| Davidson 1967 D. Davidson, Causal Relations, Journal of Philosophy 64:691-703, 1967. |
.... causal explanation rather than causality, since it includes purely logical notions (observe that A is a causal factor of B if A is a logical consequence of B ) and an event may indeed have a singular cause, even though explaining why that event happened may require the invocation of many factors (Davidson 1967, Lewis 1973) So we call it a WB analysis (for Why. Because. 2. Use of the Lewis semantics leads us to the technical problem of handling overdetermination: the occurrence of two or more independent causal factors B and C for A that are individually sufficient 3. The Lewis semantics alone is ....
Davidson 1967 D. Davidson, Causal Relations, Journal of Philosophy 64:691-703, 1967.
....to situations and for representing causal relationships among situations. Hwang and Schubert, to appear, x2, 3 ] Indeed, I suggest that the idea that sentences should be taken to completely describe situations prevents the representation of causal relationships, as argued by Davidson [ Davidson, 1967a ] and that a Davidsonian treatment of events [ Davidson, 1967b ] provides all that Hwang and Schubert require in terms of minimal episodes supporting a sentence. A nal detail of EL, relevant for the next section, concerns the orderings on episodes. Hwang and Schubert introduce two such ....
Donald Davidson. Causal relations. Journal of Philosophy, 64:691-703, 1967.
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