Larson, K., & Sandholm, T. (2001). Bargaining with limited computation: Deliberation equilibrium. Artificial Intelligence, 132(2), 183--217.  Home/Search   Document Details and Download   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....NP complete problems as well as others. Many of these problems have known methods for approximation in particular it may be possible to nd an approximate solution quickly and the quality of the solution can be re ned with additional computation. For a discussion of some of these situations see [7]. When the utility of an approximate solution decreases with time used to nd such a solution, these problems have an inherent exploration exploitation tradeo . A meta algorithm can either decide to explore (and thus nd a better solution) or exploit and execute the solution locking in the ....

K. Larson and T. Sandholm. Bargaining with limited computation: Deliberation equilibrium Articial Intelligence 2001, 132(2): 183217.

....and options to continue computation or submit bids [39] Sandholm s analysis shows that an agent can make a better decision about whether or not to perform further computation about the value of an item if it is well informed about the bids from other agents. In recent years, Larson Sandholm [22, 20, 21] have modeled agent deliberation in situations of strategic interdependence, and in particular when agents must make explicit decisions about whether to deliberate about their own values or the values of other agents in settings with costly deliberation. The authors model a full equilibrium, ....

Larson, K. and T. Sandholm: 2001a, `Bargaining with limited computation: Deliberation equilibrium'. Artificial Intelligence 132(2), 183--217.

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Kate Larson and Tuomas Sandholm. Bargaining with limited computation: Deliberation equilibrium. Artificial Intelligence, 132(2):183--217, 2001.

No context found.

Kate Larson and Tuomas Sandholm. Bargaining with limited computation: Deliberation equilibrium. Artificial Intelligence, 132(2):183--217, 2001.

No context found.

Kate Larson and Tuomas Sandholm. Bargaining with limited computation: Deliberation equilibrium. Artificial Intelligence, 132(2):183--217, 2001.

No context found.

Kate Larson and Tuomas Sandholm. Bargaining with limited computation: Deliberation equilibrium. Artificial Intelligence, 132(2):183--217, 2001. Short early version appeared in the Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pp. 48--55, Austin, TX, 2000.

No context found.

Kate Larson and Tuomas Sandholm. Bargaining with limited computation: Deliberation equilibrium. Artificial Intelligence, 132(2):183--217, 2001.

No context found.

K. Larson and T. Sandholm. Bargaining with limited computation: Deliberation equilibrium. Artificial Intelligence, 132(2):183--217, 2001.

....actions, it has to select among such actions. Reasoning about which deliberation actions to take is called metareasoning. Decision theory [7, 10] provides a normative basis for metareasoning under uncertainty, and decisiontheoretic deliberation control has been widely studied in AI (e.g. [2, 4 6, 8, 9, 12 15, 18 20] ) However, the approach of using metareasoning to control reasoning is impractical if the metareasoning problem itself is prohibitively complex. While this issue is widely acknowledged (e.g. 8, 12 14] there are few theoretical results on the complexity of metareasoning. We derive ....

....deliberation control has been widely studied in AI (e.g. 2, 4 6, 8, 9, 12 15, 18 20] However, the approach of using metareasoning to control reasoning is impractical if the metareasoning problem itself is prohibitively complex. While this issue is widely acknowledged (e.g. [8, 12 14] ) there are few theoretical results on the complexity of metareasoning. We derive hardness results for three central metareasoning problems. In the first (Section 2) the agent has to decide how to allocate its deliberation time across anytime algorithms running on different problem instances. ....

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Kate Larson and Tuomas Sandholm. Bargaining with limited computation: Deliberation equilibrium. Artificial Intelligence, 132(2):183--217, 2001.

.... of deciding what information to elicit from the players in various mechanisms [11] Another avenue involves studying more sophisticated equilibrium notions which take into account that players have limited memory (e.g. 1, 14, 32, 39, 41] or limited capability to solve optimization problems (e.g. [19, 23, 24, 34]) There are also open issues on communication complexity in games (e.g. 7, 8, 17, 35, 50] and on the complexity of computing general equilibria ( market equilibria ) e.g. 50] and other solutions. There are numerous open research questions even in the area of computing solutions to ....

