Christian Cachin, Klaus Kursawe, Frank Petzold, and Victor Shoup. Secure and e#cient asynchronous broadcast protocols. In Joe Kilian, editor, Advances in Cryptology, Proceedings of CRYPTO  Home/Search Document Not in Database Summary Related Articles Check |
This paper is cited in the following contexts:
APSS: Proactive Secret Sharing in Asynchronous Systems - Zhou, Schneider, van Renesse (7 citations) (Correct)
....with no guarantee that a move to Fair Links was possible. Another proactive secret sharing protocol for asynchronous systems was recently described in [5] This protocol di ers from APSS in two signi cant ways: It employs a randomized multi valued validated Byzantine agreement protocol [6] so that all correct servers will agree on the set of subsharings to use in generating a new sharing for the secret. APSS eschews the agreement and instead generates multiple new sharings, each with a di erent label. There is no need to generate only one new sharing, so APSS does not need to run ....
C. Cachin, K. Kursawe, F. Petzold, and V. Shoulp. Secure and e cient asynchronous broadcast protocols (extended abstract). In J. Kilian, editor, Advances in Cryptology Crypto'2001.
Building Trusted Distributed Services Across Administrative .. - Maniatis, Giuli, Baker (2001) (3 citations) (Correct)
....is to provide permanent authenticated archival of these keys, but we do not ourselves provide that public key infrastructure. 4. 2 Veri able Consistent Broadcast Facility We require a veri able consistent broadcast facility, in this case, the echo broadcast facility used in [32]as reformulated in [4]. The protocol is veri able in that it allows a sender to broadcast a payload to a group, and compose a proof that a su cient number of group members has actually received the payload. It is consistent in that any group members receiving the payload will all receive the same payload. Note that the ....
.... number of nodes minus the maximum number of failures we can tolerate) We use this facility for all of our broadcast and agreement protocols for simplicity, even though a more e cient implementation might employ a distributed shared signing facility, as seen in the protocol formulations in [4]. In addition, although distributed shared signing is e cient to use, it generally assumes that group membership does not change, and we cannot make that assumption. If membership changes, we must negotiate new signing keys (the secret share signing key, the share veri cation keys, the signature ....
[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]
Cachin, C., Kursawe, K., Petzold, F., Shoup, V. Secure and E cient Asynchronous Broadcast Protocols. Research Report RZ 3317, IBM Research, March 2001.
Enabling the Long-Term Archival of Signed Documents.. - Maniatis, Giuli, Baker (2001) (3 citations) (Correct)
....nodes minus the maximum number of expected misbehaving group members. We use this facility for all of our broadcast and agreement protocols for simplicity, even though a more e cient implementation might employ a distributed shared signing facility, as seen in the protocol formulations in 15 [CKPS01] Although distributed shared signing is e cient to use, it generally involves an expensive re keying procedure when the group membership changes. Ways to perform such renegotiation without resorting to a trusted key dealer for di erent public key cryptosystems have been described [GJKR99, ....
....but we have not yet explored their feasibility for large groups of nodes. 5. 3 Veri able consistent broadcast facility Our agreement protocols require a veri able consistent broadcast facility, in this case, the echo broadcast facility used in [Rei94] and reformulated for shared signatures in [CKPS01] The protocol is called veri able because after a sender broadcasts a payload to a group, that sender can compose a proof that a su cient number of group members has actually received the payload. The protocol is also consistent, since it ensures that any group members receiving the payload will ....
[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]
Christian Cachin, Klaus Kursawe, Frank Petzold, and Victor Shoup. Secure and e cient asynchronous broadcast protocols. Technical Report RZ 3317, IBM Research, Zurich, Switzerland, March 2001.
Byzantine Fault Tolerance on General Hybrid Adversary Structures - Kursawe, Freiling (2005) (1 citation) Self-citation (Kursawe) (Correct)
No context found.
