M. Wright, M. Adler, B. Levine, and C. Shields. An analysis of the degradation of anonymous protocols. In ISOC Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security, Febrauary 2002. 15  Home/Search Document Details and Download
Summary Related Articles Check |
This paper is cited in the following contexts:
First 50 documents
Incentives for Cooperation in Anonymity Systems - Figueiredo, Shapiro, Towsley (2003) (Correct)
....message. Furthermore, peers who forward messages cannot distinguish between the true message initiator and an intermediate peer along the forwarding path. An important property of anonymous protocols is the degree of anonymity they provide and their robustness to certain types of malicious attacks [6, 13]. These metrics are usually monotonic in the number of peers in the group; having more peers confers a higher degree of anonymity and higher robustness to attacks. Like many other peer to peer applications, anonymity systems are vulnerable to free riders, nodes that consume the service without ....
....in the group at any particular point in time, which consequently reduces the degree of anonymity. Second, the frequent turnover in group membership caused by free riders joining and leaving the system imposes a high group maintenance overhead and can facilitate certain types of malicious attacks [13]. In this work, we consider a novel technique that uses digital cash to provide explicit incentives for cooperation in peer peer anonymous systems. The main contributions of this paper are: We argue that payment based mechanisms that uses digital cash are very well suited to provide ....
Matt Wright, Micah Adler, Brian N. Levine, and Clay Shields. An analysis of the degradation of anonymous protocols. In Proc. ISOC Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS 2002.
Probabilistic Model Checking of an Anonymity System - Shmatikov (2004) (1 citation) (Correct)
....(the number of paths must grow with time since paths are rebuilt when crowd membership changes) Second, the confidence of the corrupt members that they detected the correct sender increases with the size of the group. The first flaw was reported independently by Malkhi [Mal01] and Wright et al. [WALS02], while the second, to the best of our knowledge, was reported for the first time in the conference version of this paper [Shm02] In contrast to the analysis by Wright et al. that relies on manual probability calculations, we discovered both potential vulnerabilities of Crowds by automated ....
....Since PRISM only supports model checking of finite DTMC, in our case study of Crowds we only analyze anonymity properties of finite instances of the system. By changing parameters of the model, we demonstrate how anonymity properties evolve with changes in the system configuration. Wright et al. [WALS02] investigated related properties of the Crowds system in the general case, but they do not rely on tool support and their analyses are manual rather than automated. 3 Crowds Anonymity System Providing an anonymous communication service on the Internet is a challenging task. While conventional ....
[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]
M. Wright, M. Adler, B.N. Levine, and C. Shields. An analysis of the degradation of anonymous protocols. In Proc. ISOC Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS), 2002. 27
An Analysis of GNUnet and the Implications for Anonymous.. - Kügler (Correct)
....The intersection attack [BPS01] exploits the fact that not all users of a MIX network participate in every batch. Thus, all users that have not contributed to a batch containing linkable tra#c, can be subsequently removed from the anonymity set. 2. Predecessor Attacks: The predecessor attack [WALS02] extracts information from the setup of dynamically chosen, linkable paths, where each node randomly selects the following node out of the set of all nodes. To determine the initiator, the attacker logs the preceding node. Besides the initiator, every node should be logged with equal probability. ....
....initiator, the attacker logs the preceding node. Besides the initiator, every node should be logged with equal probability. Thus, the expected number of times the initiator is logged is greater than the expected number of times any other node is logged. The predecessor attack has been used in [WALS02,Shm02] to successfully attack Crowds [RR98] In GNUnet however, the assumption that every node is logged B X 3. Response 4. Next Query Attacker Traffic 1. Query 2. Forwarded Query Fig. 2. The shortcut attack. with equal probability is not satisfied, as each node only sends queries ....
Matthew Wright, Micah Adler, Brian N. Levine, and Clay Shields. An analysis of the degradation of anonymous protocols. In Network and Distributed System Security Symposium -- NDSS 2002. Internet Society, 2002.
