| R. Anderson, F. Bergadano, B. Crispo, J.-H. Lee, C. Manifavas, R. Needham, "A New Family of Authentication Protocols", ACM Operating Ssystems Review, 1998. |
....authentication codes (MACs) and is based on delayed disclosure of keys by the sender. This technique was independently discovered by Cheung [8] in the context of authenticating link state routing updates. A related approach was used in the Guy Fawkes protocol for interactive unicast communication [1]. In the context of multicast streamed data it was proposed by several authors [2, 3, 5, 27, 28] The main idea of TESLA is that the sender attaches to each packet a MAC computed with a key k known only to itself. The receiver buffers the received packet without being able to authenticate it. A ....
R. Anderson, F. Bergadano, B. Crispo, J. Lee, C. Manifavas, and R. Needham. A new family of authentication protocols. ACM Operating Systems Review, 32(4):9--20, October 1998.
....only symmetric cryptography, more specifically on message authentication codes (MACs) and is based on delayed disclosure of keys by the sender. This technique was first used by Cheung [11] in the context of authenticating communication among routers. It was then used in the Guy Fawkes protocol [1] for interactive unicast com munication. In the context of multicast streamed data it was proposed by several authors [8, 4, 5, 25] In particular, the TESLA scheme described in [25] was presented to the reliable multicast transport (RMT) working group [26] of the IETF and the secure multicast ....
....work is by Cheung [11] He proposes a scheme akin to the basic TESLA protocol to authenticate link state routing updates between routers. He assumes that all the routers in a network are time synchronized up to q e, and does not consider the case of heterogeneous receivers. Anderson et al. [1] present the Guy Fawkes protocol which provides message authentication between two parties. Their protocol has the drawback that it cannot tolerate packet loss. They propose two methods to guarantee that the keys are not revealed too soon. The first method is that the sender and receiver are in ....
R. J. Anderson, F. Bergadano, B. Crispo, J.-H. Lee, C. Manifavas, and R. M. Needham. A new family of authentication protocols. Operating Systems Review, 32(4):9 20, October 1998.
....only symmetric cryptography, more specifically on message authentication codes (MACs) and is based on delayed disclosure of keys by the sender. This technique was first used by Cheung [11] in the context of authenticating communication among routers. It was then used in the Guy Fawkes protocol [1] for interactive unicast com munication. In the context of multicast streamed data it was proposed by several authors [8, 4, 5, 25] In particular, the TESLA scheme described in [25] was presented to the reliable multicast transport (RMT) working group [26] of the IETF and the secure multicast ....
....work is by Cheung [11] He proposes a scheme akin to the basic TESLA protocol to authenticate link state routing updates between routers. He assumes that all the routers in a network are time synchronized up to q e, and does not consider the case of heterogeneous receivers. Anderson et al. [1] present the Guy Fawkes protocol which provides message authentication between two parties. Their protocol has the drawback that it cannot tolerate packet loss. They propose two methods to guarantee that the keys are not revealed too soon. The first method is that the sender and receiver are in ....
R. J. Anderson, F. Bergadano, B. Crispo, J.-H. Lee, C. Manifavas, and R. M. Needham. A new family of authentication protocols. Operating Systems Review, 32(4):9 20, October 1998.
....only symmetric cryptography, more specifically on message authentication codes (MACs) and is based on delayed disclosure of keys by the sender. This technique was first used by Cheung [11] in the context of authenticating communication among routers. It was then used in the Guy Fawkes protocol [1] for interactive unicast communication. In the context of multicast streamed data it was proposed by several authors [8, 4, 5, 25] In particular, the TESLA scheme described in [25] was presented to the reliable multicast transport (RMT) working group [26] of the IETF and the secure multicast ....
....related work is by Cheung [11] He proposes a scheme akin to the basic TESLA protocol to authenticate link state routing updates between routers. He assumes that all the routers in a network are time synchronized up to , and does not consider the case of heterogeneous receivers. Anderson et al. [1] present the Guy Fawkes protocol which provides message authentication between two parties. Their protocol has the drawback that it cannot tolerate packet loss. They propose two methods to guarantee that the keys are not revealed too soon. The first method is that the sender and receiver are in ....
R. J. Anderson, F. Bergadano, B. Crispo, J.-H. Lee, C. Manifavas, and R. M. Needham. A new family of authentication protocols. Operating Systems Review, 32(4):9--20, October 1998.