C. Cachin, K. Kursawe, F. Petzold, and V. Shoup. Secure and e#cient asynchronous broadcast protocols. In Advances in Cryptology -- CRYPTO ' 2001, Lecture Notes in Computer Science. International Association for Cryptologic Research, Springer-Verlag, 2001.
Byzantine Fault Tolerance on General Hybrid Adversary Structures - Kursawe, Freiling (2005) (1 citation) Self-citation (Kursawe) (Correct)
No context found.
C. Cachin, K. Kursawe, F. Petzold, and V. Shoup. Secure and e#cient asynchronous broadcast protocols. In Advances in Cryptology -- CRYPTO ' 2001, Lecture Notes in Computer Science. International Association for Cryptologic Research, Springer-Verlag, 2001.
Complete Specification of APIs and Protocols for the MAFTIA.. - Neves, (eds.) (2002) (1 citation) Self-citation (Cachin) (Correct)
....validates the value for which it decides. Second, the protocol can be biased towards a value b 1 by modifying the use of the threshold coin so that in the first round it always appears to have value b. 5.2.1. 3 Validated Multi valued Byzantine Agreement We describe the protocol VBA from [9] that realizes validated multi valued Byzantine agreement. The basic idea of the validated agreement protocol is that every party proposes its value as a candidate value for the final result. One party whose proposal satisfies the validation predicate is then selected in a sequence of binary ....
....not yet delivered the broadcast by the selected candidate, obtain the proposal from the validation returned by the Byzantine agreement. The full validated multi valued Byzantine agreement protocol is shown as Protocol 4. 5.2.1. 4 Reliable Broadcast MAFTIA middleware uses the protocol RBC from [9] (which is a simple adaptation of work of Bracha [6] to reduce message complexity) for reliable broadcast. This protocol uses the hash of a payload message as a short, but unique representation for the potentially much longer message. The idea is that the payload is sent only once by the sender to ....
[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]
C. Cachin, K. Kursawe, F. Petzold, and V. Shoup. Secure and e#cient asynchronous broadcast protocols (extended abstract). In Joe Kilian, editor, Advances in Cryptology: CRYPTO 2001.
On Fairness in Simulatability-based Cryptographic Systems - Backes, Hofheinz.. (2005) (Correct)
No context found.
Christian Cachin, Klaus Kursawe, Frank Petzold, and Victor Shoup. Secure and e#cient asynchronous broadcast protocols. In Joe Kilian, editor, Advances in Cryptology, Proceedings of CRYPTO
Revisiting Liveness Properties in the Context of Secure Systems - Gärtner (2002) (Correct)
No context found.
Christian Cachin, Klaus Kursawe, Frank Petzold, and Victor Shoup. Secure and e#cient asynchronous broadcast protocols. Record 2001/006, Cryptology ePrint Archive, January 2001. An extended abstract was published as [9].
Polynomial Liveness - Backes, Pfitzmann, Waidner, Steiner (2003) (Correct)
No context found.
C. Cachin, K. Kursawe, F. Petzold, and V. Shoup. Secure and e#cient asynchronous broadcast protocols. In Advances in Cryptology: CRYPTO 2001.
Polynomial Liveness - Backes, Pfitzmann, Waidner, Steiner (2003) (Correct)
No context found.
C. Cachin, K. Kursawe, F. Petzold, and V. Shoup. Secure and e#cient asynchronous broadcast protocols. In Advances in Cryptology: CRYPTO 2001.
Revisiting Liveness Properties in the Context of Secure Systems - Gärtner (2002) (Correct)
No context found.
Christian Cachin, Klaus Kursawe, Frank Petzold, and Victor Shoup. Secure and e#cient asynchronous broadcast protocols. Record 2001/006, Cryptology ePrint Archive, January 2001. An extended abstract was published as [9].
Online articles have much greater impact More about CiteSeer.IST Add search form to your site Submit documents Feedback
CiteSeer.IST - Copyright Penn State and NEC