B. Schneier. Attack Trees: Modeling Security Threats. Dr. Dobb's Journal, December 1999. Home/Search Document Not in Database Summary Related Articles Check |
This paper is cited in the following contexts:
Educating Leaders in Information Assurance - Schumacher, Welch (Correct)
....the high level concepts associated with the topic. Additionally, hands on exercises were used at the end of the class to reinforce concepts. The initial plans for network defense in the Cyber Defend Exercise were not very strong. Even though the students were required to develop attack trees [16], the plans did not exhibit good breadth or depth. The second iteration of the plans were much better, but if completely implemented, would not form a coherent defense. Clearly, abstract discussions of computer network defense did not develop clear understanding in the students minds. During the ....
Schneier, Bruce, Attack Trees: Modeling Security Threats. Dr. Dobb's Journal, CMP Media, Inc. December 1999.
A Fault-Tree Representation of NPATRL Security Requirements - Cervesato, Meadows (2003) (Correct)
....language for formally specifying software safety requirements. Formal semantics have been provided for fault trees in terms of various logical systems (see [3] for an example and a discussion of the literature) More recently, fault trees have been used for the security analysis of systems[8, 9], although no attempt has been made to provide a formal semantics in this context yet. Our intended use of fault trees is somewhat di#erent from the above. In most applications to system safety and security, the root node is assumed to be an undesired event: either a system fault or a security ....
B. Schneier. Attack trees : Modeling security threats. Dr. Dobb's Journal, Dec. 1999.
Trustworthy Refinement Through Intrusion-Aware Design (TRIAD) - Ellison, Moore (2003) (Correct)
....in terms of costs or complexity of administration that may suggest changes to the conceptual architec ture. The large number of intrusions possible for any nontrivial system necessitates a scheme to organize related intrusions. Attack trees provide such an organizational scheme [Salter 98, Schneier 99, Schneier 00a] They refine information about intrusions by identifying the compromise of enterprise security or survivability as the root of the tree. The ways that an attacker can cause this compromise are refined incrementally as lower level nodes of the tree. A system typically has a set, or ....
Schneier, B. "Attack Trees: Modeling Security Threats." Dr. Dobb Journal, December 1999.
A Fault-Tree Representation of NPATRL Security Requirements - Cervesato, Meadows (2003) (Correct)
....language for formally specifying software safety requirements. Formal semantics have been provided for fault trees in terms of various logical systems (see [3] for an example and a discussion of the literature) More recently, fault trees have been used for the security analysis of systems[8, 9], although no attempt has been made to provide a formal semantics in this context yet. Our intended use of fault trees is somewhat di erent from the above. In most applications to system safety and security, the root node is assumed to be an undesired event: either a system fault or a security ....
B. Schneier. Attack trees : Modeling security threats. Dr. Dobb's Journal, Dec. 1999.
Trustworthy Refinement Through Intrusion-Aware Design - Ellison, Moore (2002) (Correct)
....Abuse cases describe these malicious actors in detail according to their resources, skills, and objectives. The large number of intrusions possible for any nontrivial system necessitates a scheme to organize related intrusions. Attack trees provide such an organizational scheme [Salter 98, Schneier 99, Schneier 00b] They refine information about intrusions by identifying the compromise of enterprise security or survivability as the root of the tree. The ways that an attacker can cause this compromise are refined incrementally as lower level nodes of the tree. For example, suppose that a ....
Schneier, B. "Attack Trees: Modeling Security Threats," Dr. Dobb's Journal, December 1999.
Foundations for Survivable System Development: Service Traces, .. - Linger, Moore (2001) (Correct)
....patterns to make systems more secure and survivable. 3.1 Intruder Workflows Organized Into Attack Trees The large number of intruder workflows relevant to any nontrivial enterprise necessitates a scheme to organize related workflows. Attack trees provide such an organizational scheme [Salter 98, Schneier 99, Schneier 00] They refine information about attacks by identifying the compromise of enterprise security or survivability as the root of the tree. The ways that an attacker can cause this compromise are refined incrementally as lower level nodes of the tree. For example, suppose Mal is a ....
Schneier, B. "Attack Trees: Modeling Security Threats." Dr. Dobb's Journal 24, 12 (December 1999): 21-29.
Trial-By-Fire in Information Assurance Education - Welch, Ragsdale, Schepens (Correct)
....Cyber Defense Exercise Team posing with NSA and USMA leadership after the presentation of the NSA Director s Trophy. The initial plans for network defense by the West Point Teams in the Cyber Defend Exercise were not very mature. Even though the students were required to develop attack trees [6], the plans did not exhibit good breadth or depth. The second iteration of the plans were much better but if completely implemented still would not form a coherent defense. Clearly abstract discussions of computer network defense did not develop clear understanding of a coherent defense in ....
Schneier, Bruce, Attack Trees: Modeling Security Threats. Dr. Dobb's Journal, CMP Media, Inc. December 1999.
Toward a Threat Model for Storage Systems - Ragib Hasan Rhasan (Correct)
No context found.
B. Schneier. Attack Trees: Modeling Security Threats. Dr. Dobb's Journal, December 1999.
A Formal Method for Attack Modeling and - Detection Seyit Ahmet (Correct)
No context found.
B. Schneier, "Attack trees: Modeling security threats," Dr. Dobb's Journal, December 1999.
Threat Modeling Networked And Data-Centric Systems - Myagmar (2005) (Correct)
No context found.
B. Schneier, "Attack trees: Modeling security threats," Dr. Dobb's Journal, December 1999.
Toward a Threat Model for Storage Systems - Hasan, Myagmar, Lee, Yurcik (2005) (Correct)
No context found.
B. Schneier. Attack Trees: Modeling Security Threats. Dr. Dobb's Journal, December 1999.
Vote Early, Vote Often, and VoteHere: A Security Analysis of.. - Varner (2001) (Correct)
No context found.
Schneier, Bruce. \Attack Trees: Modeling security threats". Dr. Dobb's Journal December 1999. http://www.counterpane.com/attacktrees-ddj-ft.html (Feb 2000).
Security-Critical System Development with Extended Use Cases - Popp, Jürjens, Wimmel, Breu (Correct)
No context found.
B. Schneier. Attack Trees --- Modeling Security Threats. Dr. Dobb's Journal, 12, 1999.
From System Goals to Intruder Anti-Goals: Attack.. - van Lamsweerde.. (2003) (Correct)
No context found.
B. Schneier, "Attack Trees: Modeling Security Threats", Dr. Dobb's Journal, December 1999.
Computer Security Strength & Risk: A Quantitative Approach - Schechter (2004) (1 citation) (Correct)
No context found.
Bruce Schneier. Attack trees: Modeling security threats. Dr. Dobb's Journal, December 1999.
Attack Modeling for Information Security and Survivability - Moore, Ellison, Linger (2001) (4 citations) (Correct)
No context found.
Schneier 99 Schneier, B., "Attack Trees: Modeling Security Threats," Dr. Dobb's Journal, December 1999.
Online articles have much greater impact More about CiteSeer.IST Add search form to your site Submit documents Feedback
CiteSeer.IST - Copyright Penn State and NEC