Albert D. Baker. Metaphor or reality: A case study where agents bid with actual costs to schedule a factory. In Clearwater  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....results are formally restricted to rather special environments. Scheduling problems often exhibit complementarities and nonconvexities, which violate the ideal conditions for the welfare theorems or for particular market protocols. Prior work applying market inspired mechanisms to scheduling [2, 13, 18, 34, 35] and other distributed resource allocation problems [8, 16, 32, 43] has produced promising empirical results. Understanding the scope of these methods, and developing a general design methodology for computational markets, however, requires an analytical characterization of their properties. In ....

Albert D. Baker. Metaphor or reality: A case study where agents bid with actual costs to schedule a factory. In Clearwater

....can flexibly accommodate multiattribute optimization criteria. In this sense, CONTRACT NET might be viewed as a framework for decentralized supply chain formation, rather than a single, well defined protocol. However, the most obvious way to implement CONTRACT NET, evident in many adaptations [Baker, 1996; Davis and Smith, 1983; Dellarocas et al. 2000; Sandholm, 1993] is to apply the optimization criteria locally within a level, in a greedy fashion, without reflecting the negotiations at other levels in the evolving supply chain. In this approach, request for quotes (RFQs) propagate through the ....

Albert D. Baker. Metaphor or reality: A case study where agents bid with actual costs to schedule a factory. In Clearwater [1996] .

....results are formally restricted to rather special environments. Scheduling problems often exhibit complementarities and nonconvexities, which violate the ideal conditions for the welfare theorems or for particular market protocols. Prior work applying market inspired mechanisms to scheduling [1, 12, 19, 36, 37] and other distributed resource allocation problems [6, 16, 34, 46] has produced promising empirical results. Understanding the scope of these methods, and developing a general design methodology for computational markets, however, requires an analytical characterization of their properties. In ....

Albert D. Baker. Metaphor or reality: A case study where agents bid with actual costs to schedule a factory. In Clearwater [6]. AUCTION PROTOCOLS FOR DECENTRALIZED SCHEDULING 29

....applied to autonomous internal elements as well. 3. 2 What Becomes an Agent Previous research on agent based factory control and scheduling (including our own) differs widely on what is represented as an agent: levels in a hierarchical decomposition of the factory [7, 21, 36] Resources [2, 13, 25, 28], or Parts [9, 19] In selecting our agents, we want to begin with the broadest possible set of candidates. While some entities may prove unnecessary, it s easier to cast the net broadly and leave some for potential future elaboration than to build an architecture into which omitted entities ....

....and provides an entropy leak to drain second law entropy gain from the macro to the micro level. One example of such a dissipative mechanism is the flow of currency in a market economy. AARIA institutes artificial markets among the various agents, extending the mechanisms explored in other work [2, 18, 37, 39, 40]. In addition to enabling self organization among agents, this economic model provides a natural way to measure and trade off the relative importance of conflicting demands at each decision point. It uses the same dynamics that natural markets do to measure the relative values of goods that would ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

A. D. Baker. Metaphor or Reality: A Case Study Where Agents Bid With Actual Costs to Schedule a Factory. In S. H. Clearwater, Editor, Market-Based Control: A Paradigm for Distributed Resource Allocation, pages 184-223. World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., 1996.

....special environments. Scheduling problems often exhibit complementarities and nonconvexities, which violate the ideal conditions for the welfare theorems or for particular market protocols. 4 WELLMAN, WALSH, WURMAN, AND MACKIE MASON Prior work applying market inspired mechanisms to scheduling [1, 13, 20, 37, 38] and other distributed resource allocation problems [6, 17, 35, 47] has produced promising empirical results. Understanding the scope of these methods, and developing a general design methodology for computational markets, however, requires an analytical characterization of their properties. In ....

Albert D. Baker. Metaphor or reality: A case study where agents bid with actual costs to schedule a factory. In Clearwater [6].

....results are formally restricted to rather special environments. Scheduling problems often exhibit complementarities and nonconvexities, which violate the ideal conditions for the welfare theorems or for particular market protocols. Prior work applying market inspired mechanisms to scheduling [1, 12, 20, 36, 37] and other distributed resource allocation problems [6, 17, 34, 46] has produced promising empirical results. Understanding the scope of these methods, and developing a general design methodology for computational markets, however, requires an analytical characterization of their properties. In ....

