Ballim, A. and Wilks, Y. (1991) Artificial Believers: The Ascription of Belief. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 23  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....nothing, then wiseman #2 knows that wiseman #3 does not know the color of his card. Active logic is particularly well suited to this type of deduction since it focuses on the actual individual deductive steps. Others have studied this problem (e.g. see [ Konolige, 1986, Kraus and Lehmann, 1988, Ballim and Wilks, 1991 ] from the perspective of logically closed reasoning, in which each agent already knows all the logical consequences of his beliefs, and thus are not able to address this temporal aspect of the problem: assessing what others have been able to conclude so far . In [ Fagin et al. 1995a ] Fagin, ....

Afzal Ballim and Yorick Wilks. Artificial Believers: The Ascription of Belief. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1991.

....[Hintikka, 1962; Creary, 1979; Levesque, 1984; Moore, 1980; Wilks and Bien, 1983; Konolige, 1986; Rapaport, belief and not at all be concerned with truth, which is generally viewed as a necessary ingredient of knowledge. For us a false belief is as good as any other. 2 1986; Rapaport, 1992; Ballim and Wilks, 1991] for a small selection. On the formal end of the spectrum are the various epistemic and doxastic logics, many of them modal in nature and inspired by Hintikka s famous treatment of knowledge and belief [Hintikka, 1962] On the more psychologically oriented end are systems such as Viewgen [Ballim ....

....1991] for a small selection. On the formal end of the spectrum are the various epistemic and doxastic logics, many of them modal in nature and inspired by Hintikka s famous treatment of knowledge and belief [Hintikka, 1962] On the more psychologically oriented end are systems such as Viewgen [Ballim and Wilks, 1991], or ViewFinder [Ballim, 1992] We feel, however, that none of these formalisms is fully adequate to serve as the foundation upon which to build an actual computational agent. They neglect either representation problems, or the reasoning aspect, or the defeasibility that is inherent in reasoning ....

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A. Ballim and Y. Wilks. Artificial Believers: The Ascription of Belief. Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ, 1991.

....only those beliefs consistent with those represented as being held privately. The results are thus substantially different from those obtained in classical logics [ Allen, 1983; Kraus and Lehmann, 1988; Appelt, 1985; Cohen and Levesque, 1990 ] They differ from other path based algorithms [ Ballim and Wilks, 1991 ] in the provision of semantic relevance conditions and in addressing the need for shared attitudes by ascribing them directly to groups, rather than by maintaining complex accounts of which agents believe what. This allows us to describe and process conversational mechanics without recourse to ....

Afzal Ballim and Yorick Wilks. Artificial Believers: The Ascription of Belief. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1991.

....formal definitions, examples of active logics, and a semantics. The subsequent sections then describe particular types of problems we have been able to solve using this formal approach. Section 3 describes the ease with which we can use active logics to do non monotonic reasoning. In Section 4 we present an example of using active logics to reason about others reasoning. Section 5 describes the ease with which active logics can reason in the midst of contradictions. In Section 6 we present several scenarios involving the ability of an active logic to deal with changes in the underlying ....

.... but also primary semantics (Sem) a notion of inference (inf) and a completeness theorem (Comp) Below we show the classification for first order logic (FOL) second order logic (SOL) default logic (DL) circumscription (CIRC) autoepistemic logic (AEL) and active logic (AL) The table in Figure 4 shows, for instance, that a first order logic has a fixed language and theorem set, theorems can be characterized either by semantics or by inference, and that these coincide due to the appropriate completeness result. In SOL, inferential and semantic notions of theorem do not coincide: there is ....

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Afzal Ballim and Yorick Wilks. Artificial Believers: The Ascription of Belief. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1991.

.... type of ATMS studied by Kelleher van der Gaag 1993) 6 BELIEF REASONING The central, but not the only, mode of belief reasoning in ATT Meta is simulative reasoning (SR) SR has been proposed by a number of investigators as a relatively efficient technique for reasoning about agents beliefs (Ballim Wilks 1991, Chalupsky 1993, Creary 1979, Dinsmore 1991, Haas 1986, Konolige 1986, Moore 1973; although Konolige describes as simulation what we call explicit meta reasoning, and calls SR a form of attachment ) An SR system can intuitively be described as going into the agent s belief space, and reasoning ....

Ballim, A. & Wilks, Y. (1991). Artificial believers: The ascription of belief. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum.

....A drawback of syntactic theories is that they need to employ a complicated quotation machinery to deal with nested beliefs, and that they seem to be unintuitive. Haas theory also does not deal with defeasibility. On the more psychologically oriented end of the spectrum are systems such as Viewgen [Ballim and Wilks, 1991], which its authors call a highly pragmatic approach [Ballim et al. 1991] Viewgen, too, does not deal with issues of defeasibility and belief revision, and it only does very limited reasoning with the beliefs it ascribes to other agents. In the following, I will describe how in a propositional ....

....machinery to deal with nested beliefs, and that they seem to be unintuitive. Haas theory also does not deal with defeasibility. On the more psychologically oriented end of the spectrum are systems such as Viewgen [Ballim and Wilks, 1991] which its authors call a highly pragmatic approach [Ballim et al. 1991]. Viewgen, too, does not deal with issues of defeasibility and belief revision, and it only does very limited reasoning with the beliefs it ascribes to other agents. In the following, I will describe how in a propositional semantic network formalism such as SNePS we can achieve an elegant solution ....

Afzal Ballim and Yorick Wilks. Artificial Believers: The Ascription of Belief. Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ, 1991.

....group, for example: O is a Quaker O believes that war should be avoided at all costs. O is a logician O knows the most basic results of logic. In such cases, where a particular group of persons is involved, one often speaks of a stereotype with which particular beliefs are associated (cf. Ballim and Wilks, 1991; Hustadt, 1995; Kobsa and Pohl, 1995 ] among many others) The above mentioned problem of determining which beliefs can safely be ascribed to all group members is just as acute when a specific group like these is involved. As is well known, there are Quakers who do not hold the above mentioned ....

....1993 ] and normative analyses have shown that there is often considerable justification for this tendency (see, e.g. Hoch, 1987; Dawes, 1989 ] and Section 9.3. 2 below) In a nonprobabilistic form, this basic idea can be used by a system to ascribe general background knowledge (see, e.g. Ballim and Wilks, 1991, chap. 3 ] In our example domain of used cars, S would assume (most plausibly by default, as discussed in 9.2.3) that O has the same general knowledge about cars that S has. This approach suffers from the same fundamental problem as the approach that uses group membership as evidence, namely ....

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Afzal Ballim and Yorick Wilks. Artificial Believers: The Ascription of Belief. Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ, 1991.

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Ballim, A. and Wilks, Y. (1991) Artificial Believers: The Ascription of Belief. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 23

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Ballim, A., & Wilks, Y. (1991). Artificial believers: The ascription of belief. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

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