Varela, F. J., Thompson, E. & Rosch, E. (1991) The embodied mind: Cognitive science and human experience. MIT Press: Cambridge, MA.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

.... approach that sees the production of human agency andmeaningmakingasaprocessofembodied action, made explicit or enacted through improvised, on the fly gestures and movements that spontaneously arise from theparticipants interactionwith each other as well as the proximal environment itself [7]. While the process of participants improvising or performing for each other without a pre determined script is constrained by the specific framing of the event (set length of time of engagement, numbers of simultaneous participants,architectural configurationofthe space, ritual of dressing ....

Varela, F., Thompson, E., and Rosch, E. The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991, pp.172-179.

....between symbolist, or Good Old Fashioned AI (GOFAI) and behavioral, or interactionist AI. The GOFAI interactionist distinction has shaped discourse both within AI and cognitive science [11, 12, 13] in cultural theoretic studies of AI [14] and in hybrid practice combining AI and cultural theory [15, 16, 17]. This debate has shaped much contemporary practice combining AI and cultural production, with practitioners commonly aligning themselves with the interactionist camp. Because of this connection with cultural practice, it will be useful to position expressive AI relative to this debate. In this ....

F. Varela, E. Thompson and E. Rosch, The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. (MIT Press, seventh printing 1999).

....regularities occurring at different time scales might require control systems that are able to process sensory motor information at different time scales and to detect amount of changes in amount of time. 1 Introduction A new research paradigm, that has been called Embodied Cognitive Science [1 4], has recently challenged the traditional view according to which intelligence is an abstract process that can be studied without taking into consideration the physical aspects of natural systems. In this new paradigm, researchers tend to stress (1) situatedness, i.e. the importance of studying ....

....its constituents parts, the body structure, and the environment. An important consequence of this view is that the agent and the environment constitutes a single system, i.e. the two aspects are so intimately connected that a description of each of them in isolation does not make much sense [1, 5]. By reviewing the results of a set of evolutionary experiments in which robots are free to develop their skills in close interaction with the environment [6] we will show that in many cases robots can solve complex problems in simple and effective ways by exploiting behaviors that emerge from ....

Varela F.J., Rosch E., and Thompson E. (1991). The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.

.... paradigm, research tends to stress the importance of situatedness (i.e. the importance of studying systems that are situated in an external environment) and embodiment (i.e. the importance of study systems that have bodies, receive input from their sensors and produce motor actions as output) (Varela, Thomson, and Rosch, 1991; Brooks, 1991; HendriksJansen, 1996; Clark, 1997; Pfeifer and Scheier, 1999) An attractive way to study systems that are embodied and situated is evolutionary robotics, i.e. the attempt to develop robots through a self organized process based on artificial evolution (Nolfi and Floreano, 2000) This approach ....

Varela F.J., Thompson E. and Rosch E. (1991) The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

....they identify other sources of order that have been overlooked or even neglected, out of general physical laws, genetic mechanisms and developmental constraints. In particular, we should cite Kauffman s work epitomized by his monograph [8] and the view of evolution by natural drift put forward in [20]. While in evolutionary biology exaptations and nonaptations are progressively becoming widely accepted concepts, the research communities of evolutionary computation and of computational approaches to the evolution of behaviour are still overly dominated by the adaptationist tradition. Quite ....

....of organisms are needed, but also of their environment. Very precisely Oyama ( 15] makes this point when writing that What is required for evolutionary change is not genetically encoded as opposed to acquired traits, but functioning developmental systems: ecologically embedded genomes. Also, in [20] the same idea is expressed when the authors state that Genes are, then, better conceived as elements that specify what in the environment must be fixed : In every successful reproduction an organism passes on genes as well as an environment in which these genes are embedded. In a more ....

F. Varela; E. Thompson & E. Rosch. The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, 1991. This article was processed using the L a T E X macro package with LLNCS style

....If used wisely and in conjunction with careful treatment of other parameters, these controlled random processes can yield musically interesting output. Lastly, we have begun to develop more sophisticated Players that incorporate ideas about the body, kinesthetics, and embodied cognition [13]. ....

Varela, F., E. Thompson, and E. Rosch, 1991. The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. Cambridge, MIT Press.

