P. Dumais, D. Mayers, and L. Salvail, \Perfectly concealing quantum bit commitment from any one-way permutation", Advances in Cryptology | EUROCRYPT 2000.  Home/Search   Document Details and Download   Summary   Related Articles   Check

.... one way permutations are hard to invert only if problems such as factoring or the discrete logarithm are hard, and are insecure against quantum computers, which can eciently solve such problems [18] Recently, Dumais, Mayers and Salvail considered the possibility of quantum one way permutations [11], and showed how to base quantum bit commitment on them (see also [10] Their scheme is perfectly concealing and computationally binding, in the sense that changing a commitment is computationally hard if inverting the permutation is hard. We exhibit a complementary quantum bit commitment scheme ....

....classical construction. Furthermore, a possible advantage of our protocol is that the information that must be communicated and stored between the parties consists of O(n) classical bits for bit commitment (and O(n) classical bits plus one qubit for qubit commitment) whereas the scheme in [11] employs O(n) qubits. The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we investigate a simple black box problem that is related to the Goldreich Levin Theorem. In Section 3, we give de nitions pertaining to one way permutations and hard predicates (classical and quantum versions) and ....

P. Dumais, D. Mayers, and L. Salvail, \Perfectly concealing quantum bit commitment from any one-way permutation", Advances in Cryptology | EUROCRYPT 2000.

....of information about the committed string. Statistically binding means that whatever Alice does it is impossible to open both 0 and 1 with non negligible probability of success. Recently, Dumais, Mayers, and Salvail proposed a quantum bit commitment scheme based on any quantum one way permutation [4]. This scheme is statistically concealing and computationally binding, and reduces the number of interaction and the total amount of communication compared with the classical counterpart proposed by Naor, Ostrovsky, Venkatesen, and Young [9] Incidentally, the way to convert the favor of a quantum ....

.... concealing and computationally binding, in order to commit n classical bits simultaneously with security parameter n, Bob needs to store only an O(n(log n) bit quantum string in our method, while an n bit quantum string in the previous quantum method by Dumais, Mayers, Salvail [4] with n parallel executions. Considering the rate, this scheme reduces exponentially the number of bits with Bob needs to store. Our protocols are based on the standard classical bit commitment method with the hard core predicates, the quantum bit commitment method proposed by Dumais, Mayers, ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

Dumais, P., Mayers, D., and Salvail, L. Perfectly concealing quantum bit commitment from any quantum one-way permutation. In Advances in Cryptology---EUROCRYPT

....The two part proof also holds in the quantum setting. For unconditionally concealing commitments, the weakest computational assumption for which a reduction was found is the existence of a family of classical one way permutations [22] However, the proof is not extendable to the quantum world [9]. Nevertheless, it was proven that computationally binding and unconditionally concealing quantum bit commitment can be based on any family of quantum one way permutations [9] Unfortunately, although we have candidates for quantum one way functions [10] none of them is a permutation. It was ....

.... the existence of a family of classical one way permutations [22] However, the proof is not extendable to the quantum world [9] Nevertheless, it was proven that computationally binding and unconditionally concealing quantum bit commitment can be based on any family of quantum one way permutations [9]. Unfortunately, although we have candidates for quantum one way functions [10] none of them is a permutation. It was still to be establish whether computationally binding and unconditionally concealing quantum bit commitment could rely on a weaker computational assumption, that is quantum ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

Dumais, P., D. Mayers, and L. Salvail, "Perfectly Concealing Quantum Bit Commitment From Any Quantum One-Way Permutation ", Advances in Cryptology : EUROCRYPT '00 : Proceedings, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1807, Springer-Verlag, 2000, pp. 300 -- 315.

....probability while being able to get a bias on f(b 1 ; b n ) given 2 f ; g . Our contributions In this paper, we address the question of determining how the binding property of the string commitment scheme used for implementing a QMC enforces its security. As already pointed out in [9, 7], quantum bit commitment schemes satisfy di erent binding properties than classical ones. The di erence becomes more obvious when string commitments are taken into account. We generalize the computational binding criteria of [9] to the case where commitments are made to strings of size l (n) ....

....implementing a QMC enforces its security. As already pointed out in [9, 7] quantum bit commitment schemes satisfy di erent binding properties than classical ones. The di erence becomes more obvious when string commitments are taken into account. We generalize the computational binding criteria of [9] to the case where commitments are made to strings of size l (n) for n the security parameter, and l some value depending on n. Intuitively, for a class of functions F ff : f0; 1g g, with m l both depending on n, we say that a string commitment scheme is F binding if for all f 2 F and ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

Dumais, P., D. Mayers, and L. Salvail, Perfectly Concealing Quantum Bit Commitment From Any Quantum One-Way Permutation, Advances in Cryptology : EUROCRYPT '00 : Proceedings, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1807, Springer-Verlag, 2000, pp. 300315.

.... is known to be impossible, several works have focused on reducing the error as much as possible [LC96, MS99, ATVY00, Amb01] Yet another line of work has focused on how to achieve certain twoparty tasks using computional assumptions, i.e. assuming that there exist (quantum) one way permutations [DMS00, CLS01] 17 1.2 De nitions This section describes a simple framework for proving the security of distributed quantum cryptographic protocols. The de ntions are based on the initial framework of Canetti [Can00] as well as on discussions in the dissertation of van de Graaf [vdG97] We ....

