| W. R. Bevier, R. M. Cohen, and W. D. Young. Connection policies and controlled interference. In Proc. IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pages 167--176, June 1995. |
....such format string vulnerabilities in C [22] are similar to integrity only information ow analysis. Intransitive noninterference policies [19,14,18] generalize noninterference to describe systems that contain restricted downgrading mechanisms. The work by Bevier et al. on controlled interference [3] is most similar to this work in allowing policies for information released to a set of agents. 6 Conclusions Security typed languages are a promising and exible approach to the problem of protecting con dential data in computer systems. Practical security typed 13 languages provide a rich ....
William R. Bevier, Richard M. Cohen, and William D. Young. Connection policies and controlled interference. In Proc. of the 8th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pages 167-176, 1995.
....these efforts provide only limited characterization of the safety of the declassification process. Intransitive noninterference policies [19, 17, 18] generalize noninterference to describe systems that contain restricted downgrading mechanisms. The work by Bevier et al. on controlled interference [3] is most similar to this work in allowing the specification of policies for information released to a set of agents. Their notion of agent largely agrees with the notion of a passive attacker defined here. None of this prior work addresses the issue of an active attacker. However, the results in ....
W. R. Bevier, R. M. Cohen, and W. D. Young. Connection policies and controlled interference. In Proc. of the 8th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pages 167--176, 1995.
....these efforts provide only limited characterization of the safety of the declassification process. Intransitive noninterference policies [19, 17, 18] generalize noninterference to describe systems that contain restricted downgrading mechanisms. The work by Bevier et al. on controlled interference [3] is most similar to this work in allowing the specification of policies for information released to a set of agents. Their notion of agent largely agrees with the notion of a passive attacker defined here. None of this prior work addresses the issue of an active attacker. However, the results in ....
W. R. Bevier, R. M. Cohen, and W. D. Young. Connection policies and controlled interference. In Proc. of the 8th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pages 167--176, 1995.
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W. R. Bevier, R. M. Cohen, and W. D. Young. Connection policies and controlled interference. In Proc. IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pages 167--176, June 1995.
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