....http: www.cogsci.soton.ac. uk bbs Archive bbs.thelen.html (4 of 74) 3 22 2000 10:45:34] Glenberg 1997; Gibson 1969; Harnad 1990; Johnson 1987; Lakoff 1987; Lakoff Johnson 1990; Merleau Ponty 1963; Pfeiffer Scheier 1999; Sheets Johnstone, 1990; Talmy 1988; Thelen 1995; Thelen Smith 1994; Varela et al. 1991. In this target article, we contribute to this multidisciplinary effort by focusing in considerable detail on a particular, and controversial, phenomenon seen in human infants, the so called, A not B error. We present theory, a model, simulations, and experiments that recast this phenomenon in ....

Varela, F. J., Thompson, E. & Rosch, E.(1991) The embodied mind: Cognitive science and human experience. MIT Press.

.... the physical and chemical complexity of the nervous system, it was possible to build their abstract model neurons into networks 3 The distal idea is a close conceptual neighbour of Von Uexk ull s Umwelt (Von Uexkuell, 1921) Gibson s affordances (Gibson, 1979) and Varela s enaction (Varela et al. 1991). 6 capable of computing all boolean (logical) functions. Their first simplification arose from the observation that neural communication is thresholded. That is, the spike action potential is all or none; it is either active enough to fire fully or it does not fire at all. This is similar to ....

....to the world; it is the interplay between beings and their world that creates minds. For example the organism must find a way to classify its own distal behaviour. Although there have been a number of worthwhile modern texts on the relationship between the new approach to mind and robotics, e.g. (Varela et al. 1991), it is to the earlier work of the biologist philosopher developmental psychologist Jean Piaget that we turn for inspiration. 4.1 Piaget and the emergence of intelligence In his genetic epistemology, Piaget (e.g. Piaget, 1950) developed a theory of how humans develop from immature biological ....

Varela, F., Thompson, E., and Rosch, E. (1991). The Embodied Mind: cognitive science and human experience. MIT Press, Cambridge MA.

....place the investigated ontologies and related technologies in these dimensions. In order to cut the notion of context down to a manageable size, we first make the distinction among three fundamentally different means by which software technology embodies context. Along the lines of Varala et al. [VAR91], these technologies are enactive, emergent, and symbolic . Neural nets could be viewed as representative of enactive technology. In neural nets, an associative memory embodies the relationship between demands and behaviors in response to those demands, that is, context is reflected in the ....

Varela, Francisco J., Thompson, Evan and Rosch, Elanor, "The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience" The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1991.

....the study of critical phenomena involved in the pathways that lead to one computation or another) among others. 5. 4 Enaction To some extent Enact is inspired by conceptual issues embedded in enaction, a research programme in cognitive science identified in [Varela 89] and further extended in [Varela et al. 91] The central aspect in enaction is the decrease of emphasis on the role of representations in the understanding of cognitive phenomena. In enaction representations do not really exist as suggested by enactment of a play , but are simply interpretations that can be deliberately attributed ....

F. Varela; E. Thompson, & E. Rosch. The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, 1991.

....the human mind is very much like a computer program. This has led decades of traditional AI research to fall into the internalist trap (Sharkey and Jackson 1994) of focusing solely on disembodied computer programs and internal representations supposed to mirror a pre given external reality (cf. Varela et al. 1991), while forgetting about the need for grounding and embedding these in the world they were actually supposed to represent. Hence, for cognitive scientists the use of embodied, situated agents offers an alternative, bottom up approach to the study of intelligent behavior in general, and internal ....

....and (5) what the correspondences between the two worlds are. Thus, the cognitivist view of the relation between internal model and external world was as illustrated in Figure 2, i.e. representation was seen as internal mirror of an observerindependent, pre given external reality (cf. also Varela et al. 1991). CHAIR FURNITURE TABLE is a is a mapping representational domain world contains representational contains objects entities (e.g. symbols) which represent objects and concepts in the world Figure 2: The idea of traditional AI representation as a direct mapping between internal ....

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Varela, Francisco J.; Thompson, Evan and Rosch, Eleanor (1991). The Embodied Mind Cognitive Science and Human Experience. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

....Uexkull, the organism s components are forged into a coherent unit that acts as a behavioural entity. It is a subject that, through functional embedding, forms a systematic whole with its Umwelt. Similar ideas have begun to emerge in robotics as part of a new enactive cognitive science approach, [51], and there is broad support in the field of embodied cognition where there is a reassessment of the relevance of life and biological embodiment for the study of cognition and intelligent behaviour, e.g. 15, 13, 36, 58, 34, 61, 62] Two of the principals of the new approach, Maturana and Varela ....

