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H. Luo and S. Lu. Ubiquitous and Robust Authentication Services for Ad Hoc Wireless Networks. Technical Report TR-2000.

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H. Luo and S. Lu, "Ubiquitous and robust authentication services for ad hoc wireless networks," UCLA Computer Science Technical Report 2000.

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H. Luo and S. Lu. Ubiquitous and Robust Authentication Services for Ad Hoc Wireless Networks. Technical Report TR-2000.

....TTL is defined as time to live : the maximal number of hops that a packet can traverse in the network. these information. The following theorem shows the security of our certification service algorithms and protocols, and we leave the detailed definitions and proofs to the technical report [20]. Theorem 5.1 (Security) The localized certification algorithms are RSA (k, n) secure. 6 Self initialization and Share Updates Section 5 presents the certification service instantiation by a coalition of k nodes with their polynomial shares of SK. In this section, we study the distribution of ....

....as presented in Section 6.1. Firstly a coalition of k nodes update their shares by applying the existing protocols as proposed in [14] The self initialization protocols then follow to update the shares of the rest of the network. We leave the detailed protocols in the technical report [20]. 7 Evaluation of implementation We implemented our design in both Unix platforms and a popular network simulator ns 2 [23] Our Unix implementation seeks to quantitatively characterize the computational cost of our solution, and we use the simulation experiments to evaluate communication ....

H. Luo and S. Lu. Ubiquitous and Robust Authentication Services for Ad Hoc Wireless Networks. Technical Report TR-2000.

....of SK and a history of polynomial many partial results, an adversary learns no more about SK than without these information. The following theorem shows the security of our design. Due to lack of space, we leave the detailed algorithms, communication protocols and proof to the technical report [25]. Theorem 1 (Security) The localized certification and share update algorithms are RSA (k, n) secure. 7 Implementation and Performance Evaluation We implemented our design in both the popular network simulator ns 2 and UNIX platforms. The Unix implementation is used to evaluate the ....

H. Luo and S. Lu, "Ubiquitous and robust authentication services for ad hoc wireless networks," UCLA Computer Science Technical Report

....are presented in ( 3.3.2) The transition to infrastructure mode is studied in ( 3.3.3) 6 3.3. 1 Distributed Certification Services Given the size of network 9 , a system parameter ( 9 ) and a centralized CA with RSA key pair , cryptographic algorithms [7, 35, 32, 38, 24] and systems [48, 52, 53, 20] allow the functionality of the CA to be distributed into the network where each node becomes a partial CA. Each partial CA holds a secret share 9 , and a coalition of any out of 9 partial CAs can function as the centralized CA. During the ....

....must turn off 9 partial CAs to turn off certification services, while they must break in partial CAs to steal the signing key . Further contributions on proactive secret share updates [16, 9, 8, 32] verifiable secret sharing [5, 40, 36] and fully distributed DCA [24, 20] offer more security warranties in applying the de centralized scheme in the context of scalable networks with long term adversaries and untruthful coalition members. In a scalable network with large number of secret share holders, not only the secret shares 9 can be ....

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H. Luo and S. Lu. Ubiquitous and Robust Authentication Services for Ad Hoc Wireless Networks. Technical Report TR-

....are presented in (x 3.3.2) The transition to infrastructure mode is studied in (x 3.3.3) 3.3. 1 Distributed Certification Services Given the size of network N , a system parameter K (0 KN ) and a centralized CA with RSA key pair fSK 0 ff ; PK 0 ff g, cryptographic algorithms [7, 34, 31, 37, 23] and systems [47, 51, 52, 19] allow the functionality of the CA to be distributed into the network where each node becomes a partial CA. Each partial CA holds a secret share SK 0 ff;i (1iN) and a coalition of any K out of N partial CAs can function as the centralized CA. During the ....

....must turn off (N Gamma K 1) partial CAs to turn off certification services, while they must break in K partial CAs to steal the signing key SK 0 ff . Further contributions on proactive secret share updates [16, 9, 8, 31] verifiable secret sharing [5, 39, 35] and fully distributed DCA [23, 19] offer more security warranties in applying the de centralized scheme in the context of scalable networks with long term adversaries and untruthful coalition members. In a scalable network with large number of secret share holders, not only the secret shares fSK 0 ff;i j1iNg can be proactively ....

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H. Luo and S. Lu. Ubiquitous and Robust Authentication Services for Ad Hoc Wireless Networks. Technical Report TR-

....the application domain is still group oriented multi signature with fixed number of share holders. Their algorithms cannot be directly applied in large scale networks with dynamic node membership. We have devised a new algorithm to meet the demand of scalability and dynamic node membership [9]. In our architecture, membership changes do not affect existing secret shares or the current signing key. Secret share dealing Unlike [2, 4, 12] we follow the simple procedures specified by Shamir [14] Given an RSA signing key SK = hd; ni, the shared secret is the private exponent f(0) d, ....

....member decrypts all nonces, computes a shuffled partial secret share, and then sends it back to v x . It can be shown that the self initialization protocol is still K out of N secure if there are at least two uncompromised entities in the coalition. The cryptoanalysis details are available in [9]. 4.3 Secret share update To further enhance the robustness of our design, we periodically update all the secret shares to invalidate compromised secret shares. In the bootstrapping phase all secret shares are tagged with version 1 and ID 0. Each secret share update will increase the version by ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

H. Luo and S. Lu. Ubiquitous and Robust Authentication Services for Ad Hoc Wireless Networks. Technical Report TR-

....the application domain is still group oriented multi signature with fixed number of share holders. Their algorithms cannot be directly applied in large scale networks with dynamic node membership. We have devised a new algorithm to meet the demand of scalability and dynamic node membership [9]. In our architecture, membership changes do not affect existing secret shares or the current signing key. Secret share dealing Unlike [2, 4, 12] we follow the simple procedures specified by Shamir [14] Given an RSA signing key ## # ### ##, the shared secret is the private exponent #### # #, ....

....member decrypts all nonces, computes a shuffled partial secret share, and then sends it back to # # . It can be shown that the self initialization protocol is still # out of # secure if there are at least two uncompromised entities in the coalition. The cryptoanalysis details are available in [9]. 4.3 Secret share update To further enhance the robustness of our design, we periodically update all the secret shares to invalidate compromised secret shares. In the bootstrapping phase all secret shares are tagged with version # and ID #. Each secret share update will increase the version by ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

H. Luo and S. Lu. Ubiquitous and Robust Authentication Services for Ad Hoc Wireless Networks. Technical Report TR-200030, Dept. of Computer Science, UCLA, 2000.

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H.Luo,S.Lu "Ubiquitous and Robust Authentication Services for Ad Hoc Wireless Networks". Technical report UCLA-CSD-TR-200030, October'00,UCLA.

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