Albert D. Baker. Metaphor or reality: A case study where agents bid with actual costs to schedule a factory. In Clearwater [6].

....these results are formally restricted to rather special environments. Scheduling problems often exhibit complementarities and nonconvexities, which violate the ideal conditions for the welfare theorems or for particular market protocols. Prior work applying market inspired mechanisms to scheduling [1, 12, 20, 36, 37] and other distributed resource allocation problems [6, 17, 34, 46] has produced promising empirical results. Understanding the scope of these methods, and developing a general design methodology for computational markets, however, requires an analytical characterization of their properties. In ....

Albert D. Baker. Metaphor or reality: A case study where agents bid with actual costs to schedule a factory. In Clearwater [6].

.... [69] In various studies, contract net model is proposed for dynamic on line manufacturing scheduling where each agent responsible for a manufacturing step gets its input by issuing request for bids to the agents who can supply that input and selecting the best bidder among them [53] 54] [1]. While Parunak [53] 54] discusses requirements for appropriate implementation of contract net to the manufacturing setting, Baker [1] presents an implementation of contract net in which actual accounting costs are used to generate bids which are in the form of unit cost as a function of delivery ....

.... for a manufacturing step gets its input by issuing request for bids to the agents who can supply that input and selecting the best bidder among them [53] 54] 1] While Parunak [53] 54] discusses requirements for appropriate implementation of contract net to the manufacturing setting, Baker [1] presents an implementation of contract net in which actual accounting costs are used to generate bids which are in the form of unit cost as a function of delivery time and lot size. As Parunak states, the contract net approach is suitable for systems with dynamic and stochastic events. Upton, ....

A. D. Baker. Metaphor or reality: A case study where agents bid with actual costs to schedule a factory. In S. H. Clearwater, editor, Market-Based Control: A Paradigm for Distributed Resource Allocation. World Scientific, River Edge, NJ, 1996.

....these results are formally restricted to rather special environments. Scheduling problems often exhibit complementarities and nonconvexities, which violate the ideal conditions for the welfare theorems or for particular market protocols. Prior work applying market inspired mechanisms to scheduling [1, 11, 17, 34, 35] and other distributed resource allocation problems [5, 14, 31, 42] has produced promising empirical results. Understanding the scope of these methods, and developing a general design methodology for computational markets, however, requires an analytical characterization of their properties. In ....

Albert D. Baker. Metaphor or reality: A case study where agents bid with actual costs to schedule a factory. In Clearwater [5].

....of computational market systems, we have found that decisions about good space typically drive an extensive chain of related design decisions [27] 3.2. 1 Time and Uncertainty One very common set of issues arises when goods have temporal extent, such as systems that schedule time in a factory [1], or on a CPU. In such cases, the time that a resource is available is a defining attribute. Today s newspaper is different than next week s, and today s newspaper available today is different than today s available next week. Of course, next week s newspaper available today would be the most ....

Albert D. Baker. Metaphor or reality: A case study where agents bid with actual costs to schedule a factory. In Clearwater [7].

....to achieve Pareto and system optima (or come within some tolerance of optimal) in some well characterized situations. Of course, all of these benefits do not automatically accrue as a result of setting up a market like environment. Prior work applying market inspired mechanisms to scheduling [2, 18, 21, 22] and other distributed computing problems [4] has produced promising empirical results. Understanding the scope of these methods, and developing a general design methodology for computational markets, however, requires an analytical characterization of their properties. In our own MOP work, we ....

Albert D. Baker. Metaphor or reality: A case study where agents bid with actual costs to schedule a factory. In Clearwater [4].

....design principled, effective, resource allocation protocols. Several researchers have performed in depth analyses of task allocation without hierarchical dependencies [1, 17, 20] Others have considered task allocation and scheduling that include variable costs, but not strict resource limitations [2, 5, 19]. I use a market oriented programming approach to solve task allocation and scheduling problems with hierarchical dependencies and resource limitations. In the market oriented approach, we characterize agent decisions as resource allocation problems. Market mechanisms facilitate agent negotiations ....