Paul Dumais, Dominic Mayers, and Louis Salvail. Perfectly concealing quantum bit commitment from any quantum one-way permutation. volume 1807 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 300-315. IACR, Springer, 2000.

....complicated protocols which would achieve arbitrarily small 0. At least two protocols have been proposed: by Mayers et.al. 21] 1 It is possible, however, to have quantum protocols for bit commitment under quantum complexity assumptions (existence of quantum 1 way functions) See Dumais et.al. [8] and Crepeau et.al. 7] 2 Namely, 10] assumes that it is known in advance that Alice wants to bias the coin to 0 and Bob wants to bias it to 1. Then, it is enough to give guarantees about P r[c = 0] if Bob is honest but Alice cheats and P r[c = 1] if Alice is honest but Bob cheats. In contrast, ....

P. Dumais, D. Mayers, L. Salvail. Perfectly concealing quantum bit commitment from any quantum one-way permutation. Advances in Cryptology: EUROCRYPT 2000: Proceedings, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 1807:300-315, Springer, Berlin, 2000.

No context found.

P. Dumais, D. Mayers, and L. Salvail. Perfectly Concealing Quantum Bit Commitment from any Quantum One-Way Permutation. In Advances in Cryptology --- EUROCRYPT 2000.

No context found.

Dumais, P., D. Mayers, and L. Salvail, Perfectly Concealing Quantum Bit Commitment From Any Quantum One-Way Permutation, in Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 00, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1807, Springer-Verlag, 2000.

....that they must resist quantum inverters. A quantum one way function is simply a classical function f : f0; 1g f0; 1g l(n) for which given any x 2 f0; 1g , f(x) can be eciently computed by a quantum computer but nding x 2 f (y) given y : f(x) when x 2R f0; 1g ) is hard. In [6], a concealing quantum bit commitment scheme is built from any quantum one way permutation. The resulting scheme, although improving the communication complexity of the known classical protocols, requires the same kind of assumption as in the classical case. In this paper, we show that the ....

....the opening of b. An adversary A of the binding condition who can open b = 0 with probability at least s 0 (n) and open b = 1 with probability at least s 1 (n) will be called a (s 0 (n) s 1 (n) adversary against the binding condition. We de ne the concealing and binding criteria similarly to [6]: computationally) binding: There exists no positive polynomial p(n) and quantum (s 0 (n) s 1 (n) adversary A such that s 0 (n) s 1 (n) 1 for n suciently large. The scheme is computationally binding if we add the restriction that k AkUG 2 poly(n) computationally) concealing: ....

Dumais, P., D. Mayers, and L. Salvail, \Perfectly Concealing Quantum Bit Commitment From Any Quantum One-Way Permutation", Advances in Cryptology : EUROCRYPT '00 : Proceedings, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1807, Springer-Verlag, 2000, pp. 300 - 315.

....except that they must resist quantum inverters. A quantum one way function is simply a clas sical function f: 0, 1 n 0, 1 l(n) for which given any x e 0, 1 n, f(x) Can be efficiently computed by a quantum computer but finding x e f (y) given y : f(x) when x es 0, 1 n) is hard. In [6], a concealing quantum bit com mitment scheme is built from any quantum one way permutation. The resulting scheme, although improving the communication complexity of the known classical protocols, requires the same kind of assumption as in the classical case. In this paper, we show that the ....

....to accept the opening of b. An adversary of the binding condition who can open b = 0 with probability at least So (n) and open b = i with probability at least s (n) will be called a (So (n) s (n) adversary against the binding condition. We define the concealing and binding criteria similarly to [6]: computationally) binding: There exists no positive polynomial p(n) and quantum (so(n) s(n) adversary such that so(n) s(n) for n sufficiently large. The scheme is computationally binding if we add the restriction that II.11u6 6 poly(n) computationally) concealing: For every interactive ....

DUMAIS, P., D. MAYERS, and L. SALVAIL, "Perfectly Concealing Quantum Bit Commitment From Any Quantum One-Way Permutation", Advances in Cryptology : EUROCRYPT '00: Proceedings, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1807, Springer-Verlag, 2000, pp. 300-315.

No context found.

P. Dumais, D. Mayers, and L. Salvail, \Perfectly concealing quantum bit commitment from any one-way permutation", Advances in Cryptology | EUROCRYPT 2000.

No context found.

Dumais, P., Mayers, D., and Salvail, L. Perfectly concealing quantum bit commitment from any quantum one-way permutation. In Advances in Cryptology---EUROCRYPT

No context found.

Dumais, P., D. Mayers, and L. Salvail, "Perfectly Concealing Quantum Bit Commitment From Any Quantum One-Way Permutation ", Advances in Cryptology : EUROCRYPT '00 : Proceedings, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1807, Springer-Verlag, 2000, pp. 300 -- 315.

No context found.

P. Dumais, D. Mayers, and L. Salvail, \Perfectly concealing quantum bit commitment from any one-way permutation", Advances in Cryptology | EUROCRYPT 2000, B. Preneel (Ed.), Lecture Notes in Computer Science 1807, Springer-Verlag, pp. 300-315, 2000.

Online articles have much greater impact   More about CiteSeer.IST   Add search form to your site   Submit documents   Feedback  

CiteSeer.IST - Copyright Penn State and NEC