Defending Anonymous Communications Against Passive.. - Wright, Adler, Levine, .. (2003) (9 citations) Self-citation (Wright Adler Levine Shields) (Correct)
....systems for anonymous communications is a complex and challenging task. Such systems must be secure against attackers at a single point in time; more importantly, they must also protect users from attacks that seek to gain information about users over the lifetime of the system. In our prior work [17], we analyzed such an attack: the predecessor attack. In this attack, a set of nodes in the anonymous system work together to passively log possible initiators of a stream of communications. With sucient path reformations which are unavoidable in practice the attackers will see the initiator ....
....as an attack against Crowds [13] The primary purpose of our current work is to extend our previous results in the analysis of anonymous protocols. In this section, we review the de nitions, methods, and results of that work, and we refer the reader to the full paper if greater detail is desired [17]. The rst contribution of our previous work was to de ne a class of protocols, which included all known protocols for anonymous communication, and to prove that the class degrades against the predecessor attack. We de ned an active set as the set of nodes used by the initiator of a ....
[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]
M. Wright, M. Adler, B. Levine, and C. Shields. An analysis of the degradation of anonymous protocols. In ISOC Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security, February 2002.
Passive Attack Analysis for Connection-Based Anonymity - Systems Andrei Serjantov (Correct)
No context found.
M. Wright, M. Adler, B. Levine, and C. Shields. An analysis of the degradation of anonymous protocols. In ISOC Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security, Febrauary 2002. 15
Probable Innocence Revisited - Konstantinos Chatzikokolakis Catuscia (Correct)
No context found.
M. Wright, M. Adler, B. Levine, and C. Shields. An analysis of the degradation of anonymous protocols. In ISOC Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS), 2002. 27
Towards Measuring Anonymity - Diaz, Seys, Claessens, Preneel (2002) (11 citations) (Correct)
No context found.
M. Wright, M. Adler, B. Levine and C. Shields. An Analysis of the Degradation of Anonymous Protocols. In Proceedings of Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, February 2002. Appeared in Proceedings of PET 2002, April 14-15, 2002, San Francisco, In Hannes Federath (Ed.), Designing Privacy Enhancing Technologies, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2002.
On the Analysis of the Predecessor Attack on Anonymity.. - Figueiredo, Nain, Towsley (2004) (Correct)
No context found.
Matt Wright, Micah Adler, Brian N. Levine, and Clay Shields. An analysis of the degradation of anonymous protocols. In Proc. ISOC Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS 2002.
Information Leak in the Chord Lookup Protocol - O'Donnell, Vaikuntanathan (2004) (Correct)
No context found.
M. Wright, M. Adler, B. Levine, and C. Shields. An analysis of the degradation of anonymous protocols. In ISOC Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security, Febrauary 2002.
Payment-based Incentives for Anonymous Peer-to-Peer Systems - Figueiredo, Shapiro, Towsley (2004) (Correct)
No context found.
Matt Wright, Micah Adler, Brian N. Levine, and Clay Shields. An analysis of the degradation of anonymous protocols. In Proc. ISOC Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS 2002.
Better Anonymous Communications - Danezis (2004) (1 citation) (Correct)
No context found.
Matthew Wright, Micah Adler, Brian Neil Levine, and Clay Shields. An analysis of the degradation of anonymous protocols. In Network and Distributed Security Symposium (NDSS '02), San Diego, California, 6-8 February 2002.
On the Analysis of the Predecessor Attack on Anonymity.. - Figueiredo, Nain, Towsley (2004) (Correct)
No context found.
Matt Wright, Micah Adler, Brian N. Levine, and Clay Shields. An analysis of the degradation of anonymous protocols. In Proc. ISOC Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS 2002.
SOS: An Architecture For Mitigating DDoS Attacks - Keromytis, Misra, Rubenstein (2004) (3 citations) (Correct)
No context found.
M. Wright, M. Adler, B. N. Levine, and C. Shields, "An Analysis of the Degradation of Anonymous Protocols," in Proceedings of the ISOC Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security, February 2001.