....negotiation. Contract net is a decentralized protocol that forms supply chains for problems with hierarchical subtask dependencies [5] Sandholm [19] describes a variant of contract net, in which tasks can be clustered to allow individual agents to bid for complementary inputs as a bundle. Baker [2] describes an extension to contract net to meet varying scheduling criteria. The variants of contract net produce satisficing allocations when there are sufficient resources. However, the basic protocol does not include mechanisms for handling resource scarcity or contention among multiple ....

Albert D. Baker. Metaphor or reality: A case study where agents bid with actual costs to schedule a factory. In Scott Clearwater, editor, Market-Based Control: A Paradigm for Distributed Resource Allocation. World Scientific, 1995.

.... environment [39] In various studies, the contract net model is proposed for dynamic on line manufacturing scheduling where each agent responsible for a manufacturing step gets its input by issuing request for bids to other agents who can supply that input and selecting the best bidder among them [27, 28, 1]. While Parunak [27, 28] discusses requirements for appropriate implementation of contract net to the manufacturing setting, Baker [1] presents an implementation of contract net in which actual accounting costs are used to generate bids which are in the form of unit cost as a function of delivery ....

.... for a manufacturing step gets its input by issuing request for bids to other agents who can supply that input and selecting the best bidder among them [27, 28, 1] While Parunak [27, 28] discusses requirements for appropriate implementation of contract net to the manufacturing setting, Baker [1] presents an implementation of contract net in which actual accounting costs are used to generate bids which are in the form of unit cost as a function of delivery time and lot size. As Parunak states, the contract net approach is suitable for systems with dynamic and stochastic events. Upton, ....

A. D. Baker. Metaphor or reality: A case study where agents bid with actual costs to schedule a factory. In S. H. Clearwater, editor, Market-Based Control: A Paradigm for Distributed Resource Allocation. World Scientific, River Edge, NJ, 1996.

No context found.

A. D. Baker, Metaphor or Reality: A Case Study where Agents Bid with Actual Costs to Schedule a Factory," in Market_Based Control: A Paradigm for Distributed Resource Allocation, S. H. Clearwater, Ed. River Edge, NJ: World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., 1996, pp. 184_223.

.... order R n or infinite (since the number of elements in the Real numbers R is infinite) Yet, the algorithms for finding the optimal machine sequence and start time for each task can be shown to be of order mn at each agent in the practical case where data structures remain bounded in length [3]. Intuitively, though the number of possible routings grows exponentially with the number of tasks in the job, the number of bids sent to each machine s agent remains bounded by m, as shown in Figure 3. Baker, Parunak, and Erol, Manufacturing over the Internet. 81 13 97 The practical ....

A. D. Baker, "Metaphor or Reality: A Case Study where Agents Bid with Actual Costs to Schedule a Factory," in MarketBased Control: A Paradigm for Distributed Resource Allocation, S. H. Clearwater, Ed. River Edge, NJ: World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., 1996, pp. 184-223.

....intersect at UP s. Previous research on agentbased factory control and scheduling (including our own) differs widely on what is represented as an agent: levels in a hierarchical decomposition of the factory (Butler Ohtsubo 92, Tilley Williams 92, Parunak 87) Resources (Shaw Whinston 85, Baker 96, Parunak et al. 87, Heaton 94) or Parts (Maley 88, Duffie et al. 88) In AARIA, Separate full fledged agents represent parts, resources and unit processes with substantially equal intelligence and responsibility in each type of agent. The AARIA system has a number of other important enhancements ....

....mechanism both generates a flow field to which agents can orient themselves and provides an entropy leak from the macro to the micro level. One such dissipative mechanism is currency flow in a market. AARIA draws on this dynamic by instituting markets among the agents, extending the methods of [Baker 96] To interface with the outside world (as Uniformity requires) AARIA s currency is denominated in dollars. Empowerment (Human stakeholders, including operators, manufacturing engineers, and managers, receive the information they need, with interfaces to let them control the system rather than ....

A.D.Baker, "Metaphor or Reality: A Case Study where Agents Bid with Actual Costs to Schedule a Factory." In S.H.Clearwater, ed., Market-Based Control: A Paradigm for Distributed Resource Allocation. Singapore: World Scientific.

Online articles have much greater impact   More about CiteSeer.IST   Add search form to your site   Submit documents   Feedback  

CiteSeer.IST - Copyright Penn State and NEC