P. Kollock. The production of trust in online markets. In E. J. Lawler amd M. Macy, S. Thyne, and H. A. Walker, editors, Advances in Group Processes, volume 16, pages 99--123. JAI Press, 1999.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....trust in online auction markets when individuals have short run temptations to cheat What are the conditions under which such a mechanism would work These are the questions we attempt to answer in this paper. Trust has been recognized as a very important factor to facilitate online transactions [5,7,13,15,18,20,25]. However, current literature tends to focus on the social or economic functions of trust. For example, Kollock [18] explores the emergence of endogenous solutions to the problems of risky trade and discusses the production of trust in online markets. Lee and Yoo [20] focus on the problem of ....

....would work These are the questions we attempt to answer in this paper. Trust has been recognized as a very important factor to facilitate online transactions [5,7,13,15,18,20,25] However, current literature tends to focus on the social or economic functions of trust. For example, Kollock [18] explores the emergence of endogenous solutions to the problems of risky trade and discusses the production of trust in online markets. Lee and Yoo [20] focus on the problem of quality discovery in electronic trading of physical goods. They argue that a third party mechanism can solve the problem ....

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P. Kollock, The production of trust in online markets, in: E.J. Lawler, M. Macy, S. Thyne, H.A. Walker (Eds.), Advances in Group Processes, vol. 16, JAI Press, Greenwich, CT, 1999. http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/soc/faculty/kollock/papers/ online _ trust.htm.

....have to wait until they have a bad experience until they can conclude that another node misbehaves. Another approach would be to allow only the dissemination of positive reputation information. False accusations are not an issue in positive reputation systems, since no negative information is kept [10, 7], however, the disseminated information could still be false praise and result in a good reputation for malicious nodes. Moreover, even if the disseminated information is correct, one cannot distinguish between a malicious node and a new node that just joined the network. Many reputation systems ....

Peter Kollock. The production of trust in online markets. Advances in Group Processes, edited by E. J. Lawler, M. Macy, S. Thyne, and H. A. Walker, 16, 1999.

....in distributed fashion 3. Is our system resilient to greed 4. Is our system resilient to malice deferring to Section V a discussion of the latter two. A. Rating The first component of a rating based architecture is the property of the rating information itself. This is a wellstudied issue [6]. Here, we briefly discuss the different options for ratings: Positive vs. Negative: Positive rating quantitatively describes the services a user has provided to the community. When there is no negative rating and users start at zero, there is no incentive for these users to change their names ....

P. Kollock, "The production of trust in online markets," Advances in Group Processes (Vol. 16), edited by E. J. Lawler, M. Macy, S. Thyne, and H. A. Walker. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press., 1999.

....or auctioning [15] Positive reputation systems o#er the implicit disincentive to change identifiers since reputations are built over time and having a long history of cooperation helps nodes to be chosen. Slander is not an issue in positive reputation systems, since no negative information is kept [10, 7]. Negative reputation systems o#er more scalability under the assumption that misbehavior is the exception and not the norm. We deem the combined use of both positive and negative reputation adequate for the context of mobile ad hoc networks, as we are interested in the cooperation factor ....

Peter Kollock. The production of trust in online markets. Advances in Group Processes, edited by E. J. Lawler, M. Macy, S. Thyne, and H. A. Walker, 16, 1999.

....and in similar ways. For example, in the same way that the physical shape of the built environment may foster or inhibit economic and social well being [17] structure imposed by information technology may contribute positively or negatively towards the goals of a larger social enterprise [24]. It would be valuable to be able to discuss the built information environment and its effect on its occupants as a single system, using vocabulary that has connotations in both the social and the information systems realms. This vocabulary should be accessible both to actual and potential ....

....these two kinds of systems, and for interactions between the two. We also need to deal with various kinds of commons spaces as a response to the disconnectedness of the built information environment. Marketplaces might make use of a smaller pattern such as Positive Reputation System (see [24]) Companies such as eBay and Bibliofind provide markets connecting consumers to small businesses such as antique and used book dealers. Web portal and search engine providers such as Yahoo and America On Line provide a commons, however commercialized, for navigating through large sections of the ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

Kollock. P.. The Production of Trust in Online Markets. In Lawler E.J., Macy M., Thyne S., Walker, H. Advances in Group Processes. JAI Press. Vol. 16, 1999. Also at: www.sscnet.ucla.edu/soc/faculty/kollock/papers/ online_trust.htm

....in time and space is inherent in the medium, and will not be overcome with time the trust problem is therefore not likely to go away with increasing collective familiarity. 4. 3 Separation in Space Time At the core of every economic transaction lies a situation known as prisoner s dilemma [11]: If both parties choose to maximise their own benefit (i.e. take the other party s exchange item, but keep their own) the transaction will not take place and both participants lose out. The risk of one party acting in this way can be minimised by co presence of both parties: If I go to a shop ....

