S. Zdancewic and A. C. Myers. Secure information flow and CPS. In Proceedings of the 10th European Symposium on Programming, volume 2028.  Home/Search   Document Details and Download   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....them (in the sense of John Reynolds [6, 14] readily shows that in e#ect both solutions construct an intermediate copy of the reversed words, as in the traditional solution. It would take an optimizing compiler to detect that the list constructors and the continuations are ordered linearly [7, 13, 17] and thus that they can be allocated LIFO. In contrast, the direct style version only uses cons to construct the result, and all its intermediate results are held on the control stack if one uses Chez Scheme (http: www.scheme.com) OCaml (http: caml.inria.fr) or another derivative of ALGOL 60. ....

Steve Zdancewic and Andrew Myers. Secure information flow and CPS. In David Sands, editor, Proceedings of the Tenth European Symposium on Programming, number 2028.

....and [50] using the calculus as an intermediate language (we believe this will fairly easily extends to the comparison with [44] One aspect of secrecy in programming languages whose study has just started is secrecy for low level programming primitives. In this respect, one interesting work [68] presents a typed control calculus with references, intended as a meta language for possibly low level languages via CPS translation. Its type discipline is adapted to this end, in particular in its use of linear continuations. As secrecy typing for imperative languages, 68] does not treat ....

....one interesting work [68] presents a typed control calculus with references, intended as a meta language for possibly low level languages via CPS translation. Its type discipline is adapted to this end, in particular in its use of linear continuations. As secrecy typing for imperative languages, [68] does not treat multi threading, and is not (intended as) an extension of the language in [58; 57] We believe that the incorporation of the dynamics and types in [68] into the calculus is a topic for the further study [24] as well as polymorphic extension of the calculus [10] Finally ....

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Zdancewic, S. and Myers, A., Secure Information Flow and CPS, ESOP01, LNCS 2028.

....Our types are those of ML s type system (with rows for sum types [14] decorated with security annotations that are simple levels and matrices q. The type int describes integer expressions whose value may reflect information of security level . In many type systems tracing information flow [8, 3, 12, 21, 13], arrows carry a security level representing information about the function s identity. Nevertheless, because the only way to observe a function consists in applying it and examining its results, there is really no difference between a function whose identity is secret and a function that produces ....

S. Zdancewic and A. C. Myers. Secure information flow and CPS. In D. Sands, editor, Proceedings of the

.... continuation passing style semantic formulation of a collecting interpretation [87] A range of analyses are used in determining the static dynamic aspect of program points in partial evaluation [66] binding time analyses) or determining the security level of program points and information flow [1, 55, 127] (security analyses) Other analyses determine properties relative to memory management, for instance region inference for higher order languages [117] But of crucial importance to analysis of higher order languages is control flow analysis, which is the topic of next section. In higher order ....

Steve Zdancewic and Andrew Myers. Secure information flow and CPS. In David Sands, editor, Proceedings of the Tenth European Symposium on 46--61, Padova, Italy, April

....is indeed crucial, in practice, to take advantage of it, because the calculus is a low level programming language, where continuationpassing style is ubiquitous: control is encoded through the use of (often linear) communications, rather than evident in the program s syntax. Zdancewic and Myers [26] address this issue in the case of a low level, sequential calculus. Can our proof approach be extended to deal with linearity information Let us give a rough sketch of how we envision such an extension. The semantics of the h i calculus must be modified to disallow linear communications from ....

S. Zdancewic and A. C. Myers. Secure information flow and CPS. In D. Sands, editor, Proceedings of the

....is indeed crucial, in practice, to take advantage of it, because the calculus is a low level programming language, where continuationpassing style is ubiquitous: control is encoded through the use of (often linear) communications, rather than evident in the program s syntax. Zdancewic and Myers [27] address this issue in the case of a low level, sequential calculus. Can our proof approach be extended to deal with linearity information Let us give a rough sketch of how we envision such an extension. The semantics of the h i calculus must be modified to disallow linear communications from ....

S. Zdancewic and A. C. Myers. Secure information flow and CPS. In D. Sands, editor, Proceedings of the

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S. Zdancewic and A. C. Myers. Secure information flow and CPS. In Proc. European Symp. on Programming, volume 2028.

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S. Zdancewic and A. C. Myers. Secure information flow and CPS. In Proc. of the 10th European Symposium on Programming, 2001. 14 A Syntax This section describes the recursion-free fragment of dependency core calculus (DCC) [1] and Girard-Reynolds polymorphic lambda calculus (System F) [4, 12]. The following defines the syntax for DCC's types, values, terms, evaluation contexts and lattice.

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S. Zdancewic and A. C. Myers. Secure information flow and CPS. In Proc. of the 10th European Symposium on Programming, volume 2028.

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S. Zdancewic and A. C. Myers. Secure information flow and CPS. In Proc. European Symp. on Programming, volume 2028 of LNCS, pages 46--61. Springer-Verlag, April

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S. Zdancewic and A. C. Myers. Secure information flow and CPS. In Proc. of the 10th European Symposium on Programming, volume 2028.