Open Problems in Data-Sharing Peer-to-Peer Systems - Daswani, Garcia-Molina, Yang (2003) (4 citations) (Correct)
No context found.
Wright, M., Adler, M., Levine, B., Shields, C.: An analysis of the degradation of anonymous protocols. Technical Report, Univ. of Massachusetts, Amherst (2001)
Anonymity in Structured Peer-to-Peer Networks - Ph.D. Qualifying.. - Borisov (2004) (Correct)
No context found.
Matthew Wright, Micah Adler, Brian Neil Levine, and Clay Shields. An analysis of the degradation of anonymous protocols. In Proceedings of the Network and Distributed Security Symposium - NDSS '02. IEEE, February 2002. 14
Practical Traffic Analysis: Extending and Resisting.. - Mathewson, Dingledine (Correct)
No context found.
Matthew Wright, Micah Adler, Brian Neil Levine, and Clay Shields. An analysis of the degradation of anonymous protocols. In Network and Distributed Security Symposium (NDSS 02). IEEE, February 2002.
Passive Attack Analysis for Connection-Based Anonymity Systems - Serjantov, Sewell (2003) (4 citations) (Correct)
No context found.
M. Wright, M. Adler, B. Levine, and C. Shields. An analysis of the degradation of anonymous protocols. In ISOC Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security, Febrauary 2002. 15
Practical Anonymity for the Masses with MorphMix - Rennhard, Plattner (2004) (3 citations) (Correct)
No context found.
Matthew Wright, Micah Adler, Brian Neil Levine, and Clay Shields. An Analysis of the Degradation of Anonymous Protocols. In Proceedings of ISOC Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS 2002), San Diego, USA, February 2002.
SOS: An Architecture for Mitigating DDoS Attacks - Keromytis, Misra, Rubenstein (2003) (3 citations) (Correct)
No context found.
M. Wright, M. Adler, B. N. Levine, and C. Shields, "An Analysis of the Degradation of Anonymous Protocols," in Proceedings of the ISOC Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security, February 2001.
Timing Attacks in Low-Latency Mix Systems (Extended.. - Levine, Reiter, Wang.. (Correct)
No context found.
M. Wright, M. Adler, B.N. Levine, and C. Shields. An Analysis of the Degradation of Anonymous Protocols. In Proc. ISOC Sym. on Network and Distributed System Security, Feb 2002.
k-Anonymous Message Transmission - von Ahn, Bortz, Hopper (2003) (Correct)
No context found.
M. Wright, M. Adler, B. Levine, and C. Shields. An analysis of the degradation of anonymous protocols. Proceedings of ISOC Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security, February 2002. 13
Probabilistic Model Checking of an Anonymity System - Shmatikov (2004) (1 citation) (Correct)
No context found.
M. Wright, M. Adler, B.N. Levine, and C. Shields. An analysis of the degradation of anonymous protocols. In Proc. ISOC Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS), 2002. 27
Towards Measuring Anonymity - Diaz, Seys, Claessens, Preneel (2002) (11 citations) (Correct)
No context found.
M. Wright, M. Adler, B. Levine and C. Shields. An Analysis of the Degradation of Anonymous Protocols. In Proceedings of Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, February 2002. Appeared in Proceedings of PET 2002, April 14-15, 2002, San Francisco, In Hannes Federath (Ed.), Designing Privacy Enhancing Technologies, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2002.
Quantum Computation and Privacy - Wehner (2004) (Correct)
No context found.
M. Wright, M. Adler, B. Levine, and C. Shields. An analysis of the degradation of anonymous protocols. Technical report, University of Massachusetts, Amherst., April 2001.
k-Anonymous Message Transmission - von Ahn, Bortz, Hopper (2003) (Correct)
No context found.
M.Wright,M.Adler,B.Levine,andC.Shields.An analysis of the degradation of anonymous protocols. Proceedings of ISOC Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security, 2002.
First 50 documents
Online articles have much greater impact More about CiteSeer.IST Add search form to your site Submit documents Feedback
CiteSeer.IST - Copyright Penn State and NEC