....their own trustworthiness with an irritated: well they would say that, wouldn t they. Rather, the site has to look and feel trustworthy throughout the interaction. Another way of transferring trust is a reputation sharing mechanism, as currently used by on line auctioneers such as eBay [11]. They aggregate individual e shoppers ratings of other participants trustworthiness and, based on these, assign each participant a reputation rating. This approach could also be employed by trust seals: basing their approval on customer ratings rather than solely on compliance with set ....

Kollock, P. (1999). The production of trust in online markets. Advances in Group Processes, 16.

....trading partners as well as the relative ease with which buyers and sellers can change partners from one transaction to the next, gives incentives to both parties to provide inferior service quality or to hold back on their side of the exchange. management mechanism in such online communities [4]. The goal of reputation systems is to encourage trustworthiness in transactions by using past behavior as a publicly available predictor of likely future behavior. Most electronic marketplaces on the Internet support some form of reputation mechanism. eBay (www.ebay. com) for example, ....

....of trade as well as the published reputations. Because they can no longer identify their victims , bad mouthing and negative discrimination can be avoided. It is interesting to observe that, while, in most cases, the anonymity of online communities has been viewed as a source of additional risks [2, 4], here we have an example of a situation where anonymity can be used to eliminate some transaction risks. Concealing the identities of buyers and sellers is not possible in all domains. For example, concealing the identity of sellers is not possible in restaurant and hotel ratings (although ....

Kollock, P. (1999) The Production of Trust in Online Markets. InAdvances in Group Processes (Vol. 16), eds. E.J. Lawler, M. Macy, S. Thyne, and H.A. Walker, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

....and sellers can change partners from one transaction to the next, gives incentives to both parties to provide inferior service quality or to hold back on their side of the exchange. Reputation reporting systems have emerged as an important risk management mechanism in such online communities (Kollock 1999). The goal of reputation systems is to encourage trustworthiness in transactions by using past behavior as a publicly available predictor of likely future behavior. Most electronic marketplaces on the Internet support some form of reputation mechanism. eBay, for example, encourages both parties ....

....of trade as well as the published reputations. Because they can no longer identify their victims, bad mouthing and negative discrimination can be avoided. It is interesting to observe that, while in most cases the anonymity of online communities has been viewed as a source of additional risks (Kollock 1999; Friedman and Resnick 1999) here we have an example of a situation where anonymity can be used to eliminate some transaction risks. Concealing the identities of buyers and sellers is not possible in all domains. For example, concealing the identity of sellers is not possible in restaurant and ....

Kollock, P. "The Production of Trust in Online Markets," in Advances in Group Processes (Vol. 16), E. J. Lawler, M. Macy, S. Thyne, and H. A. Walker (eds.), Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1999.

....responses to kids vary greatly in quality. Allowing teachers to rate elders interactions with their classrooms provides not only a way for future teachers to see which elders are reliable, but also provides a badge of honor for elders who are well regarded. EBay has a similar reputation system [12]. Another way that ratings might help build community is through the rating of discussion posts and PalaverStories. All members of the community could be asked to pick out items that they find to be high quality, and those items given a place of prominence within the community. Finally, Palaver ....

Kollock, P., The Production of Trust in Online Markets, in Advances in Group Processes. 1999, JAI Press: Grenwich, CT.

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P. Kollock. The production of trust in online markets. In E. J. Lawler amd M. Macy, S. Thyne, and H. A. Walker, editors, Advances in Group Processes, volume 16, pages 99--123. JAI Press, 1999.

No context found.

Peter Kollock. The production of trust in online markets. Advances in Group Processes, edited by E. J. Lawler, M. Macy, S. Thyne, and H. A. Walker, 16, 1999.

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P. Kollock. The production of trust in online markets, in advances in group processes. JAI, 16:99--123, 1999.

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Peter Kollock. The production of trust in online markets. Advances in Group Processes, edited by E. J. Lawler, M. Macy, S. Thyne, and H. A. Walker, 16, 1999.

No context found.

Peter Kollock. The production of trust in online markets. Advances in Group Processes, edited by E. J. Lawler, M. Macy, S. Thyne, and H. A. Walker, 16, 1999.

No context found.

Kollock, P. (1999) The Production of Trust in Online Markets. In Advances in Group Processes (Vol. 16), eds. E.J. Lawler, M. Macy, S. Thyne, and H.A. Walker, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

No context found.

Peter Kollock. The production of trust in online markets. Advances in Group Processes, edited by E. J. Lawler, M. Macy, S. Thyne, and H. A. Walker, 16, 1999.

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