| Kosslyn, S.M. & Hatfield, G. (1984). Representation without symbol systems. Social Research, 51, 1019-1054. |
.... biological side it appeals to those who believe that cognition can only be understood if we study it as neuroscience (e.g. Arbib, 1975; Sejnowski, 1981) It is also attractive to psychologists who think that much of the mind (including the part involved in using imagery) is not discrete (e.g. Kosslyn Hatfield, 1984), or who think that cognitive science has not paid enough attention to stochastic mechanisms or to holistic mechanisms (e.g. Lakoff, 1987) or to stochastic mechanisms, and so on and on. It also appeals to many young cognitive scientists who view the approach as not only ant establishment (and ....
....states and postulating representations with a combinatorial syntax and semantics is marked by distinguishing theories that postulate symbols from theories that postulate symbol systems. The latter theories, but not the former, are committed to a language of thought . For this usage, see Kosslyn Hatfield (1984) who take the refusal to postulate symbol systems to be the characteristic respect in which Connectionist architectures differ from Classical architectures. We agree with this diagnosis. 8 Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture structural relations among physical properties of the brain. ....
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Kosslyn, S.M. & Hatfield, G. (1984). Representation without symbol systems. Social Research, 51, 1019-1054.
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