Leendert van Doorn, Martn Abadi, Michael Burrows, and Edward Wobber. Secure network objects. In Proceedings of the 1996 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, Oakland, California, May 1996. Home/Search Document Details and Download
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Analysis of Distribution Structures: State of the Art - Boreale, De Nicola.. (2002) (1 citation) (Correct)
....by value or by reference. Objects 12 are passive entities and they do not possess mechanism for synchronization based on method calls and they are not persistent. Since Modula 3 is strongly typed, the majority of checking is performed statically. Moreover the extension Secure Network Objects [DABW99] extends the library with operations for guaranteeing integrity and non repudiation of references and objects. 5.4 Oz Oz [Smo95] is a language based on logic programming through constraints (CLP) thus it is based on rules (a formula of first order logic with values and variables) The store is ....
Leendert van Doorn, Martn Abadi, Michael Burrows, and Edward Wobber. Secure Network Objects. In Vitek and Jensen [VJ99], pages 395--412.
Validating a Web Service Security Abstraction by Typing - Gordon, Pucella (2002) (7 citations) (Correct)
....Our main innovation is the idea of formalizing the authentication guarantees offered by a security abstraction by embedding correspondence assertions in its semantics. On the other hand, our high level abstraction is fairly standard, and is directly inspired by work on secure network objects [34]. Although the rather detailed description of our model and its semantics may seem complex, the actual cryptographic protocol is actually quite simple. Still, we believe our framework and its implementation are a solid foundation for developing more sophisticated protocols and their abstractions. ....
....and encrypted call A call from a client to a web service is made up of two messages, the request from the client to the web service, and the response from the web service to the client. The inspiration for the security levels, and the guarantees they provide, comes from SRC Secure Network Objects [34]. An authenticated web method call provides a guarantee of integrity (that the request that the service receives is exactly the one sent by the client and that the response that the client receives is exactly the one sent by the service as a response to this request) and at most once semantics ....
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L. van Doorn, M. Abadi, M. Burrows, and E. Wobber. Secure network objects. In 211--221, 1996.
Capability-based Financial Instruments - Miller, Morningstar, Frantz (2000) (37 citations) (Correct)
....VatA VatC VatB b1 VatID SwissNumber Joe Fig. 5. Pluribus in operation. The description so far applies equally well to many distributed object systems, such as CORBA and RMI, that have no ambitions to capability security. What more do we need to make this into a secure protocol (See also [4, 9, 10, 32, 40]) 4.2 Cryptographic Capabilities On creation, each vat generates a public private key pair. The fingerprint of the vat s public key is its vat Identity, or VatID. What does the VatID identify The VatID can only be said to designate any vat which knows and uses the corresponding private key ....
Leendert van Doorn, Martn Abadi, Michael Burrows, and Edward P. Wobber. "Secure Network Objects" in Proceedings of the
Secure Implementation of Channel Abstractions - Mart Abadi Abadi (1998) (9 citations) Self-citation (Abadi) (Correct)
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Leendert van Doorn, Martn Abadi, Mike Burrows, and Edward Wobber. Secure network objects. In Proceedings of the 1996.
Secure Implementation of Channel Abstractions - Abadi, Fournet (1999) (21 citations) Self-citation (Abadi) (Correct)
....not be concerned with the details of key establishment and management, but should instead rely on abstractions and services that encapsulate cryptographic operations. In recent years, several APIs (application program interfaces) for security have appeared, providing such abstractions and services [28, 27, 33, 29, 9, 25, 42]. Although there are substantial differences between these APIs, they generally offer the promise of making application code more modular, simpler, and ultimately more robust. In this paper, we consider high level abstractions that largely hide the difficulties of network security from ....
....of ways. In the local case, the implementation can rely on a local operating system, whereas in the distributed case it involves a network connection and a key. Similarly, the application code may include a method invocation, which may look the same whether the method invocation is local or remote [42, 43, 41]. Security for remote method invocations may be guaranteed by the transport implementation, fairly transparently to the application. Up to now, the design and implementation of abstractions for secure communication has been more an art than a science. In particular, little is known on how to ....
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Leendert van Doorn, Mart'in Abadi, Mike Burrows, and Edward Wobber. Secure network objects. In Proceedings of the
Secure Implementation of Channel Abstractions - Abadi, Fournet, Gonthier (1998) (21 citations) Self-citation (Abadi) (Correct)
....not be concerned with the details of key establishment and management, but should instead rely on abstractions and services that encapsulate cryptographic operations. In recent years, several APIs (application program interfaces) for security have appeared, providing such abstractions and services [22, 23, 26, 24, 9, 21, 34]. Although there are substantial di#erences among these APIs, they generally o#er the promise of making application code more modular, simpler, and ultimately more robust. In this paper we consider high level abstractions that largely hide the di#culties of network security from applications. ....
....case, the implementation of the secure channel can rely on a local operating system, whereas in the distributed case it involves a network connection and a key. Similarly, the application code may include a method invocation, which may look the same whether the method invocation is local or remote [34, 35, 33]. Security for remote method invocations may be guaranteed by the transport implementation, fairly transparently to the application. Up to now, the design and implementation of abstractions for secure communication has been more an art than a science. In particular, little is known on how to ....
[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]
L. van Doorn, M. Abadi, M. Burrows, and E. Wobber. Secure network objects. In Proceedings
Secure Implementation of Channel Abstractions - Abadi, Fournet (2000) (21 citations) Self-citation (Abadi) (Correct)
....not be concerned with the details of key establishment and management, but should instead rely on abstractions and services that encapsulate cryptographic operations. In recent years, several APIs (application program interfaces) for security have appeared, providing such abstractions and services [29, 28, 34, 30, 9, 26, 43]. Although there are substantial di#erences between these APIs, they generally o#er the promise of making application code more modular, simpler, and ultimately more robust. In this paper, we consider high level abstractions that largely hide the difficulties of network security from applications. ....
....of ways. In the local case, the implementation can rely on a local operating system, whereas in the distributed case it involves a network connection and a key. Similarly, the application code may include a method invocation, which may look the same whether the method invocation is local or remote [43, 44, 42]. Security for remote method invocations may be guaranteed by the transport implementation, fairly transparently to the application. Up to now, the design and implementation of abstractions for secure communication has been more an art than a science. In particular, little is known on how to ....
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Leendert van Doorn, Martn Abadi, Mike Burrows, and Edward Wobber. Secure network objects. In Proceedings of the 1996 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 211--221, May 1996.
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Leendert van Doorn, Martn Abadi, Michael Burrows, and Edward Wobber. Secure network objects. In Proceedings of the 1996 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, Oakland, California, May 1996.
Paradigm Regained: Abstraction Mechanisms for Access Control - Miller, Shapiro (2003) (2 citations) (Correct)
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L. van Doorn, M. Abadi, M. Burrows, E. P. Wobber. "Secure Network Objects" Proceedings of the 1996 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, p. 211--221.
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L. van Doorn, M. Abadi, M. Burrows, and E. Wobber. Secure network objects. In IEEE Computer Society Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy, pages 211--221, 1996.
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L. van Doorn, M. Abadi, M. Burrows, and E. Wobber. Secure network objects. In Proceedings of the 1996 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 211-221, May 1996.
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