Trapa, P.E. & Nowak. M.A. (2000) Nash equilibria for an evolutionary language game, J. Math. Biol., 41, pp. 172--188.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles

....a high reputation (or standing in the group) and are more influential as language teachers. The assumption is that language performance measured by the function F contributes to the rate with which each language is spread. The function F defines the equilibria of the language game equation. In [Trapa Nowak 2000], such equilibria (called the Nash equilibria) were found. In this paper, we show that the result of [Trapa Nowak 2000] continues to hold if the requirement of self consistency is imposed. In other words, all the stable and neutrally stable states of the language system can be attained even if ....

....performance measured by the function F contributes to the rate with which each language is spread. The function F defines the equilibria of the language game equation. In [Trapa Nowak 2000] such equilibria (called the Nash equilibria) were found. In this paper, we show that the result of [Trapa Nowak 2000] continues to hold if the requirement of self consistency is imposed. In other words, all the stable and neutrally stable states of the language system can be attained even if the production and comprehension modes are cognitively related. We also characterize all the evolutionarily stable ....

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Trapa, P.E. & Nowak. M.A. (2000) Nash equilibria for an evolutionary language game, J. Math. Biol., 41, pp. 172--188.

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