....Maturana and Varela [29, 30] have proposed that cognition is first and foremost a biological phenomenon. For them, all living systems are cognitive systems, and living as a process is a process of cognition [29] In this framework, cognition is viewed as embodied action by which Varela et al. [51] mean . first, that cognition depends upon the kinds of experience that come from having a body with various sensorimotor capacities, and second, that these individual sensorimotor capacities are themselves embedded in a more encompassing biological, psychological, and cultural context . Thus, ....

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F. Varela, E. Thompson, and E. Rosch. The Embodied Mind - Cognitive Science and Human Experience. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1991.

....with the environment. But many researchers in cognitive science doubt that this has anything to do with higher cognitive processes. It has been argued elsewhere that, in essence, so called high level cognition is emergent from sensory motor processes, i.e. it is grounded through embodiment [6, 11, 25, 29, 31]. For example, the embodied origins of categorization, i.e. the ability to make distinctions in the real world and to form abstract categories, and memory processes have been discussed by these authors. It turns out that if we look at the mechanisms underlying the so called high level processes ....

Varela, F. J., Thompson, E., and Rosch, E. (1991). The embodied mind: Cognitive science and human experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

....This change does not indicate, however, that the reticular system is the controller of wakefulness. That system is, rather, a form of architecture in the brain that permits certain internal coherences to arise. But when these coherences arise, they are not simply due to any particular system. (Varela et al. 1991, p.94) 6 We shall not dwell further on this style of complexity induced intra neural causal spread. For causal spread does not always require impressive levels of neural complexity. Neither does it recognize the peripheries of the nervous system or the skin as crucial boundaries. Thus consider ....

....laying stress on the causal and explanatory contributions made by the agent s non neural body and her environment, theorists who embrace causal spread often display a marked hostility to the representation centred explanatory vocabulary that is at the heart of most cognitive science. For example, Varela et al. 1991) claim that their approach to cognition questions the centrality of the notion that cognition is fundamentally representation (p.9) And in discussing her robot implementation of the theory of cricket phonotaxis described earlier, Webb declares her mistrust of representational interpretations. ....

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Varela, F. J., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (1991). The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. and London, England.

.... as the study of computational models of biological phenomena and life as it could be (Langton, 1989) Moreover autonomous agents are increasingly being studied as a bottom up approach by researchers in cognitive science, in particular those interested in Situated and or Embodied Cognition (e.g. Varela et al. 1991; Hendriks Jansen, 1996; Clark, 11 1997; Pfeifer Scheier, 1998) who emphasize the situated nature of activity and the bodily sensorimotor basis of cognition and intelligent behavior. Finally, the above approaches are also referred to as New AI (e.g. Dorffner, 1997a) or Nouvelle AI (e.g. ....

....lack simulated or physical body, sensors, motors, etc. but, unlike traditional AI systems, they directly interact with a complex (software) environment. There is, however, a clear distinction to be made between agents that possess a body (or a realistic simulation of it) and those which do not (Varela et al. 1991). Considering early behavior oriented AI s emphasis on embodiment and the presumed role of sensory motor skills for the development of higher cognitive capacities (cf. section 2.1) software agents can be considered a step back from the AI cognitive science point of view. Hence, the rest of ....

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Varela, F. J., Thompson, E. & Rosch, E. (1991). The Embodied Mind - Cognitive Science and Human Experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

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Varela, F. J., Thompson, E. & Rosch, E. (1991) The embodied mind: Cognitive science and human experience. MIT Press: Cambridge, MA.

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Varela, F. J., Thompson, E. & Rosch, E. (1991) The embodied mind: Cognitive science and human experience. MIT Press: Cambridge, MA.

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F. Varela, E. Thompson, and E. Rosch. The Embodied Mind: cognitive science and human experience. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1991.

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F.J. Varela, E. Thompson, and E. Rosch, The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience, MIT Press, 1991.

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Varela, F.J., E. Thompson, and E. Rosch, The embodied mind : cognitive science and human experience. 1991, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

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Varela, F., Thompson, E. & Rosch, E. The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 1991

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Varela, F.J., Rosch, E. & Thompson, E. (1991). The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.

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Varela, F.J. et al. (1991) The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press

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Varela, F. J., Thompson, E. and Rosch, E. (1991) The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

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Varela, Francisco J.; Thompson, Evan and Rosch, Eleanor (1991). The Embodied Mind Cognitive Science and Human Experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

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