W. Arbaugh, N. Shankar, and Y.C. Wan. Your 802.11 wireless network has no clothes. Technical report, Dept. of Computer Science, University of Maryland, March 2001.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....packet processing increases, which may have a non negligible affect on the end to end delay. What is worse is that WEP has some well known security design flaws and it also lacks a mechanism for dynamic key distribution, which makes it unsuitable for AAA usage as well as a means to achieve privacy [6,7,8]. Therefore, initiatives has been taken both to improve and to replace WEP. The latter choice will be covered in the next section. 2.1.2 802.11, Future trends To remedy the problems of WEP, the 802.11 Task Group I (Tgi) was given the task to define the integration adaptation of 802.1X[9] ....

W. A. Arbaugh, N. Shankar, and Y. J. Wan. Your 802.11 wireless network has no clothes. http://www.cs.umd.edu/waa/wireless.pdf, Mar. 2001.

....thousands of installations ranging from large corporations to home users, and millions of devices sold. Wired Equivalent Privacy. Unfortunately, IEEE 802.11 has significant security problems. WEP data integrity is vulnerable to attack [BGW01] and its authentication mechanisms may be defeated [ASW01]. Moreover, the encryption protocol used in WEP has been severely compromised [FMS01, SIR02] and WEP cracking software is widely available off the Internet (cf. Air02] Many parties, including vendors (Lucent Agere [ORi02] Cisco [Cis02] and others) and the IEEE P802.11 working group ....

....host will simply not receive the new keys. An advantageous side effect of WEP is that the impact of the [FMS01, SIR02] attack is reduced if the keys expire fast enough. We further propose a variant of the basic WEP , called WEP , which also fixes some of the authentication problems observed by [BGW01, ASW01]. Clearly, WEP is not an ideal solution, and does not address all the security problems that IEEE 802.11 suffers from. However, what makes WEP worthwhile is that it is 100 compatible with the existing standard. It does not require new message formats, protocols, or encryption software. Unlike ....

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W. A. Arbaugh, N. Shankar, and Y. C. J. Wan. Your 802.11 wireless network has no clothes. In IEEE International Conference on Wireless LAN's and Home Networks, 2001. To appear in IEEE Personal Communication Magazine.

....impersonation, and fabrication exploits against ad hoc routing protocols. In Section 5, we propose a protocol not exploitable in these ways. Our focus is on vulnerabilities and exposures that result from the specification of the ad hoc routing protocol, and not from problems with IEEE 802.11 [2, 4, 18]. Additionally, trivial denial of service attacks based on interception and noncooperation are possible in all ad hoc routing protocols. While these attacks are possible, they are not achieved through subversion of the routing protocol. The attacks presented below are described in terms of the ....

W. Arbaugh, N. Shankar, and Y.C. Wan. Your 802.11 wireless network has no clothes. Technical report, Dept. of Computer Science, University of Maryland, March 2001.

....can be used for protection against them. In fact, any mobile device that permits the changing of their universal identi ers (IP address, MAC address, international mobile subscriber identity, etc. without major diculties (via software, for example) can be used. As has been observed by Arbaugh [15], most current wireless cards do. If this is true, there is not reason for not having mobile phones and other mobile devices boasted as MIDs, with similar facilities. Naturally, for a commercial implementation we would need that current mobile support stations (mobile phone base stations, for ....

William A. Arbaugh. Your 802.11 wireless network has no clothes. http://www.cs.umd.edu/ waa/wireless.html, March 2001.

....et. al [19] and by Walker [24] The serious flaws in the WEP checksum (see Section 4) however, to the best of our knowledge have not been reported before. After our work was completed, Arbaugh et. al have found several extensions that may make these weaknesses even more dangerous in practice [2, 1]. 2.2 Attack Practicality Before describing the attacks, we would like to discuss the feasibility of mounting them in practice. In addition to the cryptographic considerations discussed in the sections to follow, a common barrier to attacks on communication subsystems is access to the ....

....in practice. This attack on the authentication protocol was E There are sophisticated physical layer attacks that may be able to monitor a packet being sent and jam the receiver at the same time; at best such attacks would allow to reuse an IV once. also discovered independently by Arbaugh et al. [2] based on a preliminary version of our results. 4.4 Message Decryption What may be surprising is that the ability to modify encrypted packets without detection can also be leveraged to decrypt messages sent over the air. Consider WEP from the point of view of the adversary. Since WEP uses a ....

W. A. Arbaugh, N. Shankar, and Y. J. Wan. Your 802.11 wireless network has no clothes. http://www.cs.umd.edu/waa/wireless.pdf , Mar. 2001.

....et. al [19] and by Walker [24] The serious flaws in the WEP checksum (see Section 4) however, to the best of our knowledge have not been reported before. After our work was completed, Arbaugh et. al have found several extensions that may make these weaknesses even more dangerous in practice [2, 1]. 2.2 Attack Practicality Before describing the attacks, we would like to discuss the feasibility of mounting them in practice. In addition to the cryptographic considerations discussed in the sections to follow, a common barrier to attacks on communication subsystems is access to the ....

....practice. This attack on the authentication protocol was # There are sophisticated physical layer attacks that may be able to monitor a packet being sent and jam the receiver at the same time; at best such attacks would allow to reuse an IV once. also discovered independently by Arbaugh et al. [2] based on a preliminary version of our results. 4.4 Message Decryption What may be surprising is that the ability to modify encrypted packets without detection can also be leveraged to decrypt messages sent over the air. Consider WEP from the point of view of the adversary. Since WEP uses a ....

W. A. Arbaugh, N. Shankar, and Y. J. Wan. Your 802.11 wireless network has no clothes. http://www.cs.umd.edu/waa/wireless.pdf, Mar. 2001.

....et. al [19] and by Walker [24] The serious flaws in the WEP checksum (see Section 4) however, to the best of our knowledge have not been reported before. After our work was completed, Arbaugh et. al have found several extensions that may make these weaknesses even more dangerous in practice [2, 1]. 2.2 Attack Practicality Before describing the attacks, we would like to discuss the feasibility of mounting them in practice. In addition to the cryptographic considerations discussed in the sections to follow, a common barrier to attacks on communication subsystems is access to the ....

....practice. This attack on the authentication protocol was 4 There are sophisticated physical layer attacks that may be able to monitor a packet being sent and jam the receiver at the same time; at best such attacks would allow to reuse an IV once. also discovered independently by Arbaugh et al. [2] based on a preliminary version of our results. 4.4 Message Decryption What may be surprising is that the ability to modify encrypted packets without detection can also be leveraged to decrypt messages sent over the air. Consider WEP from the point of view of the adversary. Since WEP uses a ....

W. A. Arbaugh, N. Shankar, and Y. J. Wan. Your 802.11 wireless network has no clothes. http://www.cs.umd.edu/waa/wireless.pdf, Mar. 2001.

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W. Arbaugh, N. Shankar, and Y.C. Wan. Your 802.11 wireless network has no clothes. Technical report, Dept. of Computer Science, University of Maryland, March 2001.

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W. Arbaugh, N. Shankar, and Y.C. Wan. Your 802.11 wireless network has no clothes. Technical report, Dept. of Computer Science, University of Maryland, March 2001.

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