Kate Larson and Tuomas Sandholm. Bargaining with limited computation: Deliberation equilibrium. Artificial Intelligence, 132(2):183--217, 2001.

....rationality stems from the complexity of each agent s (optimization) problem, a setting which is ubiquitous in practice. This paper studies the impact of limited computation on bargaining. Bargaining between agents has been studied in both the game theory literature [10] and the AI literature [6, 11, 7]. In non cooperative game theory, the alternating offers model is a standard model. Much study has focused on the problem of delay in reaching agreement, when the value of the joint solution decreases over time and the values of the individual solutions do not change. Instead, in this paper we ....

....opponent is likely to allocate its computation. In equilibrium, an agent may want to allocate computation on its individual problem, the joint problem, and even on the opponent s problem. In recent work we modeled a 2 agent bargaining setting where computing actions were treated strategically [7]. We analyzed simple bargaining settings for equilibrium strategies and provided algorithms for computing (off line) the online computing strategies. Our focus was on the modeling of computing actions as part of the agents strategies and we used a very simple bargaining model where agents ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

K. Larson and T. Sandholm. Bargaining with limited computation: Deliberation equilibrium. Artificial Intelligence, 132(2):183--217, 2001.

....to select among such actions. Reasoning about which deliberation actions to take is called metareasoning. Decision theory [7, 10] provides a normative basis for metareasoning under uncertainty, and decision theoretic deliberation control has been widely studied in AI for the last 15 years (e.g. [2, 4 6, 8, 9, 12 15, 19 21]) However, the approach of using metareasoning to control reasoning is impractical if the metareasoning problem itself is prohibitively complex. While this issue is widely acknowledged (e.g. 8, 12 14] there are few theoretical results on the complexity of metareasoning. We derive hardness ....

....control has been widely studied in AI for the last 15 years (e.g. 2, 4 6, 8, 9, 12 15, 19 21] However, the approach of using metareasoning to control reasoning is impractical if the metareasoning problem itself is prohibitively complex. While this issue is widely acknowledged (e.g. [8, 12 14]) there are few theoretical results on the complexity of metareasoning. We derive hardness results for three central metareasoning problems. In the first (Section 2) the agent has to decide how to allocate its deliberation time across anytime algorithms running on di#erent problem instances. We ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

Kate Larson and Tuomas Sandholm. Bargaining with limited computation: Deliberation equilibrium. Artificial Intelligence, 132(2):183--217, 2001.

No context found.

Larson, K., & Sandholm, T. (2001). Bargaining with limited computation: Deliberation equilibrium. Artificial Intelligence, 132(2), 183--217.

No context found.

K Larson and T Sandholm, Bargaining with limited computation: Deliberation equilibrium. Artificial Intelligence, Vol. 132, No. 2, 2001, pp. 183-- 217.

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K. Larson and T. Sandholm, Bargaining with limited computation: Deliberation equilibrium, Artificial Intelligence 132 (2001a), no. 2, 183--217.

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Kate Larson and Tuomas Sandholm. Bargaining with limited computation: Deliberation equilibrium. Artificial Intelligence, 132(2):183--217, 2001.

No context found.

Larson, K. and T. Sandholm: 2001a, `Bargaining with limited computation: Deliberation equilibrium'. Artificial Intelligence 132(2), 183--217.

No context found.

Kate Larson and Tuomas Sandholm. Bargaining with limited computation: Deliberation equilibrium. Artificial Intelligence, 132(2):183--217, 2001. Short early version appeared in the Proceedings of pp. 48--55, Austin, TX, 2000.

No context found.

K. Larson and T. Sandholm. Bargaining with limited computation: Deliberation equilibrium. Artificial Intelligence, 132:183--217, 2001.

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