correct)

....about six ordinary PK (#) y = g . Proofs of knowledge or equality in di#erent groups. The previous protocol can also be used to prove that the discrete logarithms of two group elements y 1 G 1 , y 2 G 1 to the bases g 1 G 1 and g 2 G 2 in di#erent groups G 1 and G 2 are equal [BCDvdG88, CM99b]. Let the order of the groups be q 1 and q 2 , respectively. This proof can be realized only if both discrete logarithms lie in the interval [0, min q 1 , q 2 ] The idea is that the prover commits to the discrete logarithm in some group, say G = the order of which he does not know, and ....

Jan Camenisch and Markus Michels. Separability and e#ciency for generic group signature schemes. In Michael Wiener, editor, Advances in Cryptology --- CRYPTO '99, volume 1666 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 413--430. Springer Verlag, 1999.

A Signature Scheme with Efficient Protocols - Camenisch, Lysyanskaya (2002) (2 citations) Self-citation (Camenisch) (Correct)

..... g m ) where n is a special RSA modulus and g i QR n for all 1 m; and (2) a value C QR n , the prover proves knowledge of values # 1 , #m such that C = i=1 g i mod n. Proof of knowledge of equality of representation modulo two (possibly different) composite moduli [9]. That is to say, a protocol with common inputs (n 1 , g 1 , g m ) and (n 2 , h 1 , hm ) and the values C 1 QR n1 and C 2 QR n2 , the prover proves knowledge of values # 1 , #m such that C 1 = i mod n 1 and C 2 = i mod n 2 . Proof that a committed ....

....b. An e#cient protocol that implements such proofs is due to Boudot [4] However, if the integer # the prover knows in fact satisfies the the more restrictive bound, then there are more e#cient protocols (these protocols are very similar to a simple proof of knowledge of a discrete log; see, e.g. [9]) More precisely, there protocols are applicable if the prover s secret # satisfies 2 # 2 # , where # is a security parameter derived from the size of the challenge sent by the verifier as second message in the protocol and from the security parameter that governs the ....

J. Camenisch and M. Michels. Separability and e#ciency for generic group signature schemes. In M. Wiener, editor, Advances in Cryptology --- CRYPTO '99, volume 1666 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 413--430. Springer Verlag, 1999.

Dynamic Accumulators and Application to Efficient.. - Camenisch, Lysyanskaya (2002) (16 citations) Self-citation (Camenisch) (Correct)

....and verifying membership is linear in the number of current members and therefore becomes ine#cient for large groups. This drawback is overcome by schemes where the size of the group s public key as well as the complexity of proving and verifying membership is independent of the number of members [13, 21, 12, 1]. The idea underlying these schemes is that the group public key contains the group manager s public key of a suitable signature scheme. To become a group member, a user chooses a membership public key which the group manager signs. Thus, to prove membership, a user has to prove possession of ....

....credential. In the remainder of this section we provide such a protocol for the ACJT identity escrow scheme and the Camenisch Lysyanskaya credential system [1, 9] However, it is not hard to see how to add revocation for other schemes and systems that use some form of anonymous credentials (e.g. [5, 11, 12, 10, 13, 21, 23]) 4.2 The ACJT Identity Escrow Scheme and Its Friends An identity escrow scheme involves a membership manager, who is responsible for adding and deleting members, an anonymity revocation manager, who can identify the user who provided an anonymous membership proof to a verifier, and finally ....

J. Camenisch and M. Michels. Separability and e#ciency for generic group signature schemes. In CRYPTO '99, vol. 1666 of LNCS, pp. 413--430.

Self-Escrowed Public-Key Infrastructures - Published In Song (Correct)