....group members response. If unwelcome devices respond, the protocol stops at this point. 3) After authentication and key exchange, each device may broadcast encrypted data, which can only be decrypted by legitimate group members. tions. Our proposal is based on the Guy Fawkes protocol [1], originally designed for authenticating digital streams. The Guy Fawkes protocol assumes that parties A and B want to exchange streams consisting of sequential blocks A 0 A 1 A 2 11 and B 0 B 1 B 2 respectively. At step i, A sends to B a packet P i containing 4 pieces of ....
....require the presence of meaningless random messages to work: these messages can be replaced by empty messages. Note that this interactive protocol, as well as the original non interactive Guy Fawkes protocol, provides integrity protection and authentication, but cannot provide encryption. See [1] for a security analysis of the Guy Fawkes protocol. If the location limited channel being used is believed to provide secrecy as well as integrity (e.g. contact) it is possible to directly exchange a secret key across that channel, and use the key to encrypt further communications. However, ....
Anderson, Bergadano, Crispo, Lee, Manifavas, and Needham. A new family of authentication protocols. ACMOSR: ACM Operating Systems Review, 32, 1998.
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R. Anderson, F. Bergadano, B. Crispo, J.-H. Lee, C. Manifavas, R. Needham, "A New Family of Authentication Protocols", ACM Operating Ssystems Review, 1998.
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R. Anderson, F. Bergadano, B. Crispo, J. Lee, C. Manifavas, and R. Needham, "A New Family of Authentication Protocols," ACM Operating Systems Rev., vol. 32, 1998.
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Anderson, R., Bergadano, F., Crispo, B., Lee, J., Manifavas, C., and Needham, R. 1998. A new family of authentication protocols. In Operating Systems Review.
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R. Anderson, F. Bergadano, B. Crispo, J.-H. Lee, C. Manifavas, and R. Needham . A new family of authentication protocols. ACMOSR: ACM Operating Systems Review, vol. 32 (1998).
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R. Anderson, F. Bergadano, B. Crispo, J. Lee, C. Manifavas, and R. Needham,"A New Family of Authentication Protocols," ACM Operating Systems Review 32(4), pp. 9-20, 1998.
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R.J. Anderson, F. Bergadano, B. Crispo, J.H. Lee, C. Manifavas and R.M. Needham, " A New Family of Authentication Protocols," ACM Operating Systems Review, vol. 32, n. 4, pp. 9-20, October 1998, ACM Press.
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R. Anderson, F. Bergadano, B. Crispo, J. Lee, C. Manifavas, and R. Needham. A new family of authentication protocols. Operating Systems Review, 32(4):9--20, October, 1998. 12
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R. Anderson, F. Bergadano, B. Crispo, J.-H. Lee, C. Manifavas, and R. Needham, "A new family of authentication protocols," Operating Systems Review, vol. 32, no. 4, Oct. 1998.
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R. Anderson, F. Bergadano, B. Crispo, J.-H. Lee, C. Manifavas, and R. Needham, "A new family of authentication protocols," Operating Systems Review, vol. 32, no. 4, Oct. 1998.
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R. Anderson, F. Bergadano, B. Crispo, J.-H. Lee, C. Manifavas, and R. Needham . A new family of authentication protocols. ACMOSR: ACM Operating Systems Review, vol. 32 (1998).
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R. Anderson, F. Bergadano, B. Crispo, J.-H. Lee, C. Manifavas, and R. Needham, "A new family of authentication protocols," Operating Systems Review, vol. 32, no. 4, Oct. 1998.
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R.J. Anderson, F. Bergadano, B. Crispo, J.-H. Lee, C. Manifavas, and R.M. Needham. A new family of authentication protocols. ACM Operating Systems Review, 32(4):9--20, 1998.
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Ross Anderson, Francesco Bergadano, Bruno Crispo, Jong-Hyeon Lee, Charalampos Manifavas, and Roger Needham. A new family of authentication protocols. Operating Systems Review, 32(4):9--20, 1998.
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Ross J. Anderson, Francesco Bergadano, Bruno Crispo, Jong-Hyeon Lee, Charalampos Manifavas, and Roger M. Needham. A new family of authentication protocols. Operating Systems Review, 32(4):9- 20, October 1998.
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R. Anderson, F. Bergadano, B. Crispo, J. Lee, C. Manifavas, and R. Needham. A new Family of Authentication Protocols. Operating Systems Review, 1998.
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