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S. Zdancewic and A. C. Myers, "Secure information flow and CPS," in Proc. European Symposium on Programming. Apr. 2001.

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Steve Zdancewic and Andrew C. Myers. Secure information flow and CPS. In Proc. 10th European Symposium on Programming, volume 2028.

....Hash bid; if ( isCommitted) bid=v; Host h b rgoto rgoto, fwd hash lgoto, t b Figure 3. Control flow graph of the commit method implementation is quite different because it may be used concurrently by different replicas. Both rgoto ( regular goto ) and lgoto ( linear goto [60]) operations transfer control to a code segment on a remote host. Intuitively, rgoto is used to transfer control from a code segment to another with equal or lower integrity , while lgoto allows a code segment to transfer control to another code segment with higher integrity. Figure 3 shows the ....

Steve Zdancewic and Andrew C. Myers. Secure information flow and CPS. In Proc. 10th European Symposium on Programming, volume 2028.

....nance program from illicitly transmitting the private information (perhaps cleverly encoded) the compiler checks that the information ows in the program are admissible. This is an extended and revised version of a conference paper presented at the European Symposium on Programming, April 2001 [46]. Department of Computer Science, Cornell University Ithaca NY 14853, USA This research was supported by DARPA Contract F30602 99 1 0533, monitored by USAF Rome Laboratory. The U.S. Government is authorized to reproduce and distribute reprints for Government purposes, notwithstanding any ....

....t and u, respectively, and the least and greatest elements are written and . The ordering in the type system presented here is trivial because exactly one continuation is allowed in the context. It is possible to generalize these results to account for multiple continuations in the context [46]. Security Labels ; pc 2 L Base Types : int j 1 j ref j [pc] 0 Security Types : Linear Types : 0 Base Values bv : n j hi j L j [pc]f(x : y : e Values v : x j bv Linear Values lv : y j hpci(x : e Primitives prim : v j v v j ....

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Zdancewic, S. and A. C. Myers: 2001, `Secure Information Flow and CPS'. In: Proc. 10th European Symposium on Programming, Vol. 2028 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science. pp. 46-61.

....program partitioning may open the file containing my bank account information. This paper addresses the problem of how to practically specify and enforce information flow policies in distributed systems. A promising approach for describing such policies is the use of security typed languages [1, 17, 27, 35, 44, 48, 53]. In this approach, explicit program annotations specify restrictions on the flow of information, and the language implementation (the compiler and run time system) rejects programs that violate the restrictions. The program does not have to be trusted to enforce the security policy; only the ....

....partition comprises a set of code fragments that offer entry points to which rgoto and lgoto transfer control. These two kinds of goto operations are taken from a low level security typed language for which it has been proven that every well typed program automatically enforces noninterference [53]. Both operations can be thought of as an unconditional goto that transfers control to a remote host. Intuitively, rgoto transfers control from a more trusted host to a less trusted one, while lgoto allows a less trusted host to invoke high integrity code that resides on a more trusted host. The ....

Steve Zdancewic and Andrew C. Myers. Secure information flow and CPS. In Proc. of the 10th European Symposium on Programming, volume 2028.

....(functions usable as ordinary values) They propose a type system for confidentiality and integrity in SLam and prove a noninterference theorem using logical relations. They also extend SLam and the type system with state and concurrency, but do not prove noninterference. Zdancewic and Myers [12], 76] define a secure calculus that has first class continuations, state, and references, and prove that its type system enforces noninterference. Continuations are a more expressive control construct than functions. They also show that a fragment of SLam, augmented with state and references, can ....

....received much attention in studies of secure information flow. One difficulty with checking information flow in low level languages is that useful information about program structure is lost during compilation. Consequently, typical source language techniques do not generalize straightforwardly [12], 76] 119] Zdancewic and Myers [12] 76] present a type system that ensures noninterference in low level programs in which the only control construct is continuations (which correspond to indirect branches at the machine code level [120] Ordered linear continuation types enforce a stack ....

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S. Zdancewic and A. C. Myers, "Secure information flow and CPS," in Proc. European Symposium on Programming. Apr. 2001.

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S. Zdancewic and A. C. Myers. Secure information flow and CPS. In Proceedings of the 10th European Symposium on Programming, volume 2028.

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S. Zdancewic and A. C. Myers. Secure information flow and CPS. In Tenth European Symposium on Programming, volume 2028.

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S. Zdancewic and A. C. Myers. Secure information flow and CPS. In Tenth European Symposium on Programming, volume 2028.

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Steve Zdancewic and Andrew C. Myers. Secure information flow and cps. In Proc. 10th ESOP. Springer-Verlag, 2001.

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Steve Zdancewic and Andrew C. Myers. Secure information flow and cps. In Proc. 10th ESOP. Springer-Verlag, 2001.

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S. Zdancewic and A. C. Myers. Secure information flow and CPS. In Tenth European Symposium on Programming, volume 2028.

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S. Zdancewic and A. C. Myers. Secure information flow and CPS. In Proceedings of the 10th European Symposium on Programming, volume 2028.

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S. Zdancewic and A. C. Myers. Secure information flow and CPS. In Tenth European Symposium on Programming, volume 2028.

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