| McDermid, J.A., et al., Experience with the Application of HAZOP to Computer-Based Systems. COMPASS '95: Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Conference on Computer Assurance, 1995: p. 37-48. |
.... supports the notion that these techniques are complementary [18, 7, 21] Work has been done to extend the HAZOP approach to a systematic exploration of hypothetical failures, with lists of guidewords or historical failure modes contributing to the hazards analysis in the software under review [23]. Automated tools to assist with portions of these analyses are currently being tested on requirements and design models. 25] BDA is product oriented rather than processoriented in that it can exercise and stress the design of the software product [45] It first checks the effect on the ....
McDermid, J. A., M. Nicholson, D. J. Pumfrey, and P. Fenelon (1995), "Experience with the application of HAZOP to computer-based systems," in Proc of COMPASS '95 , Gaithersburg, MD, pp. 37-48.
....technique. The output is tabular. 2.2. 3 HAZOP and HAZOP based techniques HAZard and OPerability study (HAZOP) CISHEC, 1977] Kletz, 1992] Adelard, 1994] was developed by Imperial Chemical Industries in the early 1970 s [Lawley, 1974] Lawley, 1976] and extended to software in the early 1990 s [McDermid et al. 1995]. HAZOP is performed after an outline equipment design is proposed showing the main design components and the flows between them. The results of the HAZOP may be either to accept the proposed architecture, subject to some safety related derived requirements, or to ask for the design to be ....
McDermid, J.A. Nicholson, Pumfrey D. & Fenelon, P., Experience with the application of HAZOP to Computer-Based Systems. Proceeding of the l0 th annual conference on computer assurance (COMPASS 95). Gaithersburg, MD, Pp. 37-48, June 1995.
....is a component based methodology from the chemical industry. HAZOP is greatly concerned with flows and tries to find causes for e.g. no flow, too much or too little flow, partial or reverse flow between components of a system. These chemical criteria are directly translated into computer terms [4, 5] as flows of data. Another component based method is Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) It looks at individual components or functions of the system and investigates their possible modes of failure. It then considers possible causes for each failure mode and estimates their likely ....
MCDERMID J.A. ET AL. Experience with the application of HAZOP to computer-based systems. COMPASS '95. Proceedings of the 10 th Annual Conference on Computer Assurance, 1995, Page(s): 37-48
....developed as a hierarchy of lower level safety arguments, which are substantiated by technical and procedural evidence from the safety assessment. Hierarchies of safety arguments are developed in SAM using a particular form of representation called the Goal Structure Notation (GSN) Wilson and McDermid, 1995], Wilson et al., 1995] One significant contribution of this work is that it has created the concept of an electronic safety case; a safety case which, rather than being a linear document, is a structured, electronically held, set of safety arguments and technical evidence of safety. In this ....
.... we have seen categorisations of abstract failure classes for software components [Ezhilchelvan and Shrivastava, 1986] Bondavalli and Simoncini, 1990] McDermid and Pumfrey, 1994] and a number of HAZOP inspired techniques for hazard analysis of software architectures [Burns and Pitblado, 1993] [McDermid et al., 1995]. 63 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) Villemeur, 1992] is another classical technique which is typically applied at the lowest design level where the exact composition of the system architecture is known. The aim here is to produce for each component of the architecture a list of ....
McDermid J. A., Nicholson M., Pumfrey D. J., Fenelon P., Experience with the Application of HAZOP to Computer-based Systems, COMPASS '95, Gaithersburg MD, IEEE Computer Society Press, 1995.
.... Sullivan et al. 1999] Combinations of forward analysis methods (to identify the possibly hazardous consequences of failures) and backward analysis methods (to investigate whether the hypothesized failure is credible in the system) have proven especially effective for safety analyses [Maier 1995; McDermid et al. 1995; Lutz Software Engineering for Safety: A Roadmap Delta 3 and Woodhouse 1997] Safety requirements for the software are derived from the resulting descriptions of the software s behavior. These software safety requirements act as constraints on the design of the system. Software may be required ....
.... identifies which software components are critical, using classical safety analyses, and then argues that the likelihood of software contributing to a hazard is acceptably low by referring to the development process rather than whether the software product satisfies the system safety requirements [McDermid et al. 1995]. SpecTRM, a toolset built by Leveson and colleagues to support the development of embedded systems, was designed to reduce the discontinuity between system and software requirements. It reduces the gap by reflecting how people actually use specifications to think about a complex system. For ....
McDermid, J. A., Nicholson, M., Pumfrey, D. J., and Fenelon, P. 1995. Experience with the application of HAZOP to computer-based systems. In Proc of 10th Annual Conf on Computer Assurance (1995), pp. 37--48.
....possible software causes for an antenna failure. Some researchers have performed SFMECA as a preparatory activity to fault tree construction [15] Others have recommmended first performing a search for causes (as in a FTA) and then considering the effects of each failure (as in a FMECA) [17]. Combining forward and backward analyses, or the bottom up SFMECA with the top down SFTA, has been found to be effective in understanding underlying combination of circumstances that enable a failure mode to occur, as well as the likelihood of the identified failure mode [4, 10] The effectiveness ....
McDermid, J. A., M. Nicholson, D. J. Pumfrey, and P. Fenelon, "Experience with the application of HAZOP to computer-based systems," in Proc of COMPASS '95 , Gaithersburg, MD, 1995, pp. 37-48.
....control software. FMECA (Failure Modes, Effect, and Criticality Analysis) is performed on the documented software requirements. Maier finds that the major benefit of the FMECA lies in its being a preparatory activity to fault tree construction. Recent papers by McDermid and Pumfrey [1994] and by McDermid, Nicholson, Pumfrey, and Fenelon [1995] describe a technique for software safety analysis based on a structured approach to the imaginative anticipation of hazards. Based on the HAZOP approach [Leveson 1995] their work concentrates on information flows and develops sets of guide words to prompt consideration of hypothetical ....
McDermid, J. A., M. Nicholson, D. J. Pumfrey, and P. Fenelon (1995), "Experience with the application of HAZOP to computer-based systems," In Proceedings of the 10th Annual Conference on Computer Assurance, IEEE, Gaithersburg, MD, pp. 37-48.
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McDermid, J.A., et al., Experience with the Application of HAZOP to Computer-Based Systems. COMPASS '95: Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Conference on Computer Assurance, 1995: p. 37-48.
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